LGM-35A Sentinel - Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program

Wasn't aware he actually tried to do anything Must have been impressive indeed.
 
sferrin said:
Wasn't aware he actually tried to do anything Must have been impressive indeed.

Add some bipartisan incompetence the "Land Based Strategic Deterrent" was supposed to deploy in 2018. Republicans and Democrats killed it in committee IIRC.
 
sferrin said:
Wasn't aware he actually tried to do anything Must have been impressive indeed.

In the worst possible sense of the word, yes. 'Minuteman IV' in this context was the nickname for the late 2000s/early 2010s project to replace the first stages of all the remaining missiles in the Minuteman III fleet with a new first stage using 'environmentally friendly propellants'. I seem to recall that they believed they could dispense with such 'old fashioned' concepts as ground testing by relying totally on computer simulation (uncomfortable shades of some of the current GBSD proposals), simplifying development while lowering costs (or at least so they thought). Needless to say it all ended in tears.
 
Grey Havoc said:
sferrin said:
Wasn't aware he actually tried to do anything Must have been impressive indeed.

In the worst possible sense of the word, yes. 'Minuteman IV' in this context was the nickname for the late 2000s/early 2010s project to replace the first stages of all the remaining missiles in the Minuteman III fleet with a new first stage using 'environmentally friendly propellants'.

I thought they actually DID that, and lost a lot of range as a result.
 
The most recent round of MMIII life extension work was awarded in the late 90s and early 2000s, the preliminary development work was done in the mid 90s. The range and accuracy problems came not from the desire for "green" propellants, but from the requirement to manufacture the propellant and refurbish the stages in compliance with modern workplace and environmental regulations about handling toxic materials (as well as a supply base issue caused when important fuel subcontractor Phillips Petroleum literally burned out of the business). The stages grew heavier than anticipated and hurt performance. Rest assured, TP-H1011 Type II is still incredibly toxic when burned.

I know of no Obama Administration-specific "Environmentally Friendly Minuteman IV" proposal. There have been MMIV concepts bandied about since MMIII went into production, with various configurations mooted, but nothing which specifically matches that statement. Until the 2010 NPR, there was little about the ICBM force in general from the OA, in fact some expected the NPR to announce a plan to sunset the ICBM force. Then the Review came out and it was fairly conservative: keep the MMIII Life Extension work going and start studies for a new missile. Since then, the march toward GBSD had been fairly mundane.
 
Moose said:
but from the requirement to manufacture the propellant and refurbish the stages in compliance with modern workplace and environmental regulations about handling toxic materials (as well as a supply base issue caused when important fuel subcontractor Phillips Petroleum literally burned out of the business).

Any idea what, specifically, was the cause of the reduced range and accuracy?
 
sferrin said:
Moose said:
but from the requirement to manufacture the propellant and refurbish the stages in compliance with modern workplace and environmental regulations about handling toxic materials (as well as a supply base issue caused when important fuel subcontractor Phillips Petroleum literally burned out of the business).

Any idea what, specifically, was the cause of the reduced range and accuracy?
To my knowledge, the bulk of the range shortfall comes from the Propulsion Replacement Program changing the solid stages' insulation material in favor of one less toxic to the people who have to work with it. The replacement was a bit thicker and massed a bit more, so performance took a hit. Accuracy was mostly on the Guidance Replacement Program, which was its own nightmare. I believe much of the shortfall in both has all, or mostly, been smoothed out by software and PSRE upgrade work.
 
Moose said:
sferrin said:
Moose said:
but from the requirement to manufacture the propellant and refurbish the stages in compliance with modern workplace and environmental regulations about handling toxic materials (as well as a supply base issue caused when important fuel subcontractor Phillips Petroleum literally burned out of the business).

Any idea what, specifically, was the cause of the reduced range and accuracy?
To my knowledge, the bulk of the range shortfall comes from the Propulsion Replacement Program changing the solid stages' insulation material in favor of one less toxic to the people who have to work with it. The replacement was a bit thicker and massed a bit more, so performance took a hit. Accuracy was mostly on the Guidance Replacement Program, which was its own nightmare. I believe much of the shortfall in both has all, or mostly, been smoothed out by software and PSRE upgrade work.

Specifically, they were forced, due to EPA regulations, to switch the first stage SRM TPS from the low-density AVCOAT to the higher density Vamac.
NASA was confronted with the same dilemna but had the time and money to reformulate AVCOAT in an EPA compliant manner.
 
Moose said:
sferrin said:
Moose said:
but from the requirement to manufacture the propellant and refurbish the stages in compliance with modern workplace and environmental regulations about handling toxic materials (as well as a supply base issue caused when important fuel subcontractor Phillips Petroleum literally burned out of the business).

Any idea what, specifically, was the cause of the reduced range and accuracy?
To my knowledge, the bulk of the range shortfall comes from the Propulsion Replacement Program changing the solid stages' insulation material in favor of one less toxic to the people who have to work with it. The replacement was a bit thicker and massed a bit more, so performance took a hit. Accuracy was mostly on the Guidance Replacement Program, which was its own nightmare. I believe much of the shortfall in both has all, or mostly, been smoothed out by software and PSRE upgrade work.

marauder2048 said:
Moose said:
sferrin said:
Moose said:
but from the requirement to manufacture the propellant and refurbish the stages in compliance with modern workplace and environmental regulations about handling toxic materials (as well as a supply base issue caused when important fuel subcontractor Phillips Petroleum literally burned out of the business).

Any idea what, specifically, was the cause of the reduced range and accuracy?
To my knowledge, the bulk of the range shortfall comes from the Propulsion Replacement Program changing the solid stages' insulation material in favor of one less toxic to the people who have to work with it. The replacement was a bit thicker and massed a bit more, so performance took a hit. Accuracy was mostly on the Guidance Replacement Program, which was its own nightmare. I believe much of the shortfall in both has all, or mostly, been smoothed out by software and PSRE upgrade work.

Specifically, they were forced, due to EPA regulations, to switch the first stage SRM TPS from the low-density AVCOAT to the higher density Vamac.
NASA was confronted with the same dilemna but had the time and money to reformulate AVCOAT in an EPA compliant manner.

Now I'm just depressed :'(
 
GBSD article in Air Force Monthly, a few months old but did not see it here.

http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2016/July%202016/0716gb.pdf
 
From Inside the Air Force

Air Force-Navy study finds total nuclear commonality unrealistic

January 20, 2017

A joint assessment by the Air Force and Navy found pursuing full commonality for the future Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent and the Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile is "not feasible or practical," the Pentagon told lawmakers in a report delivered last month.

In analyzing potential overlap between the full systems, subsystems and components, the services determined that using the Navy's Trident II life-extension program, which redesigns and replaces missile electronics and handles additional procurement and testing, to replace the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile fleet would not work due to "unique operating environments, nuclear surety features and mission requirements."

"Leveraging the following components, technologies and processes showed potential benefit: flight systems and testing, ground/shipboard systems, acquisition and sustainment activities, weapon system architecture, requirements and concept of operations," the November 2016 report stated.

The assessment, intended to explore the possibility of cutting costs for the two replacement systems, wrapped up last March. During that process, the services looked at Trident II subsystems and components that could be procured off-the-shelf or slightly modified to work with GBSD; Trident II components that could be resized or redesigned for GBSD; and GBSD technologies that could be newly developed and applied to the SLBM.

Its results were included in the GBSD acquisition strategy approved in July 2016 and the subsequent request for proposals for the technology maturation and risk reduction phase. The Air Force plans to award up to two TMRR contracts in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2017.

"Potential future cost savings to the Navy (or other mission areas) are not addressed in the GBSD TMRR contract award criteria," the report stated.

As part of the RFP, the GBSD program categorized Trident II components and subsystems as either "prescribed" or "candidate" technologies. "Prescribed" areas offer "such clear benefit that the GBSD program will require their compliance in the RFP and incorporate them into the resultant contract," according to the report.

Those include model-based systems engineering, so the Air Force can own the technical baseline; modularity; using a common electronic parts program that relies on Navy investments in radiation-hardened parts; and a "test missile kit" that "enables ease of both services conducting flight tests on common ranges through joint development, range safety certification and telemetry acquisition."

"Candidate" technologies are thought to be beneficial to commonality, but the bidding companies have more flexibility to work out the details, according to the report.

"The prescribed and candidate items provide more benefit overall than any risks they introduced," the report stated. "The Air Force plans to continue to work with the Navy on risk assessments when specific contractor designs for GBSD are received during the TMRR phase."

Though the Air Force has asked companies to keep cost savings in mind when designing the new land-based missile, specific aspects of commonality and the money saved won't become clear until TMRR contracts are awarded.

The price tag of nuclear modernization is disputed because projections rely on assumptions made about a program that has not been revamped in several decades. The Pentagon's cost assessment and program evaluation office estimates replacing Boeing's Minuteman III will cost at least $85 billion, including $22.6 billion for research and development, $61.5 billion for procurement and $718 million for military construction. That projection is expected to be revised by March 2018.

GBSD is expected to be fielded starting in 2028, with the SLBM to follow about a decade later.
 
http://breakingdefense.com/2017/01/renew-and-strengthen-americas-strategic-deterrent/

http://media.wix.com/ugd/a2dd91_f6e6d80025ba4e9a92054b97bee954b5.pdf
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_8xo-kwtVw

Mitchell Institute presentation on the report linked to last comment
 
Inside the Air Force - January 27, 2017

STRATCOM adviser says current GBSD plan is best path to deterrence
January 26, 2017

A retired Air Force major general who commanded the 20th Air
Force and now advises U.S. Strategic Command said this week a hypersonic
nuclear missile capability could be considered at a later point, but would not
necessarily improve the deterrent offered now by America's intercontinental
ballistic missiles.

Roger Burg's comments came at a Jan. 25 Mitchell Institute
for Aerospace Studies event where he debuted a report on the need for
intercontinental ballistic missiles as the core of America's nuclear deterrent.
Much of Burg's analysis centered on defending against Russia and China's
evolving nuclear arsenal, including weapons intended to defeat anti-ballistic
missile systems, and the nuclear futures of other regional players like Iran
and North Korea.

Burg's report touts the ICBM force's capabilities that cannot
be duplicated by air- or submarine-launched nuclear missiles, citing global
instability that requires the most flexible, capable nuclear deterrent
possible.

"The extensive nuclear modernization programs of potential
adversary nations require U.S. recapitalization to avoid a serious erosion of
American nuclear deterrent capability," the report stated. "Failing to invest
in the recapitalization of the nuclear deterrent, especially in the ICBM force,
will merely clear a path to obsolescence and eventual dissolution."

Although the U.S. needs to continue with its modernization
effort for the Minuteman III fleet, now more than four decades old on average,
Burg said the country should not necessarily pursue the same updates as its
competitors.

"High-speed maneuvering weapons pose a very significant
change in how we've addressed strategic capabilities over the last 30 or 40
years," he said. "They fit inside a gap organizationally, technologically, that
we have not yet addressed. They have potentially intercontinental range, they
fly at hypersonic speeds, they maneuver and they have been tested by Russian
scientists and Chinese scientists and they've had some very good success."

The Air Force needs to retain the capacity to build those
capabilities, Burg added, but he doesn't "see a need for it in the initial
deployment of a ground-based strategic deterrent."

"I think our force of 400 Minuteman III is a competent,
capable, reliable, credible part of our deterrent," Burg said. "I don't think
we need more, I don't think we need more re-entry vehicles. That might be a
method of responding to some challenge in the future, but it's not necessary
today. I wouldn't go very far below 400 to assert that it's still credible as a
land-based strategic deterrent."

Burg noted the Air Force's unwillingness to pursue a
road-mobile missile despite the service's repeated recognition that it could be
beneficial. Lt. Gen. Jack Weinstein, deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence
and nuclear integration, told reporters last summer the service was not looking
at a mobile ICBM.

"We've evaluated ICBM mobility at least four times in the
last 40 years, and we've chosen every time to look seriously at mobility, but
we've never deployed a launch system capable of it," Burg said. "We looked hard
at whether GBSD should have a mobile basing mode, and every time we run into
very significant public interface and environmental questions that we answer by
saying, 'Those silos we built in the 1960s look pretty good.'"

Silo-based missiles, not mobile, were required in the GBSD
program's latest request for proposals. In bidding on that contract, however,
companies could study fixed and mobile ground control sites to determine the
right mix for survival in case of a first attack and subsequent launch, John Karas, Lockheed Martin vice president and GBSD program
manager, said in an October 2016 phone call with reporters.

The study called the current plan to field the Ground Based
Strategic Deterrent in the 2030s the cheapest and most effective route. Burg
also ruled out incremental modernization as a way to cut costs because
technology added earlier on could become obsolete by the time modernization is
fully complete and would be difficult to plan.

While Burg noted the cost-saving benefits of installing
common parts in the ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile systems, he
cautioned that doing so could delay the Air Force's program schedule.

"The Navy needs to release the technical designs of its
proposed common elements," the report stated. "However, it may well be that a
subsequent technical review, concomitant reevaluation of requirements, and
refining of the acquisition strategy would force the Air Force to slip the
acquisition timetable further. . . . Officials must balance commonality's
hoped-for cost savings with the possible acquisition and operational risks that
commonality may introduce to the GBSD effort."

A recent joint Air Force-Navy analysis found that total
commonality between the two missiles would be infeasible. However, companies
bidding on the GBSD program are told to include: model-based systems
engineering, so the Air Force can own the technical baseline; modularity; a
common electronic parts program that relies on Navy investments in
radiation-hardened parts; and a "test missile kit" that "enables ease of both
services conducting flight tests on common ranges through joint development,
range safety certification and telemetry acquisition."

Commonality has sparked concerns that if an adversary is able
to control or shut down any parts shared by the newly cyber-enabled ICBM and
SLBM, the air-launched cruise missile would be the only leg of the triad left
standing. Questions have also been raised about the cost overruns and schedule
delays that frequently surface in other joint programs. -- Rachel S. Karas
 
GBSD Price: Once We Know, We’ll Know

—John A. Tirpak

3/20/2017

​The Air Force and the rest of the Defense Department have not yet resolved their differences on what the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program should cost, Air Force uniformed acquisition chief Lt. Gen. Arnold Bunch said at an AFA-sponsored, Air Force breakfast on March 16. “We did have the pretty significant difference in cost estimates that came out of the CAPE (the Pentagon’s Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation shop)” and the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency, Bunch said, referring to a $22 billion discrepancy ​at the time of the GBSD’s last milestone. “What we said then was we’ll fund it to a level, we’ll update those cost estimates as we get those proposals in and we learn more of what the state of the art is, and the art of the possible,” Bunch explained. He noted that GBSD is “now in source selection” and “we haven’t updated anything, and we won’t until we get through the source selection and decide where we’re going to go.” Summing up, Bunch said, the choice “will be informed but it hasn’t happened yet.”
 
Lt. Gen. Bunch mentioned that the contract award is expected in September for both GBSD and LRSO.
 
Lockheed GBSD chief expects August award, awaits nuclear review results
March 24, 2017

The head of Lockheed Martin's Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent effort said this week the Air Force plans to have as many as two companies on contract in September, and he sees no indication the service will delay that goal, despite asking for more details on bidders' proposals, an upcoming nuclear posture review and scrutiny by the executive and legislative branches.

John Karas, Lockheed's GBSD vice president and program manager, told Inside the Air Force in a March 21 interview the Air Force asked Lockheed, Northrop Grumman and Boeing in February to clarify the details of their teams' cost and design proposals. Lockheed updated its proposal and provided those answers March 6, Karas said.

The service initially intended to award up to two technology maturation and risk-reduction contracts without discussion after the bids were submitted last October, Karas said. He added the Air Force may ask more questions and has reserved the right to issue a final price offering.

Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Stephen Wilson and Lt. Gen. Arnold Bunch, the service's top uniformed acquisition officer, told ITAF March 22 they see the follow-up questions as part of an ongoing dialogue with industry.

"That would have been done through the source-selection team and they would have done . . . evaluation notices," Bunch told ITAF at a McAleese and Associates conference. "That's frequent and common in source selections and it's not anything unusual."

The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center did not comment by press time (March 23).

Karas said if the Air Force makes good on its promise to be on contract by September, an award would need to come in August.

"There's a pretty good resolve across the board that that's not going to slip," Karas said of talking to government stakeholders about the [technology maturation and risk-reduction] contract award date, noting that plenty of outside factors could still change by September. He continued: "In near-term, I don't see any reason why we would slow down. If the government does, we'll go figure out how will we smooth out the budget they're going to give us, and/or the investment we have."

GBSD will replace the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile as the land-based leg of the nuclear triad starting in 2028. The Pentagon's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office pegs GBSD costs at $85 billion for 642 missiles, though estimates vary due to outdated information and different baselines. One company will win an engineering and manufacturing development contract in 2020, with initial operating capability slated for around the middle of the decade.

As Air Force officials preach the need to concurrently, immediately replace the air-, land- and sea-based legs of the nuclear triad, and President Trump indicates he wants to improve the arsenal -- without offering more details -- Karas said he is "guardedly optimistic" the administration and Congress are leaning toward modernization across the board.

"I'm a firm believer that the Air Force should continue all those programs in this next phase because you have focused attention by the government and focused attention and the resources by the contractors," he said. "It's good for industry and good for the government if they just award those contracts. After that, who knows, but now you can have consistency of purpose, you have consistent design and data, but if you let that delay, I don't think that serves anybody."

In January, Trump ordered the Pentagon to produce a nuclear posture review by January 2018 to ensure the triad is "modern, robust, flexible, resilient, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats and reassure our allies and partners," according to his executive order. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein told reporters last month he expects the Pentagon to begin the review this spring.

TMRR is the easiest phase in which to make changes because the first year of the program focuses on the trade space rather than production, Karas said. If the nuclear posture review gets completed within a year as instructed and recommends changing the Air Force's objectives, he believes that would be the perfect time to tweak GBSD proposals.

Todd Harrison, a budget analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told ITAF in a recent interview the NPR probably won't affect GBSD's time line. He doubts the review could realistically speed up the program, but that it wouldn't be too late to change direction.

"It would slow the program down if they changed direction, so probably extend the time line, but it's possible," he said. "Between now and January, I don't think the NPR is going to have any effect. It's only after it comes out that it may have an effect on some of these programs. I don't think they're going to put the brakes on a program now to wait and see what the NPR says."

Karas said trades for options like fewer missiles, launch sites and silos and mobile missiles were considered early in the process, so each company should have enough data to revisit those ideas, should the NPR suggest them.

Lockheed chose a three-stage solid rocket and four-stage post-boost design that mirrors the existing Minuteman III fleet, Karas told reporters in an October 2016 conference call. He added during the March 21 interview that the GBSD design draws on the company's Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system and Atlas-Centaur expendable launch system as well as on the Navy's ballistic missiles.

Lockheed's approach was constrained by program requirements dictating the missiles fit in Minuteman III silo holes and work with the current suspension system, among other stringent rules. Solid rocket motor technology hasn't improved enough to spur a significant performance boost, Karas said, and changing the propellant would raise life-cycle costs.

"You end up with something that's not a large trade space because of the requirements we were given," he said. "The trades we could make that we were allowed to make, you'd go, 'That's a simple trade, I don't want to be changing a lot of that.'"

If no requirements change as a result of the NPR, Karas said the greatest variable will be the budget and considering what aspects can be completed early, what can be deferred and what deals can be made to stabilize prices.
 
Lockheed to Use Virtual Prototyping to Develop GBSD

​—Wilson Brissett

Lockheed Martin is hoping to demonstrate the full capabilities of its virtual prototyping lab if it wins a contract to develop the next Ground Based Strategic Deterrent.

Lockheed also thinks its digital tapestry approach can help accurately pinpoint the total cost of the system, estimates of which have varied widely within the Department of Defense. “The more you can mature a cost model the better,” John Karas, vice president and GBSD program manager told reporters at the Lockheed Martin facility Monday in Littleton, Colo.

Lockheed built its Collaborative Human Immersive Lab in 2010, and the company has already used it to refine the design and engineering of systems like the GPS III satellites and the Orion spacecraft, CHIL manager Darin Bolthouse told reporters. The lab consists of a full motion capture studio to create realistic digital environments that mirror the technical details of systems still in development, and a Cave System that uses 3-D glasses and holograms to place engineers within an immersive virtual experience of that digitally designed system.

CHIL creates a “virtual build environment,” Bolthouse said, that allows engineers to rehearse production, maintenance, and sustainment tasks on products that have not yet been built in the real world. Program engineers can then learn from the virtual experience and alter the program’s design before real world prototyping, reducing the time and cost of refining a program design.

In connection with remote locations outfitted with a smaller “package system,” CHIL can also create “shared virtual reality environments across the country,” Bolthouse said. Such remote VR systems could fit inside a “conference room or any 15 by 15 space,” Bolthouse said.

This VR network is where Lockheed imagines CHIL bringing unique advantages for GBSD development, said Karas. He said CHIL could help the GBSD be “operated and developed first in a very affordable environment.” CHIL’s network of VR environments and digital redesigns could be tailor-made for modernizing the infrastructure of far-flung missile silos and their sustainment apparatus, “site to site virtually and in real time,” Karas told reporters.

CHIL would allow Lockheed to “map the inside” of existing underground missile silos and ground control systems, using data from nuclear bases around the country, and manipulate those environments digitally to maximize the spaces for the new system design. Throughout the process, CHIL could incorporate networked input from “airmen in the field that have to maintain the system,” Karas said.

If awarded the GBSD contract, Karas said Lockheed would use CHIL to “lay out the whole manufacturing flow” of the program as they have already with other, fully-developed systems. He also said that Lockheed would like to make use of 3-D printing of some GBSD components. While 3-D printing was not included in the proposal Lockheed submitted to the Air Force in October 2016, Karas said the three years of technology maturation would be more than enough to fully incorporate 3-D printing into the GBSD design.

Boeing and Northrop Grumman also submitted proposals in October 2016 in response to the Air Force RFP to develop the next GBSD system. USAF expects to award as many as two contracts before the end of Fiscal 2017.
 
http://www.defencetalk.com/new-icbms-necessary-to-secure-the-american-strategic-deterrent-66813/
 
Attachment borrowed from marauder2048 h/t

Large Class booster for strategic missile is, if I recall, 92" diameter or Peacekeeper sized. Let's hope it's for the GBSD. .
 

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http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/story/1693945-af-new-icbms-get-upgraded-guidance-circuitry
 
http://propulsionenergy.aiaa.org/MinuteMan3ReplacementPlan/
 
marauder2048 said:
Lt. Gen. Bunch mentioned that the contract award is expected in September for both GBSD and LRSO.

According to Lockheed Martin's CEO, as of July 16th 2017, September is still the timeframe for GBSD and LRSO.
 
marauder2048 said:
marauder2048 said:
Lt. Gen. Bunch mentioned that the contract award is expected in September for both GBSD and LRSO.

According to Lockheed Martin's CEO, as of July 16th 2017, September is still the timeframe for GBSD and LRSO.
Really hoping for a Peacekeeper sized ICBM expecting to be disappointed. Maybe LRSO will be hypersonic?
 
bobbymike said:
Really hoping for a Peacekeeper sized ICBM expecting to be disappointed. Maybe LRSO will be hypersonic?

I really hope I'm wrong but I'm expecting "new" refurbished MMIIIs with "new" "4th generation" Tomahawks. The same that lost to the AGM-86 30+ years ago.
 
bobbymike said:
Really hoping for a Peacekeeper sized ICBM expecting to be disappointed. Maybe LRSO will be hypersonic?

I'm also hoping that there will be a new road mobile ICBM like the MGM-134.


sferrin said:
I really hope I'm wrong but I'm expecting "new" refurbished MMIIIs with "new" "4th generation" Tomahawks. The same that lost to the AGM-86 30+ years ago.

I guess that also depends on if the LRSO is manufactured by Raytheon.
 
sferrin said:
bobbymike said:
Really hoping for a Peacekeeper sized ICBM expecting to be disappointed. Maybe LRSO will be hypersonic?

I really hope I'm wrong but I'm expecting "new" refurbished MMIIIs with "new" "4th generation" Tomahawks. The same that lost to the AGM-86 30+ years ago.
Refurbishing MM indefinitely was discarded as an option in 2015. Unless someone making decisions today stops the current work and brings the idea back, it's dead. And Tomahawk is not going to be the LRSO in any form, I don't think anyone would even pitch it.
 
Triton said:
bobbymike said:
Really hoping for a Peacekeeper sized ICBM expecting to be disappointed. Maybe LRSO will be hypersonic?

I'm also hoping that there will be a new road mobile ICBM like the MGM-134.
Of course my real dream (Bond villain style) would be to bring back the concept of the WS-120a in deeply buried hard rock basing. :eek:
 
http://breakingdefense.com/2017/08/new-icbm-cheaper-than-upgraded-minuteman-boeing-on-gbsd/
 
Lockheed out?

Aug. 21, 2017


The Boeing Co., Huntsville, Alabama, has been awarded a $349,159,962 contract for Ground-based Strategic Deterrent. This contract is to conduct technology maturation and risk reduction to deliver a low technical risk, affordable total system replacement of Minuteman III to meet intercontinental ballistic missiles operational requirements. Work will be performed in Huntsville, Alabama, and other various locations as needed and is expected to be completed by Aug. 20, 2020. This award is the result of competitive acquisition and three offers were received. Fiscal 2017 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $5,700,000 are being obligated at time of award. Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Hill Air Force Base, Utah, is the contracting activity (FA819-17-C-0001).



Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Redondo Beach, California, has been awarded a $328,584,830 contract for Ground-based Strategic Deterrent. This contract is to conduct technology maturation and risk reduction to deliver a low technical risk, affordable total system replacement of Minuteman III to meet intercontinental ballistic missiles operational requirements. Work will be performed in Redondo Beach, California, and other various locations as needed and is expected to be completed by Aug. 20, 2020. This award is the result of competitive acquisition and three offers were received. Fiscal 2017 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $5,700,000 are being obligated at time of award. Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Hill Air Force Base, Utah, is the contracting activity (FA819-17-C-0002).
 
Air Force awards two contracts for a new intercontinental ballistic missile weapon system

Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center Public Affairs / Published August 21, 2017

KIRTLAND AIR FORCE BASE, N.M. -- The Air Force announced Aug. 21 the award of two Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction
contracts for its Ground Based Strategic Deterrent intercontinental ballistic missile weapon system program. Contracts were awarded to
Boeing Company, Huntsville, Alabama, and Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation, Redondo Beach, California.

The GBSD is the weapon system replacement for the aging LGM-30 Minuteman III ICBM.

“We are moving forward with modernization of the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad,” said Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson.
“Our missiles were built in the 1970s. Things just wear out, and it becomes more expensive to maintain them than to replace them.
We need to cost-effectively modernize.”

The Minuteman III first became operational in the early 1970s. While certain components and subsystems have been upgraded over the
years, most of the fundamental infrastructure in use today is the original equipment supporting more than 50 years of continuous operation.

"Airmen must always be ready in this no-fail mission," said Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. David Goldfein. "As others have stated, the
only thing more expensive than deterrence is fighting a war. The Minuteman III is 45 years old. It is time to upgrade."

The aging Minuteman III system will continue to face increasingly significant operational and sustainment challenges until replaced.

“The Minuteman III is the enduring ground-based leg of our nuclear triad. However, it is an aging platform and requires major
investments to maintain its reliability and effectiveness,” said Gen. Robin Rand, commander of Air Force Global Strike Command.
“GBSD is the most cost-effective ICBM replacement strategy, leveraging existing infrastructure while also implementing mature,
modern technologies and more efficient operations, maintenance and security concepts.”

For the GBSD acquisition effort, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center is focused on developing and delivering an integrated GBSD
weapon system, including launch and command-and-control segments. The weapon’s developers will pursue a modular systems architecture,
which will encourage continued competition across the lifecycle of the program. Additionally, a modular system will make the GBSD weapon
system responsive to the challenges posed by the pace of technological change and new threat environments.

“The new GBSD weapon system will meet the combatant commander’s current requirements, while having the adaptability to affordably
address changing technology and emerging threats through 2075,” said Maj. Gen. Scott Jansson, AFNWC commander and the Air Force
program executive officer for strategic systems.

Two contracts, valued at no more than $359 million each, were awarded after a full and open competition. The companies selected were
determined to provide the best overall value to the warfighter and taxpayers based on the source selection’s evaluation factors.
The period of performance for each TMRR contract is approximately 36 months.

“I am proud of the hard work, professionalism and dedication of the GBSD program office members. We would not have gotten here without them,”
said Col. Heath Collins, GBSD program manager for AFNWC. “Over the last year, we have executed a thorough and fair source selection while
also putting in place the tools, infrastructure and analytic capability to execute the GBSD program. We are ready, excited and honored to begin
working with our industry partners to develop and deliver an affordable, low-risk ICBM replacement, guaranteeing uninterrupted nuclear deterrence
capabilities for the nation.”

The GBSD program office is part of AFNWC’s ICBM Systems Directorate at Hill AFB, Utah. The center is responsible for synchronizing
all aspects of nuclear materiel management on behalf of Air Force Materiel Command in direct support of AFGSC.

Headquartered at Kirtland AFB, the center has about 1,100 personnel assigned to 17 locations worldwide, including at Hanscom AFB,
Massachusetts; Hill AFB, Utah; Eglin AFB, Florida; Tinker AFB, Oklahoma; and at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

http://www.robins.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1284835/air-force-awards-two-contracts-for-a-new-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-wea/
 
http://www.rocket.com/article/aerojet-rocketdyne-providing-propulsion-system-support-northrop-grummans-ground-based
 
Airplane said:
Why were the actual contract amounts different for the 2 companies?
The amounts reflect what the companies bid for this phase of the program.
 
Moose said:
Airplane said:
Why were the actual contract amounts different for the 2 companies?
The amounts reflect what the companies bid for this phase of the program.

What I find amusing in the line about it being effective until 2075. Good grief, how do you design a missile that drops MIRVs and decoys to be effective so far out into the future. By then there are going to be hundreds of GBLs in enemy/aggressor hands to shoot down everything detectable.

Or maybe they are going to design a LO re-entry vehicle along with multiple decoys deployed on each missile? Or pre-emptively strike early warning systems?

Maybe logically it is time go to a nuclear DIAD? Stealthy ALCMs on stealth bombers and undersea deployed nukes that don't give as much warning time. Or maybe we go a hybrid DIAD / TRIAD where we deploy a few dozen land based missiles to keep countries like NK and IRAN in check.... "Hey NK, all we have to do is push a button a 15 minutes later your country is gone."

I just don't know how you design a missile today that will be survivable in 2075.
 
Airplane said:
Moose said:
Airplane said:
Why were the actual contract amounts different for the 2 companies?
The amounts reflect what the companies bid for this phase of the program.

What I find amusing in the line about it being effective until 2075. Good grief, how do you design a missile that drops MIRVs and decoys to be effective so far out into the future. By then there are going to be hundreds of GBLs in enemy/aggressor hands to shoot down everything detectable.

Or maybe they are going to design a LO re-entry vehicle along with multiple decoys deployed on each missile? Or pre-emptively strike early warning systems?

Maybe logically it is time go to a nuclear DIAD? Stealthy ALCMs on stealth bombers and undersea deployed nukes that don't give as much warning time. Or maybe we go a hybrid DIAD / TRIAD where we deploy a few dozen land based missiles to keep countries like NK and IRAN in check.... "Hey NK, all we have to do is push a button a 15 minutes later your country is gone."

I just don't know how you design a missile today that will be survivable in 2075.

Supercavitating Project Pluto that "flies" underwater, pops out of the water just offshore, and runs into the target at Mach 4 on the deck. Heard of another concept where the ICBM deploys a boost gliding upper stage that flies the final phase at Mach 10 on the deck. What I wonder is if the ionization layer around it at those altitudes/speeds would be enough to keep a laser beam from reaching the missile itself.
 
Airplane said:
Moose said:
Airplane said:
Why were the actual contract amounts different for the 2 companies?
The amounts reflect what the companies bid for this phase of the program.

What I find amusing in the line about it being effective until 2075. Good grief, how do you design a missile that drops MIRVs and decoys to be effective so far out into the future. By then there are going to be hundreds of GBLs in enemy/aggressor hands to shoot down everything detectable.

Or maybe they are going to design a LO re-entry vehicle along with multiple decoys deployed on each missile? Or pre-emptively strike early warning systems?

Maybe logically it is time go to a nuclear DIAD? Stealthy ALCMs on stealth bombers and undersea deployed nukes that don't give as much warning time. Or maybe we go a hybrid DIAD / TRIAD where we deploy a few dozen land based missiles to keep countries like NK and IRAN in check.... "Hey NK, all we have to do is push a button a 15 minutes later your country is gone."

I just don't know how you design a missile today that will be survivable in 2075.

It's not particularly difficult to harden RVs against GBLs and even a basic course correcting MaRV would detect uneven ablation
and compensate for it; a combined course-correcting/evading MaRV could probably induce precession or spin. And there's aerosol
release or other expendable CMs.

I would think the bigger threat would be EMRGs
 
http://www.rocket.com/article/aerojet-rocketdyne-providing-propulsion-system-support-ground-based-strategic-deterrent
 

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