Continuing relevance of the A-10 Warthog today and tomorrow?

yasotay said:
I think it is time for the entire mission to be reviewed.

I agree. It seems that there isn't agreement over what the "real" mission is of Close Air Support (CAS) and whether the retirement of the A-10 even represents a gap in capability. Hopefully, this review can be performed by someone who is seen as impartial so that we have some distance from inter-service rivalries, politics, and allegations of cherry picking the data or other sampling bias. The F-35 is still the intended replacement for the A-10, not a new OA-X or AT-X program. So it seems that saving the A-10 now through 2028 or 2040, or whenever the type will be replaced by the F-35, defers the debate.
 
PaulMM (Overscan) said:
Not an expert, which probably disqualifies my opinion, but...


The A-10 type platform has inherent advantages from its lack of speed and big wings in providing CAS that sticks around and owns the sky. Psychologically I think even if the F-35 does the same job of delivering ordnance on the enemy but from an invisible whizz-bang flyby at 30K, it won't have the same benefit.


What's more comforting in a fight, your buddy on your shoulder or a mobile phone and the same friend in a nearby bar on speed dial?


However, doing CAS the A-10 way in inherently more risky, especially if the enemy has modern air defence equipment. In a real fighting war of equals, the benefits of the A-10 approach may outway the risks. In limited wars, every pilot lost is a potential PR disaster.


If I was in charge, I'd look at a big wing loitering UCAV approach to CAS, able own the sky over a battlefield without risking a pilot. The right balance of low cost and survivability would be key. Not an easy balance to make.

If the answer to CAS is not "mudfighter" how is the answer to CAS big wing loitering UCAV "mudfighter"? Further, the United States Air Force would insist on operating such UCAVs with the whole perpetual "roles and responsibilities" debate rearing its head. The United States Air Force would also insist on stealth.

What if instead the Army Aviation Branch operated helicopter drones such as the X2 VUAS proposed by Sikorsky with FARPs for BOT CAS?
 
Army Aviation has been operating in a MANPAD environment for ten years. You don't hear about it because the ASE worked. When it did not in Iraq 2005ish they redeveloped the system in less than a year. MANPAD misses don't generally get released for public consumption. Army, Marine and Air Force rotorcraft have been shot at constantly and have taken hits. They have taken RPG hits as well. Again, unless the aircraft is shot down with casualties it does not make it out into the general public. I have no doubt that there is work going on to deal with the improvements in the threat.

I have no doubt that unmanned CAS will continue to grow, but until you can make it impossible for it to be hacked and you give the operator human visual acuity or better I am not sold that it is the best solution. I am always reminded of the Star Wars movie where the legions of robots are crushing the organics right up to the point their control station blows up. Here is a thought. If you are controlling UAS from an airbase at home, does not the enemy not have the right to attack the personnel and equipment associated with the opearion of that system? Do you attack the base or the controllers when they leave the base to go home? It is war after all.

The pundits who think that giving an Infantry soldier everything at the push of a button have likely never experienced the terror that is close combat. Wipping out your tablet and dialing up a bomb from the UAS accuratley is not so simple when people are really trying there best to terminate your existence and everyone around you is yelling orders and curses to expedite. Computer war seems so clean on television, reality is not. This of course will not be a problem when we field our drones soldiers to do the war thing for us. Just remember what was mentioned above. If they can't get you on the battlefield they may decide to bring the battlefield to you.

In conclusion the A-10 will go away. F-35 will do the mission brilliantly as demonstrated by USAF Inc. statistics to Congress. And the PBI will continue to do the dirty work.
 
yasotay said:
Army Aviation has been operating in a MANPAD environment for ten years. You don't hear about it because the ASE worked. When it did not in Iraq 2005ish they redeveloped the system in less than a year. MANPAD misses don't generally get released for public consumption. Army, Marine and Air Force rotorcraft have been shot at constantly and have taken hits. They have taken RPG hits as well. Again, unless the aircraft is shot down with casualties it does not make it out into the general public. I have no doubt that there is work going on to deal with the improvements in the threat.

I have no doubt that unmanned CAS will continue to grow, but until you can make it impossible for it to be hacked and you give the operator human visual acuity or better I am not sold that it is the best solution. I am always reminded of the Star Wars movie where the legions of robots are crushing the organics right up to the point their control station blows up. Here is a thought. If you are controlling UAS from an airbase at home, does not the enemy not have the right to attack the personnel and equipment associated with the opearion of that system? Do you attack the base or the controllers when they leave the base to go home? It is war after all.

The pundits who think that giving an Infantry soldier everything at the push of a button have likely never experienced the terror that is close combat. Wipping out your tablet and dialing up a bomb from the UAS accuratley is not so simple when people are really trying there best to terminate your existence and everyone around you is yelling orders and curses to expedite. Computer war seems so clean on television, reality is not. This of course will not be a problem when we field our drones soldiers to do the war thing for us. Just remember what was mentioned above. If they can't get you on the battlefield they may decide to bring the battlefield to you.

In conclusion the A-10 will go away. F-35 will do the mission brilliantly as demonstrated by USAF Inc. statistics to Congress. And the PBI will continue to do the dirty work.

How many C-130 and C-27 gunships will the US have for the low and slow mission?
 
AFSOC has ~30 or so AC-130 (a guess on my part really) and USSOCOM will have about 10 C-27J gunships I think. However they only use them at night in all but the most benign environments. They have been ridiculed for this, but in fairness they operate in a very dangerous part of the ADA umbrella for just about any weapon. The AC-130. lost in Desert Storm was lost because it did stay to fight after sunrise. I cannot fault the decision to operate only at night. Also they operate almost exclusively in support of special operations forces. They are good at what they do.

You could make a UAS gunship no doubt, but if it operates using the same tactics of driving around in circles at several thousand feet it will suffer the same sort of fate in higher threat environments. While you would not loose people, someone is going to get testy at the cost after several become smoking holes. Back in the old days of huge tank armies and massive integrated air defenses I shared ridge lines and valleys with very low flying A-10 that never flew straight and level for more than ten seconds. Usually when they were making a gun run. I once got to play target for a Joint Air Attack Team exercise and quickly found out it was not the A-10 you did see that was the one that got you. Between them the Cobra helicopters on the flanks and the artillery, I was glad I was not an armor officer.
 
Interesting comparison:
 

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GTX said:
Interesting comparison:

I dont really think thats fair. We arent fighting Stalinist Russia... keeping an outdated aircraft during a world war is a little different than keeping one that has served valiantly, and better than the newest models.

The reality is, the popular kids are killing the science club because they want that money for themselves. Its just reality... they let the wrong people in charge.

Ive met a dozen or so Generals and Admirals personally, including the former head of development for the Marines. The mentality of the new leaders is basically Corporate, which is why they keep having issues with responsibility. Under this particular Marine, even existing successful system was developed. Under several years by his successor... none have been developed that werent started by his predecessor. Not just that, some designs failed because they had 3-4 times the officers reviewing the designs, and couldnt pass simple design requirements. That amphibious tank was one of them... turret bent. How do you screw up so bad that a turret bends without being shot?

I actually saw this while competing against a few engineers... some of them had almost two magnitudes more funding, and could barely pass basic requirements. They ended up getting owned two years in a row by a group from the middle of nowhere, and then a university in Canada. Im talking about top engineers here... MIT, ect.

The whole reason things are so messed up, is because people refuse to be practical. They never learned to be practical because they never had to appreciate anything before.
 
Substitute Ju 87 by Ilyushin Il-2, rerun comparison taking into account aircraft as part of something bigger.

After that, consider: times have changed, to what extent are comparisons of aircraft separated by 50 years still valid?
 
That "comparison" probably was made for presenting the last point only ! ;)
 
The 2nd-to-last point listed in the GTX A-10/Ju 87 post is the most cogent..
- if there is a sky swept of enemy air superiority assets, it looks like the 'brown jobs' are gunna do it rough..
 
Doggzilla said:
I dont really think thats fair. We arent fighting Stalinist Russia...


Arjen said:
After that, consider: times have changed, to what extent are comparisons of aircraft separated by 50 years still valid?


I guess some people can't comprehend the detail of what is being presented. I ask both of you to point out what is inaccurate with the comparison points.
 
Greg, you call the A-10 obsolete. You stop just short of calling it useless.

Perhaps you meant 'less useful'? If so, I think the A-10 has been, and remains, very useful to the USA in the numerous asymmetric conflicts of the past decades. Ditch the A-10, which aircraft is going to take over its duties TODAY?

There's a saying in Dutch, 'Don't throw away your old shoes until you have got new ones'.
 
Good say !

Modified to match the case of the A-10 maybe a little bit better :
"If new soles for your old shoes are getting more and more expensive, think about wearing
boots during the summer, too, before you can afford new shoes !"
 
Arjen said:
Greg, you call the A-10 obsolete. You stop just short of calling it useless.

Perhaps you meant 'less useful'? If so, I think the A-10 has been, and remains, very useful to the USA in the numerous asymmetric conflicts of the past decades. Ditch the A-10, which aircraft is going to take over its duties TODAY?

There's a saying in Dutch, 'Don't throw away your old shoes until you have got new ones'.


Nice attempt to try to put words into my mouth or to imply things I did not say. Where did I say of even imply the A-10 was useless?! Maybe not the ideal platform for many roles (i.e. too much for low intensity but not enough for high) and certainly not the mythical platform some people seem to think it is.

Moving on though and responding to your question (will you respond to mine I wonder… ::) ): If the A-10 were retired immediately, what platforms would take over its duties? Well, the ones that are already doing so! That is: The F-16, the F/A-18 (classic and super), the various attack helicopters being used (AH-64, AH-1, Tigre…), UAVs such as MQ-9s, B-1Bs, Harriers, Rafales….should I go on?

BTW, following on from your Dutch saying…here is a photo of a Dutch F-16 operating over Afghanistan in 2008 - I would hazard a guess that it didn't just carry those LGBs for the photo opportunity... ::)

1024px-Dutch_F-16.jpg
 
GTX said:
Moving on though and responding to your question (will you respond to mine I wonder… ::) ): If the A-10 were retired immediately, what platforms would take over its duties? Well, the ones that are already doing so! That is: The F-16, the F/A-18 (classic and super), the various attack helicopters being used (AH-64, AH-1, Tigre…), UAVs such as MQ-9s, B-1Bs, Harriers, Rafales….should I go on?


I do not believe that the B-1B, MQ-9, AH-64, AH-1, or Rafale are used for airborne forward air controller duties, nor are their crews trained for such duties.
 
Someone remind me why the A-10 was developed in the first place.
Someone tell me what percentage of the conflicts in the last forty years that the United States has participated in were major combat operations in less than air superiority environments. How many of the major combat operations did the A-10 not participate in due to air and air defense threats.
Someone tell me how often the US has committed ground forces to offensive operations without first having achieved air superiority first.
We will repeat history. We will rid ourselves of the unsurvivable and slow A-1 Skyra...(oops) A-10 Thunderbolt. The Army will develop a capability to deal with the missing component, USAF will feel threatened and (hopefully) develop a capability that works in the dirty confusion that exist in support of ground forces.
 
What it boils down to is this: the A-10 is to be phased out, not because it has outlived its usefulness. It has to go, because the money to maintain and operate it is needed for other projects.
 
yasotay said:
Someone remind me why the A-10 was developed in the first place.


Because the USAF didn't want the Army to get the Cheyenne.
 
quellish said:
GTX said:
Moving on though and responding to your question (will you respond to mine I wonder… ::) ): If the A-10 were retired immediately, what platforms would take over its duties? Well, the ones that are already doing so! That is: The F-16, the F/A-18 (classic and super), the various attack helicopters being used (AH-64, AH-1, Tigre…), UAVs such as MQ-9s, B-1Bs, Harriers, Rafales….should I go on?


I do not believe that the B-1B, MQ-9, AH-64, AH-1, or Rafale are used for airborne forward air controller duties, nor are their crews trained for such duties.

A FAC won the Silver Star for calling in air support for an Army unit fighting a large Taliban force (I posted this elsewhere) and one of the platforms was the B-1, along with F-15's and F-16's.
 
Jeb said:
yasotay said:
Someone remind me why the A-10 was developed in the first place.


Because the USAF didn't want the Army to get the Cheyenne.

Lame. The AH-56 cancellation had zero to do with the A-10, nor did the A-10 prevent the US Army from starting up a Cheyenne replacement (AAH) almost immediately.
 
yasotay said:
Someone remind me why the A-10 was developed in the first place.

To replace the A-1 Skyraider. I agree in principle with you that USAF could do with a dedicated COIN platform. I would think an ideal solution for such a need would be a something like the AIAA gunship competition winner the CalPoly Firefox. Long endurance ISR and CAS/BAI fires. Could replace A-10s, AC-130s, MC-12s, SKAs, etc. But someone has to pony up the money. Which is why we are in a state of tension. No money.
 
Your mileage may vary:

"Why No One Is Buying the Air Force’s Argument To Ditch the A-10"
by Dr. Janine Davidson
May 21, 2014

Source:
http://www.defenseone.com/management/2014/05/why-no-one-buying-air-forces-argument-ditch-10/84949/

One of the most controversial proposals by the Air Force this year is its plan to divest the A-10 jet aircraft. The “warthog,” as it is known, is a slow moving, low-flying, ear-piercingly loud jet airplane built around a giant “Avenger” Gatling gun, which has provided intimidating fire power for troops in contact on the ground for nearly 40 years. By divesting an entire fleet, instead of just a few airplanes, the Air Force saves “billions, not millions” across the board in production and maintenance.

That $3.5 billion can then be invested in “multi-mission” aircraft, like the F-35, which, like the F-16, F-15, B1, and other platforms can conduct close air support (CAS), in addition to their other missions. From an enterprise management perspective, they argue, it is just inefficient to maintain a “niche” airplane like the A-10, when so many other more survivable platforms can also do CAS, in addition to interdiction, air-to-air, and penetrating strike.

As a taxpayer, I get the Air Force’s budget argument; but as the wife of a former infantry officer who claims the A-10 has saved real lives in combat, my belief that the A-10 can probably be retired is not really about the money. It’s about my assessment that the Air Force can adequately perform the CAS mission without the A10. The lingering question is, will they?

Soldiers in combat on the ground could not care less about the Air Force’s “enterprise-wide” analysis and the “efficiencies” gained by utilizing operationally oriented “multi-mission platforms.” Blah. Blah. Blah. What soldiers (and parents, spouses, and senators) want to know is that the firepower will be there when needed. Period. And here, the Air Force is just not getting that message across.

Truth is, the debate is not really about the A10—it is about the Air Force’s reputation and its perceived lack of dedication to the CAS mission. Divesting the one plane most visible to ground troops and perceived as the most optimized for CAS simply fuels the suspicion that the Air Force’s last priority is supporting the troops on the ground.

The Air Force’s own rhetoric about the need to “take risk” across the inventory and the value of “multi-mission” aircraft, focuses on business, not war, and drowns out the solid facts about how CAS has been and will be conducted in the future. And it only adds fuel to the fire when Chief of Staff, General Welsh says that various multi-mission platforms can do the mission “…maybe not as well, but reasonably well.” What, exactly, is “reasonably well?”

Consider a recent heated exchange between Senator John McCain during testimony by the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The Senator was incredulous when told by Secretary Deborah James and General Mark Welsh that a variety of aircraft, including the high-altitude B-1 bomber, would be able to fill the gap in the CAS mission:

“That’s a remarkable statement. That doesn’t comport with any experience I’ve ever had, nor anyone I know has ever had,” he said. “You’re throwing in the B-1 bomber as a close air support weapon to replace the A-10. This is the reason why there is … such incredible skepticism here in the Congress.” When General Welsh broke in to provide some data, Senator McCain cut him off saying, “General, please don’t insult my intelligence.”

Had the Chief been allowed to elaborate, he might have focused, not on the business case, but on the following facts:

CAS Is a Mission, Not An Airplane

CAS really is a mission, not a particular airplane. It is not being replaced by the F-35 alone, its holistic mission is being carried out by all sorts of other planes, manned and unmanned. Changes in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) along with technological advances have enabled an array of other platforms to conduct the vast majority of CAS over the last decade, and to do so with precision not available when the A-10 was designed in the early 1970’s.

Eighty percent of CAS missions in Iraq and Afghanistan have been conducted not by the A-10, but by an array of other aircraft, including AC-130’s, F-15E’s, F-16’s, MQ-1’, B-52’s, and yes, the B-1. As for the B-1, it is not an insult to anyone’s intelligence to point out that 40% of the weapons tonnage dropped in Afghanistan came from the B1, in over 10,000 CAS-oriented sorties—and there is just no way the A-10 could have done this.

CAS Looks Different from the Air

For troops on the ground, the thundering sound of an incoming jet means one of two things, relief or annihilation. Thanks to the fact that the U.S. Air Force maintains “air superiority” across the entire theater of battle, not just one company’s patch, U.S. and allied infantry welcome that otherwise terrifying noise. From the air, however, getting that firepower on target, and maintaining control of the skies, requires maintaining a technological edge over an increasingly sophisticated enemy.

The Air Force argues that the best way to protect troops on the ground is to take out the enemy before it even gets in contact with our forces. This means maintaining theater-wide air dominance with an array of platforms airborne across the battle space, and being able to swing within minutes from point to point. In this environment, the A-10 does not keep up. As one Air Force strategist explained, relying on the close-in only A-10 instead of these multi-mission platforms, “actually increases risk to our soldiers by reducing the ability to kill the enemy before the Army closes with to destroy the enemy…the less enemy soldiers can actually look our American ground forces in the eye, the better we’ve done our job.”

That said, the A-10 is most valued when then the enemy does get through and airpower is needed in shorter range. But this reliance on the A-10 may be misplaced, as the Air Force claims that the Warthog has increasingly demonstrated limited capabilities compared to other platforms. Take for instance the case of the 2011 Mackay Trophy winners, Don Cornwell, Dylan Wells, Leigh Larkin, and Nicholas Tsougas, a flight of two F-15Es, call sign “Dude flight,” who responded in conditions unreachable by the A-10:

With weather below rescue force minimums, Dude flight used Terrain Following Radar to execute five ‘Show of Force’ passes in a valley surrounded by high terrain. When hostilities escalated, Dude Flight expertly employed six Joint Direct Attack Munitions, helping kill over 80 Taliban fighters who occupied reinforced positions within the town. Their efforts helped save the lives of approximately 30 coalition troops. There were no civilian casualties.

These aircrew represent a generation of pilots of various aircraft, besides the A-10, who have added CAS to their skill sets in the last decade. For the Air Force to convince skeptics that CAS is a priority as the A-10 comes out of the inventory, the mission will need to remain high on the list of required skill sets for which pilots are trained and that they practice regularly.

The A-10 is Old

The A-10 was designed in a very different era, when, as one Air Force pilot explained, “the only way to deliver precise fires and effects was strafing with a gun.” Indeed, the A-10 is often thought of as a flying Gatling gun. Today’s precision-guided systems allow F-15Es or B-1s to deliver an array of munitions in greater numbers and with accuracy “unimaginable” when the A-10 was designed. Finally, the Air Force argues that future ground fights will see increasingly sophisticated anti-aircraft surface to air threats, making the A-10 increasingly vulnerable. Relying on this outdated jet in future fights places airmen and soldiers at greater risk.

These facts mean that even without the budget crunch, this old jet would be due for an upgrade. Even the most skeptical group of senators conceded in their recent letter of protest “We do not believe the A-10 can serve in the inventory forever—it will eventually be replaced.”

The Need for a Joint CAS Picture

Curiously, the Army has not formally objected to the Air Force’s divestment plan; nor have they asked Congress for funding to take over the A-10 system. Might this reflect an acknowledgment that, as the Air Force claims, the fire power has in fact been there when they needed it in Afghanistan and Iraq—either from an A-10 or from something else they perhaps did not even see?

As the primary “customer” of this Air Force mission, the Army’s voice is needed in the CAS debate. The Pentagon should conduct a joint Army-Air Force study of CAS, looking forward and back. They should look at the last ten years and get the facts of how well the air power has been delivered – from the air and the ground perspectives. They should also examine future CAS-oriented scenarios, from a joint perspective, to determine if losing the A-10 will create any “niche” gaps that cannot be covered by the rest of the inventory with existing or adapted TTPs. This holistic air-ground perspective will illuminate the nature of the risk, if any, being taken in divesting the A-10. It will also get Congress focused on the mission, not the plane.

Recent calls from Congress to delay A-10 divestment until a “capable replacement reaches full operational capability” miss the point of how this mission and the threat have changed and how technology has adapted. What Congress should be asking, in order to ease everyone’s minds, is how the Air Force intends to conduct the mission to the satisfaction of the Army with an array of twenty-first century platforms; not how it will replace, on a one-for-one basis, a plane originally intended to repel Soviet tank columns in the early 1970s.

Dr. Janine Davidson is senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Her areas of expertise include defense strategy and policy, military operations, national security, and civil-military relations.
This post appears courtesy of CFR.org.
 
bobbymike said:
A FAC won the Silver Star for calling in air support for an Army unit fighting a large Taliban force (I posted this elsewhere) and one of the platforms was the B-1, along with F-15's and F-16's.


I believe the person you are referring to was Sgt Eric Brandenburg, Jr. who was awarded the Silver Star for his actions as a JTAC in Iraq. He was not an airborne FAC, but worked with FAC(A) in A-10s. The B-1s, F-15s, F-16s were deploying weapons on coordinates.
 
Two points from the article. First the doctor is right that the Army does not trust the Air Force and has not for a long time. Second the reason the Army is not jumping up and down to get the aircraft is simple. They can't afford it.

We will repeat history, again. The enemy will learn to close with our soldiers very quickly, despite the claims airpower will get them first. Rules Of Engagement and enemies who cheat airpower by dressing in civilian clothes and hanging out at schools and hospitals and religious shrines will use information age technology to know how to optimize their opportunities to close to a point where JDAM will kill soldiers and enemy combatants alike. A gun run on one side of the wall while soldiers are hunkered down on the other will be the impossible from 30,000 feet. They will wait for multiple layers of cloud cover to degrade synthetic targeting. Combat is the ultimate Darwinian effort. The enemy will learn quickly, accelerated by global information access. The Army will invest in further accuracy to the cannon on attack helicopters, ask for a greater portion of the budget to develop more responsive rotorcraft and the USAF Inc. will pull a hat trick.

Anyone around in twenty years that proves me wrong, I'll buy all the beer.
 
sferrin said:
Jeb said:
yasotay said:
Someone remind me why the A-10 was developed in the first place.


Because the USAF didn't want the Army to get the Cheyenne.

Lame. The AH-56 cancellation had zero to do with the A-10, nor did the A-10 prevent the US Army from starting up a Cheyenne replacement (AAH) almost immediately.

Must disagree, and support Yasotay.

True, AH-56 cancellation had zero to do with A-10, because Army itself decided that delays/problems with Cheyenne were making it too expensive and politically untenable.

However, during its development Army noted that in addition to helicopter escort and limited anti-tank (the "approved" roles for attack helos), The Cheyenne could perform recon, Close Air Support and could dive bomb. When they started talking that, AF went ballistic and upgraded the announced role of the AX/A-10 from a medium priority long loiter A-1 replacement to a "premier" anti-tank vehicle as well as the only CAS vehicle the US would ever need. They specifically lobbied against the AH-56 citing the A-10 as being what the US really wanted if it was smart, and besides it's their role anyway. They were quite open about it, and you'll find multiple references to it in the literature at the time. The late, great Jeff Ethell talked about this on camera for one of the programs he worked on for the late, lamented Wings Channel. USAF was caught flat-footed when Army went and canceled AH-56 on it own.

Regarding AAH, USAF let it alone because Army had "realized", that Cheyenne was "too ambitious", and although low speed agility became a priority, the AAH requirements would not impinge on forbidden territory. No pusher/reversible props here! As Lockheed said in its marketing for its AAH proposal: "We're scaling down, not up".
 
"Why the A-10 is needed now more than ever"

There was an interesting editorial in the newest AW&ST that got it exactly right. An earlier article "Russian Response" which said 100 A-10s deployed in the Ukraine would make the Russians "take note" more than sending 600 troops. Also, that the Russians aren't concerned about F-35 at all when dealing with large numbers of deployed tanks, armor and heavy equipment. Also, NATO members Ukraine and Poland would be first in line and love to be able to help the Air Force out by doing the Air Force a favor by buying up all those useless, ageing and obsolete A-10s.
 
Yeah, it's the second week in a row that people write to AvWeek making similar arguments. Are you talking about selling/gifting A-10 to the Ukraine?
Totally unrealistic, if you ask me. You can't just hand the A-10s over and tell the Ukrainians to operate them for plenty of practical reasons. Not to mention that it would be seen as a very overt provocation towards uncle Vlad (whom admittedly is not known for subtlety himself...).
 
kcran567 said:
There was an interesting editorial in the newest AW&ST that got it exactly right. An earlier article "Russian Response" which said 100 A-10s deployed in the Ukraine would make the Russians "take note" more than sending 600 troops. Also, that the Russians aren't concerned about F-35 at all when dealing with large numbers of deployed tanks, armor and heavy equipment. Also, NATO members Ukraine and Poland would be first in line and love to be able to help the Air Force out by doing the Air Force a favor by buying up all those useless, ageing and obsolete A-10s.

The US is deploying combat forces to the Ukraine, the Ukraine is a member of NATO, Russians don't think the F-35 is a threat to ground forces and Poland wants to buy the A-10? I don't know if that was in the AW&ST editorial or just embellishment by kcran but whomever originated it ought to lay of the medical marijuana. Some serious hardcore delusion right there.
 
AeroFranz said:
Yeah, it's the second week in a row that people write to AvWeek making similar arguments. Are you talking about selling/gifting A-10 to the Ukraine?
Totally unrealistic, if you ask me. You can't just hand the A-10s over and tell the Ukrainians to operate them for plenty of practical reasons. Not to mention that it would be seen as a very overt provocation towards uncle Vlad (whom admittedly is not known for subtlety himself...).

The Ukraine inherited 92 Su-25s from the Soviet Union they don't need A-10s. Worst excuse for A-10 retention ever.
 
kcran567 said:
There was an interesting editorial in the newest AW&ST that got it exactly right. An earlier article "Russian Response" which said 100 A-10s deployed in the Ukraine would make the Russians "take note" more than sending 600 troops. Also, that the Russians aren't concerned about F-35 at all when dealing with large numbers of deployed tanks, armor and heavy equipment. Also, NATO members Ukraine and Poland would be first in line and love to be able to help the Air Force out by doing the Air Force a favor by buying up all those useless, ageing and obsolete A-10s.

Please provide supporting evidence for all of this.
 
GTX said:
responding to your question (will you respond to mine I wonder… ::)

So I guess the answer to my question is "no"...how surprising... ::)
 
kcran567 said:
"Why the A-10 is needed now more than ever"

There was an interesting editorial in the newest AW&ST that got it exactly right. An earlier article "Russian Response" which said 100 A-10s deployed in the Ukraine would make the Russians "take note" more than sending 600 troops. Also, that the Russians aren't concerned about F-35 at all when dealing with large numbers of deployed tanks, armor and heavy equipment. Also, NATO members Ukraine and Poland would be first in line and love to be able to help the Air Force out by doing the Air Force a favor by buying up all those useless, ageing and obsolete A-10s.

Ukraine is not a member of NATO, and one might remember how warmly the Russians reacted to Georgia's proposed joining NATO. Putin has said that he would consider Ukraine joining NATO as "direct threat" to his country. Two months ago, the Ukrainian Prime Minister said (in Russian) that Ukraine was not seeking NATO membership, and President Obama quickly echoed that.
 
Sure, they don't trust the USAF, but the US Army has had a special.. hate.. reserved for the USN/USMC..
..going back centuries..
 
J.A.W. said:
Sure, they don't trust the USAF, but the US Army has had a special.. hate.. reserved for the USN/USMC..
..going back centuries..

The rivalry between Army and USN/USMC is the traditional rivalry those types of services worldwide have had for centuries, especially when alcohol has flown freely. The concern Army has with USAF is the perception that USAF as an organization (not the aircrew themselves) will do what it wants, rather than what is needed, in supporting ground troops; will not always come as soon or as low as may be required and that if USAF feels something is its proper role, will work against Army (and to a lesser extent other services) from performing the task, even if it has no intention of doing it itself.

One of the things that endeared A-10 to Army for CAS so much was that it really couldn't do anything else and that's what its crews trained for. A-10s were there to support ground troops, period. Army didn't have to worry that they'd be assigned to do deep strike, attack the "rear echelon", perform battlefield air interdiction or be sent off looking for enemy planes to shoot down.
 
F-14D said:
The rivalry between Army and USN/USMC is the traditional rivalry those types of services worldwide have had for centuries, especially when alcohol has flown freely. The concern Army has with USAF is the perception that USAF as an organization (not the aircrew themselves) will do what it wants, rather than what is needed, in supporting ground troops; will not always come as soon or as low as may be required and that if USAF feels something is its proper role, will work against Army (and to a lesser extent other services) from performing the task, even if it has no intention of doing it itself.

One of the things that endeared A-10 to Army for CAS so much was that it really couldn't do anything else and that's what its crews trained for. A-10s were there to support ground troops, period. Army didn't have to worry that they'd be assigned to do deep strike, attack the "rear echelon", perform battlefield air interdiction or be sent off looking for enemy planes to shoot down.

Is that belief from way back when the United States Army Air Forces became autonomous from the United States Army by executive order in 1942?
 
Triton said:
F-14D said:
The rivalry between Army and USN/USMC is the traditional rivalry those types of services worldwide have had for centuries, especially when alcohol has flown freely. The concern Army has with USAF is the perception that USAF as an organization (not the aircrew themselves) will do what it wants, rather than what is needed, in supporting ground troops; will not always come as soon or as low as may be required and that if USAF feels something is its proper role, will work against Army (and to a lesser extent other services) from performing the task, even if it has no intention of doing it itself.

One of the things that endeared A-10 to Army for CAS so much was that it really couldn't do anything else and that's what its crews trained for. A-10s were there to support ground troops, period. Army didn't have to worry that they'd be assigned to do deep strike, attack the "rear echelon", perform battlefield air interdiction or be sent off looking for enemy planes to shoot down.

Is that belief from way back when the United States Army Air Forces became autonomous from the United States Army by executive order in 1942?

Do not want to take this off topic or start a "war", but it's more from actual and historical experience since USAF became an independent service in 1947. USN and USMC share the view to a certain extent, but they have their own air forces, so it isn't as pronounced.

Again, this regards overall policy and procedures, not the aircrews themselves.
 
F-14D said:
J.A.W. said:
Sure, they don't trust the USAF, but the US Army has had a special.. hate.. reserved for the USN/USMC..
..going back centuries..

The rivalry between Army and USN/USMC is the traditional rivalry those types of services worldwide have had for centuries, especially when alcohol has flown freely. The concern Army has with USAF is the perception that USAF as an organization (not the aircrew themselves) will do what it wants, rather than what is needed, in supporting ground troops; will not always come as soon or as low as may be required and that if USAF feels something is its proper role, will work against Army (and to a lesser extent other services) from performing the task, even if it has no intention of doing it itself.

One of the things that endeared A-10 to Army for CAS so much was that it really couldn't do anything else and that's what its crews trained for. A-10s were there to support ground troops, period. Army didn't have to worry that they'd be assigned to do deep strike, attack the "rear echelon", perform battlefield air interdiction or be sent off looking for enemy planes to shoot down.
100% spot on. For those who hang around folks who have been in the ugly places recently, there has been more than one occasion where USAF left a fight to the Army to deal with on its own. The distrust is NOT with the men and women in the ranks but with the hyper-PC, risk adverse senior ranks and the professional staff of USAF Inc.
Especially after twelve years in the mud together the USA and USMC are tight. The ribbing is traditional and more in tune with sport team taunts. USMC shakes their heads and says " Glad we got our own air force" over beer.
 
To be fair, the US forces rivalry has had a shorter, more scientifically/politically acrimonious history than most..

The USN hated the 'Army' when Billy Mitchell used bomber aircraft in a 'stunt' to destroy warships..
& the USMC have always rated themselves over the lubbers in dirt combat, living off their hand-me-downs or no..

& the USAF really begrudgingly admitted that various USN/USMC A & F type aircraft were better than what they had..

The British 'senior service' (Royal Navy) has, - valid condescension regarding command by merit, rather than by birth,
or buying - apart.. ..never hesitated to turn up & render landing (& rescue services) to the British army - unstintingly.

The demarcation issues regarding air arms has however been & still is - an ongoing issue, hence this thread..
 

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