What if the Soviet Union did not recieve RR Derwent & Nene turbojets???

[Pioneer]

G’day gents
For Christmas, I was fortunate enough to be given the book MiG: Fifty Years of Secret Aircraft Design – by R.A. Belyakov and J. Marmain, by a good mate, who appreciates my interest in aviation.
Whilst immersing myself into this fantastic simple but informative book, I have come across little bits and pieces I was not aware of (a sign of a good book!!).  The book covers the stage/variant development of each MiG aircraft. Although I thought I knew something of the I-305/MiG-9 series (one of the Soviet’s 1^st gen jet fighters). I was fascinated to discover the I-305/FL variant, a one-off MiG-9 airframe which was modified to take a single indigenous Lyulka TR-1 turbojet of 1,500 kg (3,300 lb) in place of the standard MiG-9’s pair of RD-20 (German BMW 003) turbojets. Sadly for the Soviet’s, at the end of 1947, when the I-305/FL was almost complete and ready to have the TR-1 engine fitted, the TR-1A then under development exploded whilst under testing. As a result of the failings of the TR-1A and the promising more technologically and vastly superior performing Lavochkin La-15 ‘Fantail’and Mikoyan-Guryevich I-310 S (MiG-15 ‘Fagot’), along with the stupidity and ignorance of the British government in supplying the Soviet’s with their state-of-the-art Rolls Royce Derwent V and Nene I & II turbojets. The I-305/FL (along with the Ilyushin IL-22 bomber) was discontinued.Now if I may, my question to the forum members is this-I hypothetically ask what if Britain and its politician’s at the time had more intelligence and foresight than they displayed in 1946. Say that they refused the request of the Soviet Union and do not handing over one of their greatest technologically advancements – the Rolls Royce turbojet engines (both Derwent and Nene designs). The Soviet aviation industry (and more importantly the Soviet military) would have been force to either persevere with the development of the RD-20 (German BMW 003) turbojets (perhaps coming up with something similar in line to the French and their SNECMA Atar – itself an afterburning development of the German BMW 003 turbojet) or and the continuation of the development of their own indigenous Lyulka TR-1 turbojet. (Note: In mid-1946, the Council of Ministers ordered the development of a MiG-9 with an 'afterburning' versions of the RD-20, based on the BMW 003S engine. These engines had a maximum power of 1,000–1,050 kgf (9.8–10.3 kN; 2,200–2,300 lbf) and were intended to increase the aircraft's speed to 920 km/h (570 mph) at sea level and 950 km/h (590 mph) at 5,000 meters (16,000 ft).(Note: the MiG bureau engineers left room in the redesign of the I-305/FL rear airframe for an afterburner then being developed for the TR-1 engine, that would boast the TR-1’s thrust to 2,000-2,500 kg (1,960-2,450 daN. (Does anyone know the designation of this engine??)
My question to the forum members is to apply your knowledge and experience in helping me obtain the following information:How long do you think it would have taken the Soviet’s to master the technical issues with the Lyulka TR-1turbojet?
 
Does the forum think it likely that an actual the Lyulka TR-1 I-301/FL would have entered operational service as an interim due to delays in fielding the Lyulka TR-1 powered MiG-15?  If the Soviet’s were not afforded the luxury of a technological jump in turbojet knowledge of British turbojets, how do you think the MiG I-310 S (aka MiG-15) would have performed powered by the operational Lyulka TR-1 turbojet? Saying this can I ask the forum’s expertice to calculate the possible/likely performance of a Lyulka TR-1 turbojet powered MiG-15 ‘Fagot’? Could the MiG-15 been fitted with the proposed afterburner variant of the TA-1 under study (sorry I don’t know the designation of this model of the TR-1 or how far it got)? After all this was proven to be possible with the later MiG-17 ‘Fresco’ The information I have for the Lyulka TR-1 turbojet is as follows:- In May 1944 Lyulka was ordered to begin development of a turbojet with a thrust of 12.3 kN (2,800 lb). He demonstrated an eight-stage axial-flow engine in March 1945 called the S-18.- In early 1946 the Council of Ministers ordered that the S-18 be developed into an operational engine with a thrust of 15.5 kN (3,500 lb). The TR-1 was developed in early 1946 and had its first static run on 9 August. It was tested in the air on a pylon fitted to a B-25 Mitchell piston-engine bomber.- The TR-1 proved to have less thrust and a higher specific fuel consumption than designed.- Lyulka further developed the engine into the TR-1A of 20.5 kN of thrust, but its specific fuel consumption was very high and it too was cancelled.
 Specifications of Lyulka TR-1

Weight: 885 kg (1,951 lb)
Maximum thrust (TR-1): 1,350kg(12.8 kN) (2,900 lb)                       
                       (TR-1A): 1,500 kg (3,300 lb)
Specific fuel consumption: 129 - 137 kg/kN·h (1.27-1.35 lb/lbf·h)
Thrust-to-weight ratio: 14.5 N/kg (1.47 lbf/lb)
 
Thanks for your time and consideration
 
Regards
Pioneer

[royabulgaf]

I don't think there would be very much change.   Axial flow engines were the future.   You would have probably seen a MiG-15 parallel using two Jumo clones.

[PaulMM (Overscan)]

From an early stage, there are axial designs, from Russian and expat German designers, but they are immature and the Derwent & Nene are reliable and easy to produce in comparison.


Lyulka's TR-1 gets press due to being Russian in origin, it took a relatively long time to evolve to a production design (as AL-7, 1954-55) and was universally regarded as appallingly unreliable until AL-7F-1.

Mikhulin's AM-TRD-1 (later AM-1) was actually used on the German/Soviet EF-140 prototype (derived from the Ju-287) was probably based on existing high thrust engine work done at Junkers, and flew in 1948, but was too unreliable for production. Development continued to the AM-3 used on the Tu-16 (first flight 1952). It was scaled down to make the AM-5, which was developed into the Tumansky RD-9 used on the MiG-19 (first flight 1952). Note both Tu-16 and MiG-19 were twin engined, so engine reliability was a bit less critical. The twin-spool AM-11, later Tumansky R-11, was the foundation of Soviet fighter engine design for the next 20 years. 

The unanswered question would be if possession of the Nene & Derwent had any real impact on the design of the AL-7, AM-3 and RD-9. Designwise, it seems unlikely, but possibly some metallurgy benefits from access to Rolls-Royce materials for analysis.

[tartle]

The Mig 15 would have been much later as a reliable engine would have taken much longer to develop than copying the Nene/Derwent engine sent to USSR. At the time people had not woken up to how relations would develop and change in late 40s so a left leaning UK government would not have realised how things would develop. The transfer of German prisoners-civilians who were on gas turbine teams in WWII were quite numerous. On the night of Oct 22 1946 250 BMW and 350 Junkers specialists were transferred to USSR.
The BMW task was to improve and support BMW 003 production at 2,200 lbt rating. Rotten turbine material meant the life and integrity of the blades was low and only a small number were built.
The Junkers group worked on developing a 6,700 lbt jet based on the Jumo 012; again turbine blade integrity meant the engine could not pass the Russian 100 hr type test and development was stopped in 1948. The combined Junkers/BMW team were then tasked with developing a 6,000hp turboprop.
Nikolai Kuznezow was the chief designer who ensured test beds and rigs were constructed while German specialists...
Alfred Schreiber and Josef Vogts supervised development, Ferdinand Brandner- the construction of prototypes and Karl Prestel supervised test bed trials.
A 100 hr test was achieved in Oct 1950 and the TW-2 engine as it was now called was readied for production at a completely Russian Manufacturing plant away from German personnel. The production ready version became the NK-4, rated at 5,000hp for take-off.
Produced in large quantities, it powered the Russian transport aircraft fleet. The German team then turned to a twin coupled engine version -TW-2F- and then moved on to the NK-12 at 12,000hp! This was first run in 1953; first flight was 1954 in the Tu95 bomber. Later it powered the Tu114 civil transport. Development pushed the power up to 15,000hp for the Tu95 'Bear' long range reconnaissance aircraft (see below).
The BMW/Junkers team also designed, in 1953, a civil turbojet that was transferred to the GDR who developed it as the Pirna 014.
Also prior to the moving of the BMW/Junkers personnel, Russia had moved a small team of pulsejet experts into Russia together with their Ju88 flying testbed for an engine being developed for the Junkers EF126 cheap and simple fighter. They carried on for a while with the project.
Another team of around 500 people ended up near Moscow in Sept 1946 flight testing the Ju287 and the forward wing sweep EF131 with 6 Jumo 004s. Testing these two configurations, limited though it was led to the airframe being modified once more into the Mikulin bomber No 14 with VK1 engines, modified Nene derivatives.
All this work ground to a halt due to wing buffeting that could not be easily cured. But the aircraft served as prototype for the GDRs 152 transport.
Klimov in 1945 had begun to try and copy the Nene engine but had great difficulty as their prototype was very crude; the present from UK in the Nene allowed them to begin again and reverse engineer the jet.
So what does this all mean for the original question? Would the MIG 15 have been ready in time for the Korean War? The MIG-9 straight wing aircraft using the axial BMW 003 being built by the first team (above) was in production and maybe a swept wing version of that plus more focus on solving the 003s turbine challenges could have got them there.
The Sabre was in service in 1949 and the MIG-15 in Nov 1950 and proved to be a better aircraft in most respects until later mark Sabres were introduced in 1953.
I guess the Sabre (First Flight Oct 1, 1947) would have been superior to the MIG-15 (FF Dec 30, 1947) from the start if no Nenes/Derwents were sent to Russia... which may have altered the length of Korean War?

[tartle]

This website in French has the Lyulka story ..Google trans ... not yet edited for trans funnies!is below.
It looks as though Russia could have used these engine a lot earlier if they had accepted the high sfc in the short term. Also getting metallurgists onto the problem of turbine materials would have helped tackle the integrity problem... a MIG could have flown with this engine if powerful enough..but that was later.. in the meantime would the Suhkoi have done?

[Michel Van]

With out British centrifugal compressor turbojet engine, It had only delay the USSR Aerospace a little bit.
The Junkers Werke in Soviet occupy zone was a Goldmine for the construction bureaus,

like the JUMO 004, the first successful axial compressor jet engine!
by the way Junker work on  advance JUMO 012 Jet engine and it Turboprop version,
last one was template for Kuznetsov NK-12 Turboprop engine for Tu-95 Bomber
 
the Tumansky Design Bureau, OKB-300. take over the JUMO production. becoming leader for Jet Engine in Soviet Union

So with working axial compressor jet engine, the early Soviet jets would very bad surprise for British and US in conflict implying Soviet Hardware.
the centrifugal compressor turbojet engine would replace fast by axial compressor jet engine in West...

[alertken]

OP: (Br.) stupidity and ignorance...supplying..state-of-the-art Derwent V and Nene I & II.
UK mid-1946 de-classified Goblin/Derwent/Nene. We had no enemy. We also had no $ to buy food and timber. We had very few things that anyone might care to buy...but we did have Vampire/Meteor, and centrifugal turbines. Argentina was a prime target. USSR noted engines' Open status and presumed that what UK was offering to a proto-Fascist was also available to an Ally, so made a barter proposition: Nene/Derwent for grain and timber. Curtiss-Wright was peddling big piston licences to USSR from Spring,1946: every Aero-business Prospect would be strongly contested UK:US. So, 10/46, with PM approval, Export Licences were issued for 10 Nene/10 Derwent. 15 more Nene/20 Derwent went Spring,47. Stalin, who had adhered to Allied Understandings and withdrawn from N.Iran, from Bornholm, Czechoslovakia, Manchuria, then started the dismal process of enslaving E.Europe. PM Attlee decided that no USSR/RR manufacturing licence should be granted, nor Meteor sold (though 100 went to Argentina); 11/47 UK restored military classification. J.A.Engel,The Surly Bonds:Am.Cold War Constraints on Br. Avn,P18,Enterprise& Society,1-1-6-2005,OUP; Cold War at 30K.ft,Harvard,07,pp53-89.
 
Revisionist historians will assert that UK/US' refusal to share with our Ally on a basis of equality and mutual respect, such as in Occupation of Italy and Japan...oh, and the Bomb...was the proximate cause of the Iron Curtain of self-defence. B-36 and B-50 were still in production, B-47 in development. Why?In order to deal with them, USSR spent muchly on Defence when food would have been good.
 
La-15, MiG-15, Il-28 were in hand to repel encirclement. Power for them was funded, on the captured German base, in parallel with effort to reverse the RR templates. In their absence, maybe MiG-15 would have appeared later and MiG-9 been enhanced - they built >1,000 of them anyway.

[tartle]

alertkin... that about sums it up!
Prodded me to remember Kranzberg's first law: technology is neither good nor bad – nor is it neutral.
...also it is worth bearing in mind books like Britain's War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second World War (2011) by David Edgerton which says UK view of itself as declinist is not correct and we were actually spending plenty on defence... factor in that and US expansionist approach and therefore offensive weapons development... the Russian culture of feeling under attack along a long border and we have a recipe for what happened next.... so perhaps the pressure to develop the indigenous gas turbines would have been more focussed? To misquote Churchill "We shape the tools and then the tools shape us." Which must have something to do with Kranzberg's first law.

[JFC Fuller]

In the broad sense, Edgerton misses a key point, he correctly identifies that the UK continues to spend a large portion of national output on defence though what he fails to point out with sufficient gusto is that overall the UK's percentage of global wealth has declined in the mean-time (and PPP has fallen) meaning that the amount of relative (to the rest of the world) military power it gets for that money is declining (especially in his earlier work, Warfare State). There are a multitude of anecdotal examples that demonstrate this. The UK was certainly spending a larger portion of its national wealth on defence in 1945-50 than it was in the inter-war period, with the exception of the last year before the war, but it was getting less for its money and the Soviets knew this as it was evidenced by the collapse of British military strength in Europe for which they had (courtesy of their new found empire) a front-row seat. It was also evident that military spending in the US was collapsing too with spending there (as a percentage of GDP) actually going lower than in Britain whilst by 1948 the allies could muster a maximum of just twelve divisions in Europe.

As for enemy's, governments may attempt to speak as one but we all know they do not; we know for instance that Bevin was concerned about the Soviet Union from the moment he entered office as foreign Secretary in 1945 culminating in his famous 1948 cabinet paper "The Threat to Western Civilisation" and active SIS operations (using what was left of the SOE absorbed into SIS; having been dissolved by Attlee in 1946) in Soviet occupied countries. Of course the transfer of the RR gas turbine technology to the Soviet Union did occur in a period of notable appeasement crescendoed by the switching of recognition from the Western Poles to the less savoury Soviet ones whilst ignoring such un-pleasantries as the Katyn massacre not to mention the Soviet complicity in the war of aggression for which so many senior Germans were prosecuted. The transfer of the RR engines is known to have angered the UK chiefs of staff (including Tedder as Chief of the Air Staff who despite initially being in favour was opposed by December 1946) and the Americans to the point that they scaled back existing intelligence cooperation and stalled further integration of intelligence operations. There was no universal naivety about the Soviet Union and there was strong opposition to the Nene and Derwent transfer, ultimately a Soviet request for Vampires and Meteors (three each, made in January 1947) was rejected. The transfer of the engines never seems to have made it to cabinet level and looks like it occurred because by the time anyone with the inclination and power to stop it realised it was a bad idea it had already happened. Certainly the driving force was Stafford Cripps who had a dual affinity to the Soviet Union being both a fully signed-up Marxist and having played a key part in the early-war relations between Britain and the Soviets. At the same time, in his role as head of the board of trade he was aware of Soviet complaints of being treated unfairly in trade with Britain and this was the middle of the post-war export drive whilst the engines in question were apparently no longer on the secret list. Reading literature from the time one also gets the impression that the allies thought the Soviet's were much further ahead than they actually were based on the assumption that the BMW 018 and Junkers Jumo 012 technology acquired by the Soviets was more complete and developed than it appears to have been in reality. When you combine those factors one can see why some may have thought the transfer innocuous.

That Stalin's Soviet Union was a deranged and paranoid entity focussed on its own self-defence (survival) is indisputable but that ignores the fact that it was also ruthlessly opportunistic when the opportunity for expansionism appeared, as was discovered by the German's even prior to the war. Of course the latter requires substantial military power and it is clear that the Stalin intended to maintain and develop substantial military forces irrespective of the military strength of the Western allies thus it is fairly obvious that without the technology transfer the Russians would have been delayed but would have probably filled the gap by stepping up espionage activities pushing their own R&D activities.

[redstar72]

The Sabre was in service in 1949 and the MIG-15 in Nov 1950

??
The first production MiG-15 was built on December 30, 1948 (exactly a year after prototype first flight). MiG-15 entered service in 29th GIAP (Guards Fighter Air Regiment) of 324th IAD (Fighter Air Division) on February 22, 1949! In 1949, 729 MiG-15s were built: 510 by Zavod No.1 in Kuibyshev (now Samara), 144 by Zavod No.153 in Novosibirsk, and 75 by Zavod No.381 in Moscow.

Or did you mean MiG-15bis?

[thrax]

In the broad sense, Edgerton misses a key point, he correctly identifies that the UK continues to spend a large portion of national output on defence though what he fails to point out with sufficient gusto is that overall the UK's percentage of global wealth has declined in the mean-time (and PPP has fallen) meaning that the amount of relative (to the rest of the world) military power it gets for that is declining (especially in his earlier work, Warfare State). There are a multitude of anecdotal examples that demonstrate this. The UK was certainly spending a larger portion of its national wealth on defence in 1945-50 than it was in the inter-war period, with the exception of the last year before the war, but it was getting less for its money and the Soviets knew this as it was evidenced by the collapse of British military strength in Europe for which they had (courtesy of their new found empire) a front-row seat. It was also evident that military spending in the US was collapsing to with spending there (as a percentage of GDP) actually going lower than in Britain whilst by 1948 the allies could muster a maximum of just twelve divisions in Europe.

As for enemy's, governments may attempt to speak as one but we all know they do not; we know for instance that Bevin was concerned about the Soviet Union from the moment he entered office as foreign Secretary in 1945 culminating in his famous 1948 cabinet paper "The Threat to Western Civilisation" and active SIS operations (using what was left of the SOE absorbed into SIS; having been dissolved by Attlee in 1946) in Soviet occupied countries. Of course the transfer of the RR gas turbine technology to the Soviet Union did occur in a period of notable appeasement crescendoed by the switching of recognition from the Western Poles to the less savoury Soviet ones whilst ignoring such un-pleasantries as the Katyn massacre not to mention the Soviet complicity in the war of aggression for which so many senior Germans were prosecuted. The transfer of the RR engines is known to have angered the UK chiefs of staff (including Tedder as Chief of the Air Staff who despite initially being in favour was opposed by December 1946) and the Americans to the point that they scaled back existing intelligence cooperation and stalled further integration of intelligence operations. There was no universal naivety about the Soviet Union and there was strong opposition to the Nene and Derwent transfer, ultimately a Soviet request for Vampires and Meteors (three each, made in January 1947) was rejected. 

That Stalin's Soviet Union was a deranged and paranoid entity focussed on its own self-defence (survival) is indisputable but that ignores the fact that it was also ruthlessly opportunistic when the opportunity for expansionism appeared, as was discovered by the German's even prior to the war. Of course the latter requires substantial military power and it is clear that the Stalin intended to maintain and develop substantial military forces irrespective of the military strength of the western allies thus it is fairly obvious that without the technology transfer the Russians would have been delayed but would have probably filled the gap by stepping up espionage activities pushing their own R&D activities.

Maybe the brittish feared the the US with nukes, advanced technoly and the ..momentum it had immediately after ww2 would go insane and have a go on USSR.. They kept the balance in Europe and the world one would say

[alertken]

balance. My view.
 
Start, say, late-1946. Uncle Joe is a good guy. He had paid 25Mn. times to be so. Truman is not a legitimate Pres and we know he will lose in 1948 - certain of that after 1946 mid-term Election. Republicans will hold him to pledge to bring the boys home before 11/48.
UK has a US Loan, and little else except Burden of World Policing, from Trieste, Greece, to Palestine, to India, to strange (under-reported) goings-on in Indo China and Neths. E.Indies. And no Bomb, about to be stolen by Congress.
If...HST had moved Right, towards isolationism, then...all bad guys needed to do was gently wait. France, Belgium, Italy, Iceland had >30% communist votes/MPs.
 
Now go to late-1947, and we are onway to (where we sat to 1991): ERP, NATO, blocs...and US commitment of warm, largely pink bodies to the cohesion of Free Nations. Now, If Dewey had won, 11/48, who knows...but HST won and poured money and more into making the world the way it is now. UK, especially Bevin-for-NATO, played a part that we may call balancing, but be clear: the commitment of New York to defend York, all-for-one and one-for-all, was sublime, unprecedented.
 
Was it all a misreading of UJ's objectives? Did he not really mean what his religion says, about exporting the way and the light? Like the Iranis, should we ignore all the bluster for domestic consumption? Well...no. You never can tell.
 
The single most significant development, learning from history, in post-Cold War times, is the Open Skies transparency extant, NATO:Russian Fedn. Attaches, legitimate spies, sit in SHAPE and in Moscow. Trust...but verify.

[JFC Fuller]

balance. My view.
 
Start, say, late-1946. Uncle Joe is a good guy. He had paid 25Mn. times to be so. Truman is not a legitimate Pres and we know he will lose in 1948 - certain of that after 1946 mid-term Election. Republicans will hold him to pledge to bring the boys home before 11/48.
UK has a US Loan, and little else except Burden of World Policing, from Trieste, Greece, to Palestine, to India, to strange (under-reported) goings-on in Indo China and Neths. E.Indies. And no Bomb, about to be stolen by Congress.
If...HST had moved Right, towards isolationism, then...all bad guys needed to do was gently wait. France, Belgium, Italy, Iceland had >30% communist votes/MPs.
 
Now go to late-1947, and we are onway to (where we sat to 1991): ERP, NATO, blocs...and US commitment of warm, largely pink bodies to the cohesion of Free Nations. Now, If Dewey had won, 11/48, who knows...but HST won and poured money and more into making the world the way it is now. UK, especially Bevin-for-NATO, played a part that we may call balancing, but be clear: the commitment of New York to defend York, all-for-one and one-for-all, was sublime, unprecedented.

I don't think anyone, in relation to the Nene/Derwent transfer, ever thought at that level. Rather bureaucratic inertia was the cause: Assumption that German technology has given the Soviets far more than it had, Nene/Derwent off the secret list, massive post-war export drive with aviation seen as a key industry, and a board of trade relatively positively disposed to the Soviet Union in the first place. Only now, with the benefit of time, do we realise that the transfer was actually a corner stone of Soviet turbojet development and only after the act was it realised just how opposed  the US was; hence no Meteors or Vampires with red stars.
 

Was it all a misreading of UJ's objectives? Did he not really mean what his religion says, about exporting the way and the light? Like the Iranis, should we ignore all the bluster for domestic consumption? Well...no. You never can tell.

Given that Stalin's Soviet Union conspired with Hitler's Germany to carve up Eastern Europe, including invasions of both Poland, Finland and the absorption of the Baltic states then consolidated its gains with a healthy dose of firing squads, then used its 1945 victory to push its client state empire further West before making territorial demands of Turkey it is fair to say that there was only a degree of bluster.

[Pioneer]

Thank you gentlemen for your very interesting and informative replies and input!!
This has helped me a lot in understanding and appreciating how things might have progressed.


I look forward to more input from the knowledge and points of views from fellow forum member's

P.S. Sorry Overscan for posting this topic in the wrong section of the forum 

Regards
Pioneer   

[PaulMM (Overscan)]

Useful info on German assistance with Soviet engine development here:

Military trophies of the Soviet Union
http://www.airpages.ru/eng/ru/troph.shtml

German specialists in the USSR
http://www.airpages.ru/eng/ru/troph2.shtml

Creation of the TV-2 (NK-12) turboprop engine
http://www.airpages.ru/eng/ru/troph3.shtml

based on the book
"The German Imprint on the History of Russian Aviation " D.A. Sobolev, D.B. Khazanov Rusavia 1999

[PaulMM (Overscan)]

Interesting from previous links is that the key to successful Soviet engine development like NK-12 was getting the right alloys for high temperatures.


So, the importance of Nene & Derwent post early fifties also depends on whether material samples from them (Nimonic 75, 80) provided the basis for Soviet development of high temperature alloys.

Also note:

  By this time, young Soviet engineers who had just graduated from aviation higher educational institutes joined the ranks of the German specialists. Thus, the entire graduating class of the Engine Department at the Kuybyshev Aviation Institute was sent to Plant No. 2 in 1947. 

[LazloF]

I don't think there would be very much change.   Axial flow engines were the future.   You would have probably seen a MiG-15 parallel using two Jumo clones.

I couldn't disagree more Bulgaf. I think the Nene deal was stupid in extreme. Stafford Cripps was ignorant of the outcome. Indeed, the F-86 was no match for the MiG-15 with its Nene copy engine for the first year of the Korean War and I often wonder if the RAF chose not to send any front-line aircraft to Korea precisely because they knew the MiG's engine would be better than anything we had. Why the hell we skilled the Nene (except in the Vampire) beats me!

Also, Americans were so angry about the deal that they imposed restrictions on the new De Havilland Comet, so that it could not land in countries not allied with the USA and groundcrews had to comprise exclusively of UK personnel.

I think the whole thing led to a breakdown of trust between the UK and USA aeronautical industries and probably caused indirectly the demise of the UK aviation industry. To say it had little effect on the development of engines seems unlikely.