LGM-35A Sentinel - Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program

marauder2048 said:
Grey Havoc said:
Grey Havoc said:
http://www.defensenews.com/articles/james-new-icbm-cost-question-will-not-impact-next-budget

Why do the words 'train wreck' come to mind?

CAPE just revised its B-21 APUC down by ~ 7% which translates into a multi billion dollar swing in total program cost. Is that a train wreck?

Typically "train wreck" refers to the fact that, because certain administrations pushed off modernization due to the mythical "Peace Dividend", EVERYTHING needs to be replaced at the same time. Cruisers, our entire nuclear forces, (and they're not even discussing replacing old warheads), bombers, fighters, tankers, tanks, self-propelled guns, cargo aircraft, you name it. We really ought to add torpedoes and a slew of tactical missiles to the list as well.
 
sferrin said:
marauder2048 said:
Grey Havoc said:
Grey Havoc said:
http://www.defensenews.com/articles/james-new-icbm-cost-question-will-not-impact-next-budget

Why do the words 'train wreck' come to mind?

CAPE just revised its B-21 APUC down by ~ 7% which translates into a multi billion dollar swing in total program cost. Is that a train wreck?

Typically "train wreck" refers to the fact that, because certain administrations pushed off modernization due to the mythical "Peace Dividend", EVERYTHING needs to be replaced at the same time. Cruisers, our entire nuclear forces, (and they're not even discussing replacing old warheads), bombers, fighters, tankers, tanks, self-propelled guns, cargo aircraft, you name it. We really ought to add torpedoes and a slew of tactical missiles to the list as well.

I appreciate the sentiment but I have to slightly disagree on the GBSD side; even if the AF had gotten the full planned quantity of Peacekeepers
we'd still be in the present situation just by virtue of the system's age and the reduction in inventory due to the need for testing and proficiency.
 
marauder2048 said:
I appreciate the sentiment but I have to slightly disagree on the GBSD side; even if the AF had gotten the full planned quantity of Peacekeepers
we'd still be in the present situation just by virtue of the system's age and the reduction in inventory due to the need for testing and proficiency.

Except we were suppose to get Midgetman as well. We'd have been left with a Peacekeeper/Midgetman force and Minuteman would have been retired. That would have made today's situation much less urgent. The last MMII was produced in 1977. Peacekeeper was a decade+ newer than that. Midgetman would have been newer still. Also, it isn't just GBSD creating the train wreck. It's ALL of it. That's why there's a train wreck. If it was only GBSD that needed replacing and not bombers, cruise missiles, SSBNs, etc. etc. funding would be no big deal.
 
sferrin said:
marauder2048 said:
Grey Havoc said:
Grey Havoc said:
http://www.defensenews.com/articles/james-new-icbm-cost-question-will-not-impact-next-budget

Why do the words 'train wreck' come to mind?

CAPE just revised its B-21 APUC down by ~ 7% which translates into a multi billion dollar swing in total program cost. Is that a train wreck?

Typically "train wreck" refers to the fact that, because certain administrations pushed off modernization due to the mythical "Peace Dividend", EVERYTHING needs to be replaced at the same time. Cruisers, our entire nuclear forces, (and they're not even discussing replacing old warheads), bombers, fighters, tankers, tanks, self-propelled guns, cargo aircraft, you name it. We really ought to add torpedoes and a slew of tactical missiles to the list as well.
I had such high hopes in 2001 that after a decade of neglect and coming on the heels of a Nuclear Posture Review and talk of the New Triad that comprised three corners of a) responsive [nuclear] infrastructure 2) Nuclear delivery vehicles and 3) Conventional prompt global strike we would see a robust modernization plan.

Early in Bush 43's Presidency warhead modernization was also contemplated in the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, Reliable Replacement Warhead and R&D on Advanced Concepts.

While I expected broad and vituperative opposition from arms control zealots and Democrats what I didn't foresee was the REPUBLICAN majorities in the relevant House defense committees (along with 100% Democrat support) zeroed out funding for all of this. But it was Republican support that then shifted the issue to the sacred realm of "bipartisan" and when combined with 911 and the war on terror made nuclear modernization not worth the political capital for its dwindling number of proponents.

So here's where we sit not knowing how to cost a new ICBM because we don't remember, really, what it takes to build one anymore.
 
bobbymike said:
So here's where we sit not knowing how to cost a new ICBM because we don't remember, really, what it takes to build one anymore.

And yet little old North Korea continues to plug along. The pathetic state of things in the US was really brought home the other day. There was an article wherein the author was gushing, almost in disbelief, that North Korea continues to progress despite, "being willing to fail". The author was completely oblivious to the fact that willingness to fail is the ONLY way one can progress.
 
I guess my earlier point was that under the *original* Air Force MX plan, we'd have 200 MX in either MPS or in silos that would need to be replaced now anyway.
The Scowcroft compromise more than anything else managed to kill both MX and SICBM.

On other strategic systems: the AF should have taken NG up on their offer for the B-2C circa 2001 and the Navy should have elected to build a new D6 rather than life extending the D5 in 2002.
The latter might have jump started a refresh on GBSD earlier. Having said that, cost estimate disputes also go back to MX/MPS and the Air Force vs. OTA. So in that sense, it's frustrating.
 
sferrin said:
marauder2048 said:
I appreciate the sentiment but I have to slightly disagree on the GBSD side; even if the AF had gotten the full planned quantity of Peacekeepers
we'd still be in the present situation just by virtue of the system's age and the reduction in inventory due to the need for testing and proficiency.

Except we were suppose to get Midgetman as well. We'd have been left with a Peacekeeper/Midgetman force and Minuteman would have been retired. That would have made today's situation much less urgent. The last MMII was produced in 1977. Peacekeeper was a decade+ newer than that. Midgetman would have been newer still. Also, it isn't just GBSD creating the train wreck. It's ALL of it. That's why there's a train wreck. If it was only GBSD that needed replacing and not bombers, cruise missiles, SSBNs, etc. etc. funding would be no big deal.

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-navy-needs-more-submarines-match-russia-china-17775
 
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/us-security-proliferated-world-will-require-new-icbm-17781
 
http://breakingdefense.com/2016/09/new-icbms-could-cost-way-above-85b-capes-morin/
 
Given the financial situation, the difficulty in targeting mobile ballistic missiles that was demonstrated by "the great SCUD hunt" and the need for speed in procurement, why do they not just dust off Midgetman?I'm deeply concerned about the deteriorating deterrent, but the ever increasing budget of this thing looks dubious when a Minuteman replacement is available. Obviously tooling up would be required and a few test shot failures to relearn the bits that were institutional knowledge and not actually in the plans, but most of the development is done. The Midgetman was not MIRVED, but Minuteman isn't anymore either so it's a wash.
 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/09/25/us-air-force-set-replace-intercontinental-nuke-arsenal.html?ESRC=todayinmil.sm
 
Brickmuppet said:
Given the financial situation, the difficulty in targeting mobile ballistic missiles that was demonstrated by "the great SCUD hunt" and the need for speed in procurement, why do they not just dust off Midgetman?I'm deeply concerned about the deteriorating deterrent, but the ever increasing budget of this thing looks dubious when a Minuteman replacement is available. Obviously tooling up would be required and a few test shot failures to relearn the bits that were institutional knowledge and not actually in the plans, but most of the development is done. The Midgetman was not MIRVED, but Minuteman isn't anymore either so it's a wash.

No. Just. . .no.
 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a23048/new-us-nuclear-missiles-could-cost-85-billion/
 
Northrop's GBSD brochures from website;

http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/gbsd/Documents/GBSD_Brochure.pdf

http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/gbsd/Documents/GBSD_Data_Sheet.pdf

Includes this as well.

http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/gbsd/Documents/ICBM_Resource_List.pdf
 
sferrin said:
Brickmuppet said:
Given the financial situation, the difficulty in targeting mobile ballistic missiles that was demonstrated by "the great SCUD hunt" and the need for speed in procurement, why do they not just dust off Midgetman?I'm deeply concerned about the deteriorating deterrent, but the ever increasing budget of this thing looks dubious when a Minuteman replacement is available. Obviously tooling up would be required and a few test shot failures to relearn the bits that were institutional knowledge and not actually in the plans, but most of the development is done. The Midgetman was not MIRVED, but Minuteman isn't anymore either so it's a wash.

No. Just. . .no.

I gathered from the notable lack of it being proposed that there was probably a catch. I'm curious as to what that catch is. Most people here know more about the matter than me and aren't invested in the companies involved so I was hoping for a reason not to dust off Midgetman other than "Not enough money in it for campaign contributors." Given the budget situation and the inherent survivability of mobile missiles, Midgetman really seems like a decent option to me, but I'm far from an expert in these matters. I'm genuinely curious; What are the technical, or geopolitical factors that cause this option to be so emphatically opposed?
 
Damn. My bad. I read, "dust off Minuteman" not Midgetman. Midgetman wouldn't be a bad idea, and I think I've actually suggested it elsewhere. A new Peacekeeper-sized silo based missile (200-300) and 500 Midgetmen on their TELs would be my preference. The mobility of Midgetman would give you the best of all worlds and the heavier throw weight of Peacekeeper (or larger) would give you options for things like boost gliders, larger MaRVs, etc.
 
Brickmuppet said:
sferrin said:
Brickmuppet said:
Given the financial situation, the difficulty in targeting mobile ballistic missiles that was demonstrated by "the great SCUD hunt" and the need for speed in procurement, why do they not just dust off Midgetman?I'm deeply concerned about the deteriorating deterrent, but the ever increasing budget of this thing looks dubious when a Minuteman replacement is available. Obviously tooling up would be required and a few test shot failures to relearn the bits that were institutional knowledge and not actually in the plans, but most of the development is done. The Midgetman was not MIRVED, but Minuteman isn't anymore either so it's a wash.

No. Just. . .no.

I gathered from the notable lack of it being proposed that there was probably a catch. I'm curious as to what that catch is. Most people here know more about the matter than me and aren't invested in the companies involved so I was hoping for a reason not to dust off Midgetman other than "Not enough money in it for campaign contributors." Given the budget situation and the inherent survivability of mobile missiles, Midgetman really seems like a decent option to me, but I'm far from an expert in these matters. I'm genuinely curious; What are the technical, or geopolitical factors that cause this option to be so emphatically opposed?

A large part of it is that there are those in the U.S. political establishment who consider mobile ICBMs as 'destabilizing'. ::) Another arguably even bigger problem is that much of the U.S. based industrial infrastructure necessary for a mobile ICBM (among many other things) was, starting in the 1990s and it's infamous End of History/Peace Dividend, dismantled, scrapped, or sold off to the People's Republic of China and elsewhere. This textbook example of stupidity & insanity combined has continued right up into this decade.

Bearing that last point in mind and to be fair, there are those who are quite in favour of a new ICBM, but that feel given the current shortages in just about every resource category (with the exception of hot air) including skilled/experienced manpower it is better to use those limited resources to build a silo based heavy ICBM in the Peacekeeper to Satan class with much more throw weight (meaning more warheads, pentaids, a more capable warhead bus, etc.) rather than a lighter more mobile ICBM.

sferrin said:
Damn. My bad. I read, "dust off Minuteman" not Midgetman. Midgetman wouldn't be a bad idea, and I think I've actually suggested it elsewhere. A new Peacekeeper-sized silo based missile (200-300) and 500 Midgetmen on their TELs would be my preference. The mobility of Midgetman would give you the best of all worlds and the heavier throw weight of Peacekeeper (or larger) would give you options for things like boost gliders, larger MaRVs, etc.

Preaching to the choir, sir.
 
Boeing Responds to GBSD Solicitation

—Brian Everstine 10/12/2016

​Boeing on Tuesday said it responded to the Air Force’s request for proposal for the next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile system. The company, in a brief statement, said it created the first Minuteman ICBM almost 60 years ago “and we are ready to again offer an ICBM that will meet the Air Force mission requirements through 2075.” The Air Force released the RFP in early August, with a deadline of Wednesday. The service plans to award up to two cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts next summer, with eventual deployment in the late 2020s. The expected value of the program is about $62.3 billion. Lockheed Martin is expected to announce its proposal later this week. (See also: GBSD: The Biggest Operational Test Program Ever? And Ground-Based Question Mark from the July issue of Air Force Magazine.)
 
http://aviationweek.com/defense/usaf-bars-exclusive-teaming-rocket-shops-new-icbm

This caught my eye, up to 10 MIRVs, fingers crossed

The operational requirement is for 400 alert GBSD missiles capped with government-provided Mark 12A or Mark 21 re-entry vehicles containing anywhere from one to 10 independently targetable warheads.
 
If they want 400 missiles with anything like more than one warhead they better learn how to build them all over again. RVs, warheads, producing the bomb materials, etc. IIRC it's all gone. Sure, they can scrounge up some material here and there for a NASA prob. but enough of the right stuff to make new warheads? I'm skeptical.
 
sferrin said:
If they want 400 missiles with anything like more than one warhead they better learn how to build them all over again. RVs, warheads, producing the bomb materials, etc. IIRC it's all gone. Sure, they can scrounge up some material here and there for a NASA prob. but enough of the right stuff to make new warheads? I'm skeptical.
For me let's start with a 'big' missile first that in and of itself gives me some hope.
 
bobbymike said:
sferrin said:
If they want 400 missiles with anything like more than one warhead they better learn how to build them all over again. RVs, warheads, producing the bomb materials, etc. IIRC it's all gone. Sure, they can scrounge up some material here and there for a NASA prob. but enough of the right stuff to make new warheads? I'm skeptical.
For me let's start with a 'big' missile first that in and of itself gives me some hope.

Just looked up the size of the tiny W68. This will make you cry:

"A total of 5,250 W68 warheads were produced, the single largest production run of any American nuclear weapon model. It was manufactured starting in June 1970 and ending in June 1975. Each Poseidon missile could carry up to 14 warheads; at the peak deployment, there were 41 US Poseidon submarines with 16 missiles each, for a total of 656 deployed missiles, at a density of about 10 warheads per missile.
 
sferrin said:
bobbymike said:
sferrin said:
If they want 400 missiles with anything like more than one warhead they better learn how to build them all over again. RVs, warheads, producing the bomb materials, etc. IIRC it's all gone. Sure, they can scrounge up some material here and there for a NASA prob. but enough of the right stuff to make new warheads? I'm skeptical.
For me let's start with a 'big' missile first that in and of itself gives me some hope.

Just looked up the size of the tiny W68. This will make you cry:

"A total of 5,250 W68 warheads were produced, the single largest production run of any American nuclear weapon model. It was manufactured starting in June 1970 and ending in June 1975. Each Poseidon missile could carry up to 14 warheads; at the peak deployment, there were 41 US Poseidon submarines with 16 missiles each, for a total of 656 deployed missiles, at a density of about 10 warheads per missile.
How about 5,250 warheads OF ONE TYPE produced in FIVE years :eek: would take us 50 years today (if we could even do it)

I would prefer about a 5 ton payload with 4 - 5Mt W-71s ;D

Lockheed announces GBSD team

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=2330
 
Hell, the Nike Hercules (a SAM at that) had 2550 W31s built for it.
 
Lockheed, Northrop Also Submit GBSD Proposals

—Wilson Brissett10/14/2016

Lockheed Martin announced Thursday that it has submitted a proposal to develop and produce the Air Force’s new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) system, including a new ICBM. The proposal was submitted Tuesday ahead of the Oct. 12 deadline. In a conference call with reporters, John Karas, vice president and GBSD program manager, said the new missile design would include three stages and a fourth post-boost stage, similar to Minuteman III, the USAF’s current ICBM. Lockheed Martin said it would design the system within a “total digital environment,” which Karas said would be a first for the Air Force. The “digital tapestry” design approach will lead to both cost savings in development scheduling and adaptability of the system design to emerging technologies, since the new GBSD is expected to be deployed up to 2075.

The Air Force has not released a full list of proposals received, but Boeing and Northrop Grumman also have delivered proposals, according to company officials. Northrop Grumman, which has served as the "developer and systems integrator on every ICBM weapon system since 1954," submitted its proposal on Oct. 11, according to a company statement. “Northrop Grumman is leveraging its comprehensive ICBM weapon systems understanding to fully integrate flight systems, launch systems, and command and control into a sustainable, capable, and affordable ICBM weapon system,” the company said.
 
bobbymike said:
Lockheed Martin said it would design the system within a “total digital environment,” which Karas said would be a first for the Air Force. The “digital tapestry” design approach will lead to both cost savings in development scheduling and adaptability of the system design to emerging technologies, since the new GBSD is expected to be deployed up to 2075.

Famous Last Words, to put it politely.
 
Grey Havoc said:
bobbymike said:
Lockheed Martin said it would design the system within a “total digital environment,” which Karas said would be a first for the Air Force. The “digital tapestry” design approach will lead to both cost savings in development scheduling and adaptability of the system design to emerging technologies, since the new GBSD is expected to be deployed up to 2075.

Famous Last Words, to put it politely.

I'd tend to agree, given our complete lack of any recent experience in the field.
 
Lockheed aims to leverage commonality, best practices in GBSD design

October 13, 2016

Lockheed Martin will look at commonality between Air Force, Navy and Missile Defense Agency programs and requirements to cut down on time, cost and risk when designing their pitch for the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, John Karas, the company's vice president and program manager for the effort, said Oct. 13.

Lockheed, Northrop Grumman and Boeing submitted their proposals Oct. 11 in hopes of winning the technology maturation and risk reduction contract. GBSD achieved milestone A in August, and the service expects to award up to two risk-reduction contracts by late fiscal year 2017.

Lockheed will collaborate with General Dynamics, Draper Labs, Aerojet Rocketdyne, Orbital ATK, Moog Inc. and Bechtel Corp. The most cost-efficient, least-risky technologies from each company may be combined into new hybrid products, though Karas said it's too early to tell. Karas, who spoke with reporters in an Oct. 13 conference call, expects the three-stage solid rocket and four-stage post-boost design to mirror the existing Minuteman III fleet.

Karas noted that Lockheed is exploring commonality of airborne and ground-based programs that are pertinent to both Air Force and Navy requirements. While Air Force and Navy requirements aren't always identical, he said, they are very close in many cases. The Navy is also pursuing a modernization effort for its submarine-launched ballistic missile.

"Several of the components that first and foremost meet the Air Force requirements, we're looking at to provide derivatives of those things specifically for the GBSD program, so it's a mix and a blend," Karas said. "We also have not only just on the airborne side, but on the ground side, other cyber-hard operational [operations and sustainment] systems that Lockheed Martin has for other Air Force programs we're leveraging, too."

Commonality is a major concern when fielding large numbers of new weapons -- 600 missiles and 450 launch sites as the Air Force has asked, Karas said. He suggested that digital similarities will help shorten the production schedule and save money, while hardware commonality is key as well because the physical missile plays a large part in initial life-cycle cost estimates.

He added that it's important for Lockheed not to be presumptive in deciding what common systems to pursue, and that those decisions will be driven by Air Force requirements and needs. Lockheed anticipates it could save more than $10 million a year through model-based systems engineering and the digital improvements, which would pair with savings earned through broader commonality.

Lockheed's missile design accounts for cybersecurity needs from the beginning to protect against hacking, Karas said. Nuclear surety designs will prevent the missiles from erroneous launch, and cybersecurity pieces will defend against infiltration and compromise. Those systems will be stress-tested later in the process, Karas added.

Lockheed has also conducted studies of fixed and mobile ground control sites to determine the right mix that would allow the silo-based missiles to survive in case of a first attack and subsequent launch. The company is attempting to reduce the number of sites to lower operation and sustainment costs while keeping the same level of survivability, Karas said.

Lockheed will continue discussions with the Air Force before choosing their final configuration of fixed and mobile sites, the mix of which was not a requirement but is dictated in part by survivability objectives.

The company will also analyze which of its sites can best handle the production of 666 missiles over the next decade or so. Arms Control Today reported earlier this month that Pentagon acquisition chief Frank Kendall approved an $85 billion cost baseline that would pay for 666 new missiles and rebuild existing missile infrastructure as part of the milestone A decision.

The new ICBMs are projected to start replacing the Minuteman III fleet in the late 2020s. The Air Force estimates the life-cycle cost of the GBSD at $159 billion through 2075.

Northrop Grumman and Boeing also issued statements on their ability to design the next ICBM.

"As the developer and systems integrator on every ICBM weapons system since 1954, Northrop Grumman is uniquely qualified to design and develop the next ICBM weapon system for the Air Force," the company said in an Oct. 13 email. "Northrop Grumman is leveraging its comprehensive ICBM weapon systems understanding to fully integrate flight systems, launch systems and command and control into a sustainable, capable and affordable ICBM weapon system."

Boeing contends that its experience creating the Minuteman ICBM in 1958 and related expertise "has influenced a GBSD concept that is readily capable and affordable . . . that will meet the Air Force mission requirements through 2075."
 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/GBSD?__prclt=BCua8voU

 

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LM is also the only US company that has built large ballistic missiles in the last 25 years. (Trident D-5 and Midgetman.)
 
The knowledge base for American ICBM design and production is not solely within Lockheed.
 
Moose said:
The knowledge base for American ICBM design and production is not solely within Lockheed.

I didn't say it was. I said they were the only company that has built ICBMs in the last 25 years.
 
http://www.defensenews.com/articles/labor-costs-data-questions-driving-icbm-replacement-cost-estimate

“So I would characterize all of the estimates in this area as lower fidelity than we would like. It’s unavoidable now because we just didn’t make those choices to collect that data ten or 20 years ago.”

Those in the nonproliferation community opposed to the ICBM replacement have pointed to the cost uncertainty as a sign that the GBSD program needs to be rethought. Kingston Reif of the Arms Control Association calls the ICBM the “least valuable triad leg” and sees the price tag as a potential weakness for the program’s future.

Question why in a "news" article about building the GBSD would you even get a comment from the ACA? They have no insight into how to build or at what cost they are proponents of unilateral disarmament and this IS NOT an article about arms control.
 
http://lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2016/october/ssc-GBSD-102016.html?__prclt=ydTQwFoN
 
From Inside Defense

Boeing delays choosing partners in GBSD bid, explores broad commonality
November 11, 2016

A Boeing official said this week the company does not plan to choose subcontractors in its bid to create the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent until the Air Force firms up its requirements, trying to ensure they choose industry partners who are best-suited to work on the service's final proposal instead of preempting Air Force needs.

"We think it's wise to wait until the requirements are firm to give the government the maximum flexibility as they establish those requirements, and then we can proceed to the supply competition with certainty around the requirements to make sure we bring the right kind of value," GBSD Program Manager Frank McCall said in a Nov. 8 phone interview with Inside the Air Force.

Boeing's approach contrasts with that of Lockheed Martin, which announced its industry partners last month, and Northrop Grumman, which declined to disclose its team in an Oct. 19 interview with ITAF.

Lockheed will collaborate with General Dynamics, Draper Labs, Aerojet Rocketdyne, Orbital ATK, Moog Inc. and Bechtel Corp., its GBSD program manager John Karas said in an Oct. 13 call with reporters.

GBSD is the Air Force's replacement for the fleet of aging LGM-30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles, which are planned to be retired by the late 2020s, as part of an overhaul of the entire nuclear arsenal. An Air Force report sent to the Senate Armed Services Committee in July estimates the life-cycle cost of the GBSD at $159 billion through 2075.

The three prime contractors, who have already submitted their proposals to vie for the technology maturation and risk-reduction contracts, will need to select subcontractors for their weapon system command and control, guidance navigation and control, cross-vector control and launch sites. Up to two TMRR contracts are expected to be awarded in late fiscal year 2017.

"We have a complete and comprehensive team of suppliers who will provide component solutions within our system architecture, and we have chosen not to commit any content to any subcontractor so that we maintain the broadest possible range of solutions for the Air Force as they finalize their requirements, and it enables us to bring competition or affordability once the requirements are locked down," McCall said.

Multiple Boeing suppliers can take on the Air Force's requirements, he continued, and said the company's approach will help the Air Force control the technical baseline going into design and development. Keeping options open will also provide more possibilities for commonality, McCall said.

"We believe actually that we should cast a broader net for commonality," he said. Air Force-Navy commonality poses an area of opportunity, "but there's a much broader set of systems and commonalities that can be utilized on GBSD for benefit to the Air Force. So we're casting a very broad net and bringing solutions that certainly encompass Navy commonality but bring other elements of commonality to the Air Force as well."

McCall declined to give examples of where commonality gains could be made, but pointed to Boeing's work in Ohio to refurbish all three legs of the nuclear triad.

"We view commonality as important, but I would say subordinate to the mission," he said. "Smart commonality is identifying those things that enable us to optimize the mission at low risk to the government."

While McCall declined to discuss specifics of Boeing's TMRR proposal, he noted that in addition to a study on the trade-offs of fixed and mobile ground stations, the company came up with a solution for GBSD ground units that enables government flexibility while "substantially" reducing operations and sustainment costs compared to the current Minuteman system at the same level of security.

Boeing is drawing upon its history as the prime contractor, chosen in 1958, for the original Minuteman missiles as proof it should win the next-generation nuclear contracts as well.
 
Boeing from their website

http://www.boeing.com/defense/weapons/minuteman-iii/index.page?cm_mmc=BDS2016-_-AdBanner-_-GBSD_WashExam-_-300+x+250

Yes I realize they are starting from a "look at our history" perspective but I really hope the thinking for the GBSD is not just Minuteman IV but more Peacekeeper II.
 
bobbymike said:
Boeing from their website

http://www.boeing.com/defense/weapons/minuteman-iii/index.page?cm_mmc=BDS2016-_-AdBanner-_-GBSD_WashExam-_-300+x+250

Yes I realize they are starting from a "look at our history" perspective but I really hope the thinking for the GBSD is not just Minuteman IV but more Peacekeeper II.

Minuteman IV might not be too bad:

http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-75.html

;)
 
bobbymike said:
Boeing from their website

http://www.boeing.com/defense/weapons/minuteman-iii/index.page?cm_mmc=BDS2016-_-AdBanner-_-GBSD_WashExam-_-300+x+250

Yes I realize they are starting from a "look at our history" perspective but I really hope the thinking for the GBSD is not just Minuteman IV but more Peacekeeper II.

Given that the Navy and Air Force are looking at a common RV/RB it's not inconceivable that future Trident D5 RVs would be uploaded to GBSDs while the host sub is
undergoing refit.

I also tend to think that Lockheed and its team have a huge advantage since they won most of the recent GBSD DemVal study contracts (penaids, re-entry technologies, guidance)
and have been running guidance experiments on Trident D5 LE DASO flights (e.g. multiple stellar sightings) on a modern guidance stack for years now.

Having said that, NG, Boeing and Honeywell have been working on other strategic guidance technologies that were not mature enough for Trident D5 LE but
have been matured and are maturing possibly sufficiently for their inclusion on GBSD.
 

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sferrin said:
bobbymike said:
Boeing from their website

http://www.boeing.com/defense/weapons/minuteman-iii/index.page?cm_mmc=BDS2016-_-AdBanner-_-GBSD_WashExam-_-300+x+250

Yes I realize they are starting from a "look at our history" perspective but I really hope the thinking for the GBSD is not just Minuteman IV but more Peacekeeper II.

Minuteman IV might not be too bad:

http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-75.html

;)

As long as it's not anything like that 'Minuteman IV' fiasco from the early Obama administration. [shudders]
 

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