Zootycoon said:
SR71 was a high alt, high speed but it’s frequently claimed that it’s never been intercepted or missile locked.

Some BAC Lightning pilots would dispute that, just as they would dispute that Concorde could not be intercepted. SR-71s were intercepted by Lightnings flying ballistic trajectories above the SR-71's flightpath.
 
Kadija_Man said:
Zootycoon said:
SR71 was a high alt, high speed but it’s frequently claimed that it’s never been intercepted or missile locked.

Some BAC Lightning pilots would dispute that, just as they would dispute that Concorde could not be intercepted. SR-71s were intercepted by Lightnings flying ballistic trajectories above the SR-71's flightpath.

Flying a ballistic path over an aircraft flying under control is unlikely to result in an intercept. Just ask the many Soviet pilots who tried that against subsonic U-2s.
 
Indeed. Getting to 84,000ft in a zoom climb is one thing - doing at at the precise second to watch the SR-71 streak by out your window at Mach 3.5 is terribly hard.

Also you'll be travelling slowly on a ballistic path - good luck aiming your Red Top AAM. Which won't go fast enough to catch it in a tailchase....
 
Your points are valid but the claim was that the SR-71 had "never been intercepted or had a missile lock". The Lightnings did both. Therefore, my point stands, the SR-71 had been intercepted and had suffered a missile lock.

Red Top was IIRC an "all angle" IR missile against supersonic targets and that describes the SR-71. Therefore, firing it in a stern chase wasn't necessary.
 
I couldn't possibly d'iss the contributor's aircraft recognition skills, but they wouldn't happen to have seen this?
 

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Zootycoon said:
SR71 was a high alt, high speed but it’s frequently claimed that it’s never been intercepted or missile locked. Does the real experience of the last 40 years really rule out high level high speed?
Reading this
https://theaviationgeekclub.com/viggen-vs-blackbird-swedish-air-force-ja-37-fighter-pilots-able-achieve-radar-lock-legendary-sr-71-mach-3-spy-plane/
... makes me think JA37 Viggen and MiG-25 were able to achieve missile lock on an SR-71.
Almost every time the SR-71 was about to leave the Baltic, a lone MiG-25 Foxbat belonging to the 787th IAP at Finow-Eberwalde in the German Democratic Republic was scrambled. […] Arriving at its exit point, the “Baltic Express” was flying at about 22km and the lone MiG would reach about 19km in a left turn before rolling out and always completing its stern attack 3km behind its target. We were always impressed by this precision; it was always 22km and 3 km behind the SR-71. [this would seem to suggest that these were the parameters necessary for its weapons system to effect a successful intercept if the order to fire was ever given.] This is interesting, since US Air Force intelligence specialists and SR-71 crewmembers believed that the only possibility of an interceptor successful engaging a Blackbird would be head on, a position given further credence by the fact that the DEF systems designed to tackle an airborne threat operating within the X-band (DEF A2) was forward-facing]. When the SR-71 detachment at Mildellhall [Mildenhall] was deactivated, the 787th IAP re-equipped with new MiG-29 Fulcrum, but even after the withdrawal, we believe that at least three Foxbats remained behind at Finow-Eberswalde, just in case the “Baltic Express” returned!
As told by Crickmore, the first successful intercept of an SR-71 over the Baltic was carried out by Per-Olof Eldh, who recalls the incident: “In the 1980, I joined the 2nd Squadron “Blue Marlins” of Fighter Wing 13, equipped with the JA-37 fighter Viggen and based at Bravalla, just outside the town of Norrkšping, on the Baltic coast. Our mission was to conduct operational task and evaluation focused on air defence and air superiority. We were already equipped with a datalink from the air defence network; the next step was to establish it between fighters and we achieved this in 1981. Integrating this with the PS-46 air-to-air pulse-Doppler radar and the Skyflash missile provided the JA-37 with a significant enhanced capability. Looking at the map display on the MFD, the pilot could see other friendlies, the enemy, SAM sites, etc, and this information was constantly updated via the datalink by fighter controllers and other JA-37s, giving the pilot unprecedented levels of situational awareness. In fact, the system was so good that we could employ the same tactics – line abreast, box formations or scissors maneuvers – day or night in VFR or IFR [visual flight rules or instrument flight rules] conditions.

When i conducted the first Swedish Air Force intercept of an SR-71, the target had completed its north-bound pass of the Soviet coastline, and had turned west, south of the Finnish island of Aland, and was tracking south of a heading that would take it between Gotland and Öland. The datalink from the fighter controller was on, and I lined up for a head-on attack with a target angle of 180°. From my altitude of 8.000m I accelerated to Mach 1.35 then pulled up, very gently, continuing to accelerate to between Mach 1.7 and Mach 2.0, topping out at between 18.500 and 20.000m. All the target data was on my map display, including radar detection of the target at maximum range, which then locked on immediately afterwards. I simulated missile launches – the closing velocity was very high, between Mach 4.5 and 5.0; the SR-71 was flying at Mach 2.98 and 21.500m.
I had visual contact.

In total I have five hot intercepts against the SR-71 to my credit. All can be described as successful. I was visual three times; on a couple of occasions the SR-71 was contrailing, which was very useful because you could do a visual check to ensure you ended up in the right spot!

When we began conducting these SR-71 intercepts, the squadron began a special air safety program and we all underwent an intense series of emergency procedure checks in the simulator, because we were flying at the outer edges of the envelope and at higher risk.

On January 1986, while leading a JA-37 three-ship in aircraft tail number “38”, we received target data immediately after take-off from Bravalla. We flew in trail, receiving updated target information over the link from both the fighter controller and the other fighters in the formation. All three of us carried out successful intercepts between 13:14 hours and 13:25 hours, about 50km west of the town of Visby, on the island of Gotland. Major Moller was number two, in tail number “60”, and Captain Ulf Johansson number three in tail number “53”.
I remember that the SR-71 was flying at an altitude of 22.000m and a speed of Mach 2.9. Ulf had some difficulties coming back to earth – he actually reached the target’s altitude and passed the SR-71 head-on at the same altitude with some side separation, but suffered a high temperature engine stall! A cartoon drawn by SAS Captain Stefan Lofren to commemorate this event was used as a poster in our briefing room.”
 
Kadija_Man said:
Your points are valid but the claim was that the SR-71 had "never been intercepted or had a missile lock". The Lightnings did both.

Evidence?
 
Arjen said:
Zootycoon said:
SR71 was a high alt, high speed but it’s frequently claimed that it’s never been intercepted or missile locked. Does the real experience of the last 40 years really rule out high level high speed?
Reading this
https://theaviationgeekclub.com/viggen-vs-blackbird-swedish-air-force-ja-37-fighter-pilots-able-achieve-radar-lock-legendary-sr-71-mach-3-spy-plane/
... makes me think JA37 Viggen and MiG-25 were able to achieve missile lock on an SR-71.
Almost every time the SR-71 was about to leave the Baltic, a lone MiG-25 Foxbat belonging to the 787th IAP at Finow-Eberwalde in the German Democratic Republic was scrambled. […] Arriving at its exit point, the “Baltic Express” was flying at about 22km and the lone MiG would reach about 19km in a left turn before rolling out and always completing its stern attack 3km behind its target. We were always impressed by this precision; it was always 22km and 3 km behind the SR-71. [this would seem to suggest that these were the parameters necessary for its weapons system to effect a successful intercept if the order to fire was ever given.] This is interesting, since US Air Force intelligence specialists and SR-71 crewmembers believed that the only possibility of an interceptor successful engaging a Blackbird would be head on, a position given further credence by the fact that the DEF systems designed to tackle an airborne threat operating within the X-band (DEF A2) was forward-facing]. When the SR-71 detachment at Mildellhall [Mildenhall] was deactivated, the 787th IAP re-equipped with new MiG-29 Fulcrum, but even after the withdrawal, we believe that at least three Foxbats remained behind at Finow-Eberswalde, just in case the “Baltic Express” returned!
As told by Crickmore, the first successful intercept of an SR-71 over the Baltic was carried out by Per-Olof Eldh, who recalls the incident: “In the 1980, I joined the 2nd Squadron “Blue Marlins” of Fighter Wing 13, equipped with the JA-37 fighter Viggen and based at Bravalla, just outside the town of Norrkšping, on the Baltic coast. Our mission was to conduct operational task and evaluation focused on air defence and air superiority. We were already equipped with a datalink from the air defence network; the next step was to establish it between fighters and we achieved this in 1981. Integrating this with the PS-46 air-to-air pulse-Doppler radar and the Skyflash missile provided the JA-37 with a significant enhanced capability. Looking at the map display on the MFD, the pilot could see other friendlies, the enemy, SAM sites, etc, and this information was constantly updated via the datalink by fighter controllers and other JA-37s, giving the pilot unprecedented levels of situational awareness. In fact, the system was so good that we could employ the same tactics – line abreast, box formations or scissors maneuvers – day or night in VFR or IFR [visual flight rules or instrument flight rules] conditions.

When i conducted the first Swedish Air Force intercept of an SR-71, the target had completed its north-bound pass of the Soviet coastline, and had turned west, south of the Finnish island of Aland, and was tracking south of a heading that would take it between Gotland and Öland. The datalink from the fighter controller was on, and I lined up for a head-on attack with a target angle of 180°. From my altitude of 8.000m I accelerated to Mach 1.35 then pulled up, very gently, continuing to accelerate to between Mach 1.7 and Mach 2.0, topping out at between 18.500 and 20.000m. All the target data was on my map display, including radar detection of the target at maximum range, which then locked on immediately afterwards. I simulated missile launches – the closing velocity was very high, between Mach 4.5 and 5.0; the SR-71 was flying at Mach 2.98 and 21.500m.
I had visual contact.

In total I have five hot intercepts against the SR-71 to my credit. All can be described as successful. I was visual three times; on a couple of occasions the SR-71 was contrailing, which was very useful because you could do a visual check to ensure you ended up in the right spot!

When we began conducting these SR-71 intercepts, the squadron began a special air safety program and we all underwent an intense series of emergency procedure checks in the simulator, because we were flying at the outer edges of the envelope and at higher risk.

On January 1986, while leading a JA-37 three-ship in aircraft tail number “38”, we received target data immediately after take-off from Bravalla. We flew in trail, receiving updated target information over the link from both the fighter controller and the other fighters in the formation. All three of us carried out successful intercepts between 13:14 hours and 13:25 hours, about 50km west of the town of Visby, on the island of Gotland. Major Moller was number two, in tail number “60”, and Captain Ulf Johansson number three in tail number “53”.
I remember that the SR-71 was flying at an altitude of 22.000m and a speed of Mach 2.9. Ulf had some difficulties coming back to earth – he actually reached the target’s altitude and passed the SR-71 head-on at the same altitude with some side separation, but suffered a high temperature engine stall! A cartoon drawn by SAS Captain Stefan Lofren to commemorate this event was used as a poster in our briefing room.”

Sure. F-15s did the same thing - when the SR-71s weren't treating them as a threat. When the Blackbird pilots treated them as threats there was zero success on the part of the Eagle pilots.
 
The first JA37 interceptions were in the eighties. Technology has advanced since then.
 
Arjen said:
The first JA37 interceptions were in the eighties. Technology has advanced since then.

Which would be relevant if we weren't taking about ancient BAC Lightnings.
 
I thought we were discussing the util8ty of intruding fast and high with Military Concorde.
 
So the B52 successfully intruded at medium level in Nam, Iraq, and Stan. As did the Supersonic B1. The Supersonic Tu160 successfully intruded at medium level in Syria. The Vulcan even successfully intruded at medium level down south....... so why would a military Concorde have faired so badly at high level?
 
Consider the opposition.
 
It gets a mention in Nimrod's Genesis, but the pic was too horrid to use.

Chris
 
Consider the opposition?

So had a military Concorde entered service in the late 70’s and been out of service by 2010 do we consider the opposition which actually occurred or the projected worst case as seen at the time? They’re very different

Consider that;-
1 - the low level penetration doctrine was only really tested once during GW1 and it junked as fast as possible (the first medium level B52 raid was just 24hr after the start and low level penetration stopped after about 96hr) . A rapid degrading the radars, C3 etc so as to allow medium level operations seems to have been a much more practical strategy.

2 - when the military Concorde was being proposed workable AEW and look down shoot down had arrived which pretty much low level penetration obsolete.

So by the early 1980’s the new penetration strategy was degrade and stealth which in turn gave a new lease of life to the aging bomb trucks......Mach 2 at 70+k ft was unnecessary.
 
Zootycoon said:
And nobody bought a military Concorde;- if anyone really wanted to chuck SRAM’s around they would have been much better off buying F111 which could carry 4 and fly at low level (or integrating it on Tornado) . The whole Concorde strike aircraft probably amounted to little more than a dozen or so pages in a futile attempt to sell just a few more when the writing was on the wall for the whole project.

That said;-
Tu 95 was not known for its low level performance but like B52, it’s still in service;- B52 has been used quite a bit but seldom if ever has it needed its low level capabilities;- most of it’s work is at medium level (even Nam). As has the B1 and when Tu160’s have come steaming inbound to test the UK air defences they’ve not been particularly low. SR71 was a high alt, high speed but it’s frequently claimed that it’s never been intercepted or missile locked. Does the real experience of the last 40 years really rule out high level high speed?

Maybe the real reason to kill ambitious projects/small fleets was far more mundane in particular very high costs.

The Bear-H had a second life as a cruise missile carrier (those cruise missiles doing the low altitude high-subsonic penetrating); ditto the B-52G & H.
The combat use of strategic bombers post-Vietnam have been as stand-off missile carriers or against 3rd rate or all-but non-existent air defenses.
That’s not to say high altitude supersonic speed dash doesn’t have a limited utility (theoretically available to the B-1B, BlackJacks & Backfires) but chasing ever higher and faster was judged a fools games when missiles (principally SAMs and AAMs) having reached a degree of maturity would, if required to evolve to counter such threats, would win that race relatively easily.
Hence a high price (cost, complexity, weight etc.) to pay unless also tied up with maximizing high-subsonic low level penetration performance.
To give an example the SR-71 was never actually developed for a bombing role (despite many rumors that it had) and would have been vulnerable during a deep penetration of Soviet air defences against the most advanced Russian SAMs and fighters of the time.
 
Military Concorde flying into full-on Warsaw Pact AA-systems would have caught a snoot full of missiles.
 
The question would be: how many of the air defense sites and airfields that hosted
the DEW-line/AEW/interceptors that could threaten a high-altitude, high-speed
penetrator would survive precursor attacks by SLBMs and ICBMs?

SIOP-62, for example, devoted a good chunk of the Polaris inventory towards SEAD.
And even in the early 70's very few ICBMs and SLBMs had the hard target kill capability
of the penetrating bomber.
 
marauder2048 said:
The question would be: how many of the air defense sites and airfields that hosted
the DEW-line/AEW/interceptors that could threaten a high-altitude, high-speed
penetrator would survive precursor attacks by SLBMs and ICBMs?

SIOP-62, for example, devoted a good chunk of the Polaris inventory towards SEAD.
And even in the early 70's very few ICBMs and SLBMs had the hard target kill capability
of the penetrating bomber.

Why use the ICBMs to clear a path for supersonic bombers while you could use the ICBMs to strike the main targets? And please don’t go down the line that a theoretical Concorde bomber of this time period could have realistically located and hit mobile targets or small hardened targets like silos; it would likely have been markedly inferior and less survivable than the actual bombers that were fielded at this time.
 
Polaris was targeted as SEAD weapon because of its relatively short range, perception was Soviet air defences were stronger along the borders and coasts so could be taken out by the early short-ranged SLBMs allowing bombers to roam the hinterland (note the B-1A was intended to penetrate at low altitude but then climb once in the Soviet interior). In the 1960s and 1970s the bombers could carry higher yield weapons (e.g. B53) than the in-inventory ICBMs so were assigned the bunker busting mission against strategic targets. That seems to have been the US approach.

I have been told that Canberra crews in RAF Germany were to perform a similar door-kicking role for the V-force prior to its replacement with Polaris.
 
The proposed military Concorde carries something like SRAM so it’s a cruise missile carrier just like the B52/B1/Tu95. SRAM had a low level operating mode and was replaced by ALCM in about 1990 hence its not unreasonable to assume a similar line of evolution.

The opening phase of GW1 against a copy of a Warsaw pack air defence structure showed low level penetration was really problematic and alone offered little protection. Combined strike packages precisely targeted against key assets degraded it, so as open up medium level operations. This is the same strategy which would have been used in any major engagement in Eastern Europe. Just how well this would have worked is anyone’s guess as in the timeline when a military Concorde would have been in service we never had to find out ...........thank goodness.
 
kaiserd said:
Why use the ICBMs to clear a path for supersonic bombers while you could use the ICBMs to strike the main targets?

Because the main targets are protected by ABM systems that are unconstrained by a treaty.


kaiserd said:
And please don’t go down the line that a theoretical Concorde bomber of this time period could have realistically located and hit mobile targets or small hardened targets like silos; it would likely have been markedly inferior and less survivable than the actual bombers that were fielded at this time.

The hardened targets of this period were vulnerable to 1-2 MT warheads with 400m CEP. Well within the abilities
of the tech of the late 60's/early 70's.
 
sferrin said:
Kadija_Man said:
Your points are valid but the claim was that the SR-71 had "never been intercepted or had a missile lock". The Lightnings did both.

Evidence?

Mentioned in several books, about the English Electric/BAC Lightning.
 
marauder2048 said:
kaiserd said:
Why use the ICBMs to clear a path for supersonic bombers while you could use the ICBMs to strike the main targets?

Because the main targets are protected by ABM systems that are unconstrained by a treaty.

And which supposed ABM systems were these?
 
The best way to solve this bomber conundrum is for someone to go to this 'Concorde archive' (I find that far too vague for my liking) and dig out the file.

Also, back in the early 60s, Skybolts (and MR kit) were being strapped on and in anything that could possibly lift them in various design studies (Atlantic, Belfast, Trident, VC10, HP.117). I suspect the same was true of SRAMs and any British equivalent studies in the 1970s, so perhaps some drawing office apprentice might just have been sent to draw up a Concorde bomber. Always bear in mind Ralph Hooper's 'boy racer three-views'. I'd be surprised if it wasn't done.

Your mission is to proceed up the Nung River, beyond the Do Long Bridge, dig it out and let's have a proper look.

Chris
 
Kadija_Man said:
sferrin said:
Kadija_Man said:
Your points are valid but the claim was that the SR-71 had "never been intercepted or had a missile lock". The Lightnings did both.

Evidence?

Mentioned in several books, about the English Electric/BAC Lightning.

Could you give some specifics?
 
Kadija_Man said:
marauder2048 said:
kaiserd said:
Why use the ICBMs to clear a path for supersonic bombers while you could use the ICBMs to strike the main targets?

Because the main targets are protected by ABM systems that are unconstrained by a treaty.

And which supposed ABM systems were these?

Galosh, Gorgon, Gazelle. . .

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ABM-1_Galosh

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Rus-ABM-Systems.html
 
"Would high-fast have worked?" is an interesting what-if. I'd bracket the issue with two observations.

First, shooting down any high-fast intruder was not the falling-off-a-log exercise that McNamara's whiz-kids and missile experts sometimes seemed to expect, and combined modest signature reduction and jamming could complicate the problem further. Physically, it required either a large SAM or an interceptor pre-positioned by AEW.

Second, the absence of (overt) high-fast threats - the SR being confined to border missions - meant that much of the steam went out of counter-high-fast systems after the 1960s: the MiG-25 evolved into the MiG-31. So any lack of capability against M3/80kft things was influenced by strategy and priorities as well as physics.
 
LowObservable said:
"Would high-fast have worked?" is an interesting what-if. I'd bracket the issue with two observations.

First, shooting down any high-fast intruder was not the falling-off-a-log exercise that McNamara's whiz-kids and missile experts sometimes seemed to expect, and combined modest signature reduction and jamming could complicate the problem further. Physically, it required either a large SAM or an interceptor pre-positioned by AEW.

If you take a look at some DoD source documents from the early 1960s, USSR SAMs and ABMs were often assumed to have much greater capabilities than they did at the time. This is not entirely a wrong approach as you always have to understand what your adversary might be capable of in order to develop a system that isn't obsolete before it's deployed (e.g., Snark).

This is not intended to denigrate Soviet capability in this area -- far from it -- but simply to note that the whiz kids' assumptions were well beyond reality at the time. Whether this was a cynical political ploy or genuine concern about technical surprise and investment choices is left as an exercise for historians.
 
My gut feeling is that whatever this document was, it was probably little more than a basic feasibility study. It's not surprising that BAC may have briefly looked at the possibilities but I suspect it was just a brief view of what military roles might have been covered rather than responding to any official requirement. The Concorde's design was probably too optimised for its primary role to be of much use as a bomber/missile carrier without some redesign of the wings and fuselage.

At a guess the elusive 'Concorde Archive' might have been at Bristol (Filton) or Brooklands.
 
IIRC Blackbird pilots had tons of respect for the SA-5 (S-200). Presumably it wouldn't have had more trouble with a B-70 or Concorde bomber than a Blackbird. And they had a lot of them.
 
The operational role of a "Bombcorde" (or "Bombcordski") would be standoff weapons delivery. Noone is expecting it to zoom over Russia at 50,000 ft dropping nukes unopposed. Think Mig-31 with Kinzhal IRBM.

Fly fast to as near the target as you can get without entering SA-5 range, at Mach 2, 50,000 ft - drop stand-off weapons - and get the hell out of dodge.
 
PaulMM (Overscan) said:
The operational role of a "Bombcorde" (or "Bombcordski") would be standoff weapons delivery. Noone is expecting it to zoom over Russia at 50,000 ft dropping nukes unopposed. Think Mig-31 with Kinzhal IRBM.

Fly fast to as near the target as you can get without entering SA-5 range, at Mach 2, 50,000 ft - drop stand-off weapons - and get the hell out of dodge.

Or B-70 with Skybolt? :'(
 
How many SA-5 batteries* were located around Bombcorde approach routes?


Kristensen in "The protection paradox" states that

A 1970 study published by the British Atomic Energy Authority concluded
that SA-5B interceptors were not a threat to British Polaris missiles, and
that it would take only two Polaris missile payloads to saturate a standard
SA-5B battery.


* leaving aside the thorny terminology issues (complex vs. site vs. battery)
 
Errm.... a well informed source told me in the 80s that the SA-5 was only a credible threat if the warhead comprised Instant Sunshine. (Fuzing??)
 
Given that by the 80's most of the SA-5 sites had been upgraded with nuclear weapons handling/storage
facilities, instant sunshine was a most credible assumption.

Though, IIRC, the typical allocation was only one nuclear warhead per battalion i.e. one missile in six.
 
LowObservable said:
Errm.... a well informed source told me in the 80s that the SA-5 was only a credible threat if the warhead comprised Instant Sunshine. (Fuzing??)
US Nike-Hercules had nuclear warheads too.
 
Trident said:
marauder2048 said:
Irrelevant given that we're talking about the period before the treaty.

Are we? Concorde entered scheduled passenger service in 1976 and the recent thread revival was prompted by a reference to studies about military derivatives dating from 1974.


I was going by Vega ECM's later post that gives a 1972 date.

https://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?142455-Concorde-Hard-points

Even a mid-70's date wouldn't alter the point for the UK since their nuclear targeting strategy
required a successful attack on Moscow even in the absence of a supporting US strike.
 
marauder2048 said:
Trident said:
marauder2048 said:
Irrelevant given that we're talking about the period before the treaty.

Are we? Concorde entered scheduled passenger service in 1976 and the recent thread revival was prompted by a reference to studies about military derivatives dating from 1974.


I was going by Vega ECM's later post that gives a 1972 date.

https://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?142455-Concorde-Hard-points

Interestingly, the date in the post in question has now (been) changed to 1974, which indicates the author may well be aware of the discussion here - paging Vega ECM...
 

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