Boeing 737 MAX family NEWS ONLY

"FAA Eyes Consensus On 737 MAX Flight Approvals"
Mar 25, 2019 Sean Broderick | Aviation Daily

Source:
https://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/faa-eyes-consensus-737-max-flight-approvals

WASHINGTON—FAA does not want to be the first regulator to lift its 737 MAX operations ban and is working with other agencies to find consensus on joint approval of the model’s return to service, but the agency is prepared to act alone if the authorities cannot agree, sources with knowledge of the agency’s thinking tell Aviation Daily.

“The world thinks FAA is in Boeing’s pocket,” said one source, who requested anonymity due to the issue’s sensitivity. “FAA does not want to be first to lift the grounding.”

The problem: several regulators are pledging to conduct their own reviews of Boeing’s changes, separate from FAA’s decision. While not unprecedented between countries with bilateral agreements that allow mutual acceptance of each other’s certification approvals, the independent reviews could set up a scenario where FAA chooses between leading the way in granting approval for operations when it is convinced the MAX is safe, or stand down until it has more global consensus.

A second source with direct ties to FAA acknowledged that while the agency is seeking consensus, getting buy-in from other regulators “will not be the qualifying factor” that ends the U.S. ban on MAX operations.

Several regulators, including the EASA and Transport Canada, have said they plan to conduct their own reviews of the flight control computer changes that Boeing will propose for the MAX. Boeing has tested the changes and plans to discuss them with airlines and regulators in several meetings, including a large gathering Mar. 27 in Seattle.

Boeing appears close to a final version of the software upgrades that will significantly change how the MAX’s maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) anti-stall flight-control law operates. FAA has seen the changes demonstrated on a 737-7, and was expecting to get a copy of the software early this week—perhaps as soon as Mar. 25. Once the software and related training are vetted by operators and regulators and meets their approvals, Boeing will issue a service bulletin so operators can begin upgrading their grounded aircraft.

But no regulator has said the upgrades and new training alone will completely satisfy their concerns with the MAX. The MAX fleet was grounded by a series of operations bans triggered by the Mar. 10 crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 (ET302), a 737 MAX 8, near Addis Ababa. It came less than five months after Lion Air Flight 610 (JT610), went down near Jakarta. MCAS is at the center of the JT610 probe, while preliminary information from the ET302 investigation suggest the system, which provides automatic nose-down inputs in certain flight profiles, may have played a role.

The software changes are seen as crucial to getting the MAX fleet back in revenue service, but FAA and others want more certainty that issues beyond MCAS are not presenting unacceptable risk to MAX operations. The U.S. participants in the Ethiopian probe, including FAA, the NTSB, and Boeing, have not been allowed to analyze ET302’s flight-data recorder data, the source with FAA ties said. Access to the critical data has been limited to what amounts to cursory reviews, meaning U.S. investigators “have not seen enough to know” what role, if any, MCAS played in the accident sequence, or to identify other possible issues, the source said.

Ethiopian Airlines President Tewolde Gebremariam told the The Wall Street Journal in a Mar. 25 interview that MCAS was activated on the Mar. 10 accident flight “to the best of our knowledge.” Gebremariam said he did not have access to the the FDR or cockpit voice recorder data, but had listed to air traffic control communications recording between controllers and the ET302’s flight crew.

The JT610 probe is focused on MCAS’s activation due to erroneous data from a single angle-of-attack (AOA) sensor that repeatedly pushed the 737 MAX 8’s nose down by adjusting its horizontal stabilizer. The flight crew countered with manual nose-up inputs via their control columns, but this only interrupted MCAS, which had the authority to apply full nose-down trim. The crew apparently did not consider the failure to be a runaway stabilizer, and did not reference the related checklist that tells pilots to de-power the stabilizer using two cutout switches. Following than 20 back-and-forth exchanges between the crew and MCAS, JT610 dove into the sea. ET302 followed a similar flight path, but investigators have not conclusively linked the two accidents.

Boeing’s changes reduce the anti-stall function’s authority, and add data from the MAX’s second AOA sensor. Pilots also will be alerted when AOA readings disagree, and MCAS will not operate if the discrepancy is above a certain threshold. Pilots also will receive specific training on MCAS—something that was not included in the original MAX flight crew training or 737NG-to-MAX differences documentation. This, along with FAA’s apparent lack of scrutiny of MCAS’s failure scenarios during certification, generated significant criticism of the agency in the weeks following the JT610 accident.

FAA, which was the last regulator to ban MAX operations, will surely be the first to approve Boeing’s changes, and accept that the MAX is again safe to operate. It could then face a decision on whether to make its airlines, which operate about 70 of the 370 MAXs in service, wait for more global consensus, or—once again—act alone.

Most U.S.-operated MAXs were on domestic routes when FAA issued its Mar. 13 grounding. This means U.S. operators could easily put them back in service even if FAA was the lone regulator to lift its ban. Operators are taking varying approaches to losing their MAXs. American, which operates 24 MAXs, has been the most publicly proactive, announcing Mar. 24 that it was removing its MAXs from its schedule through Apr. 24.

Meanwhile, the U.S Department of Transportation (DOT) will stand up a special committee to review FAA's new-aircraft certification procedures. Retired Air Force General Darren McDew, former head of the U.S. Transportation Command, and Captain Lee Moak, former President of the Air Line Pilots Association President Lee Moak will serve as interim co-chairs while the committee is formed.

"This review by leading outside experts will help determine if improvements can be made to the FAA aircraft certification process,” said DOT Secretary Elaine L. Chao.

"The [committee] will provide advice and recommendations on issues facing the aviation community related to the FAA’s safety oversight and certification programs and activities," DOT said. The group, which will be made up of industry representatives, will present its findings to senior DOT and FAA officials.
 
Pilots also will be alerted when AOA readings disagree, and MCAS will not operate if the discrepancy is above a certain threshold

Food for troubles. Sad.
An AoA sensor that send faulty data should itself self monitor its status and apply the proper fix (that could be as simple as a system shutdown). If you start solving basic system problems upstream, this is the open bar for gremlins.
 
This video was posted March 13, 2019 before the US grounding of the 737 Max 8 and includes points and commentary by someone who sadly now has skin in the game.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0BR--blfMpo
 
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/stick-shaker-triggered-as-747-slowed-to-insufficient-456978/

But the pilot-induced oscillations which resulted from the loss of speed and altitude had injured some occupants of the aircraft, including a cabin crew member who was thrown against the ceiling before falling onto seats.

Damage to lavatory fittings, the inquiry believes, triggered a series of smoke alarms which prompted the crew to take precautionary measures and request a priority landing at Hong Kong.

Analysis determined that, while the stick-shaker engaged, the aircraft did not enter a stall. The inquiry adds that, although relevant speeds were displayed to the crew, the pilots did not detect that the 747’s speed had fallen below the thresholds “as their attention was on other operational tasks”.

Four cabin crew members and two passengers – from among the 347 passengers and 17 crew on board – suffered minor injuries during the incident and the cabin of the jet (VH-OJU) sustained minor damage.
Once again I am baffled by the fact that nobody paid attention to what could have been the panic in the cabin. As you can see in this incident that involved a 747, the public reaction is instantaneous and the damages reals.
How can you NOT abort such flight encountering similar conditions soon after takeoff?
 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/investigators-believe-737-max-stall-prevention-feature-activated-in-ethiopian-crash-11553836204
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47745191
 
"Boeing: MAX Changes Add Redundancy, Pilot Control"
Mar 27, 2019 Guy Norris | Aviation Daily

Source:
https://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/boeing-max-changes-add-redundancy-pilot-control
 
Via Slashdot: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/04/boeing-delays-737-max-software-fix-delivery/

EDIT: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/04/ethiopian-air-pilots-turned-off-737-max-anti-stall-system-then-it-turned-on-again/
 
Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 pilots 'could not stop nosedive' (BBC News)

The Ethiopian Airlines plane that crashed last month nosedived several times before it hit the ground, a preliminary report has said.

Pilots "repeatedly" followed procedures recommended by Boeing before the crash, according to the first official report into the disaster.

Despite their efforts, pilots "were not able to control the aircraft", Transport Minister Dagmawit Moges said.

Flight ET302 crashed after take-off from Addis Ababa, killing 157 people.
 
page 10 of the Ethiopian report:

At 05:40:06, left and right flap position reached a recorded value of 0.019 degrees which remained
until the end of the recording.

Flaps down (slightly - Jammed?) + speed over 480 and then a nose heavy trim... could it be?
 
2 hundredths of a degree. That's effectively stowed, probably within the margin of error of the sensor.
 
We don't know but speculatively it could be the last value read by the sensor. If the MCAS get operational once flaps are up, the next thing that happens after the flaps are retracted - if the AoA value is erroneous -... is a push over.
 
That flaps reading is basically saying that the flaps were fully retracted. That 0.019 degrees is a tiny amount, considering that Flaps 5 (takeoff setting) is 14 degrees of flap extension. Even Flaps 1 (minimal flaps) is 8 degrees.

The sequence of events is really complicated. The folks over at PPRUNE are doing a fairly good job of parsing the data, so if you want to get more detail, I'd check them out. It looks like the key failure is the left hand AOA sensor going haywire right at takeoff. There was a bunch of manually commanded nose-up trim at takeoff (as expected) then some automatic nose down trim that probably isn't MCAS (the Speed Trim System also does this; MCAS is nominally a subset of STS) and then some manual nose up trim followed by MCAS kicking in. At some point, they did pull the automatic trim cutouts (per Boeing's instructions) but were too fast to effectively trim up manually so they put electric trim back on and trimmed up a bit (but not enough) and then MCAS kicked in again and made it unrecoverable.
 
Thank you for the details. I do agree that the value is basically a fully retracted indication. But the flaps in that speculative scenario would have been pulled back due to the pull over (how long time b/w the captor received the value and the actuation of the lock mechanism?).

Anyway It's scary that they didn't land asap. Imagine a cab going down the motorway with a brakes failure inviting you to tight your seatbelt as if everything was normal.

At the end the problem is not in the system that will statically encounters a failure at one time or another but in the operators behind that don't provide the layer of professionalism needed in every failsafe system.
 
In other words, blame the pilot. I suggest you take a look at the pprune thread.
 
I am certainly not blaming the pilot (as a whole). Please have a look at my history of posting if you are not convinced.

But there is two points that annoy me a lot in this story:
- first the unanimous say in the media about MCAS and blablabla that appeared so early after the crash and everywhere that it's scary (the morning of my first post in this thread I was awaken by the morning radio show (classical music) having its lecture of classical recital in town swapped to take the opportunity to make a point using philosophy (and Socrate the old fellow was obviously part of it!) about Boeing manufacturing choices! And there you would have heard the same point about MCAS (just like if anybody in Europe had heard the acronym everyday since birth...).
- Secondly the fact that nobody voicing their theme seems to know that those systems have been in place since the early day of jet aviation... 70 years ago!*



*very few pilots flying today were born before the system was first fielded...
 
So blame the terrible quality of non-specialist aviation media (and even a lot of specialist media).

But to your point (I think) while various bits of flight control intervention is almost as old as aircraft themselves, MCAS specifically is new to the 737 Max family to solve a very specific issue -- the tendency of this version to pitch up excessively due to the forward position of the new large diameter nacelles. And it's very much looking as though MCAS does not behave properly when faced with unreliable AOA indications.(And it seems like maybe this version of the 737 also has a problem with its AOA sensors.). And to cap things off, Boeing changed how the cutoffs work in the Max. In the NG, one if the cutoffs just takes autopilot systems (including STS and thus MCAS if it existed on the NG) out, allowing the pilots to still apply trim manually using the electric trim motors. That right there might have saved this aircraft.
 
no fcs will behave normally when faced with improper inputs from sensors. Hell, we can't even drive properly drunk, think about being blind and under influence!
Boeing claims that the fix is to use both sensor when draft and yaw excursions (think landing) makes it a necessity*!

allowing the pilots to still apply trim manually using the electric trim motors. That right there might have saved this aircraft.
I am not really convinced by this. I don't see any relation. Many GA airframe are so restricted in speed that you'll loose trim authority in some circumstances. Trim loss is not a flight hazard by itself!


*to rely the old way to one single sensor
 
TomcatViP said:
no fcs will behave normally when faced with improper inputs from sensors.

This is utterly incorrect.

You can install 3 sensors, so the fcs knows to ignore a single malfunctioned sensor.

You can verify data with different sensors. Wrong AOA data can be exposed by checking its plausibility with input from INS and pitot sensor(s).

Boeing failed grossly in the safety department.


Secondly the fact that nobody voicing their theme seems to know that those systems have been in place since the early day of jet aviation... 70 years ago!

High authority autopilots in 'manual' control mode are not that old. They go back to the 70's. The Boeing 737MAX8 MCAS clearly has high authority while the regular autopilot is off.
 
TomcatViP said:
...Anyway It's scary that they didn't land asap. Imagine a cab going down the motorway with a brakes failure inviting you to tight your seatbelt as if everything was normal.
...

To land you need to control your plane ... they were fighting get in control of the bloody thing. Plus the crash occurred very small time after takeoff (6 to 8 mm) , trying to "land asap" would mean trying to land the plane while not having full control and doing yoyos, which would have given the same result. And land where after 6-8 mm ? straight ahead after the runway ?, what is there at Adis Abeba? turning back ? again you need full authority for that.

Please... they guys died in the crash too.
 
They were flying so fast that they went slightly out of the domain: this is not how you prepare to land in case of failure.

@Lastdingo: stick pusher are old as jets. It's not because it is part of an automated system (something normal to benefit from modern digitalization today) that it's different. Your coffee machine has probably a numerical circuit and you don't look at it as something revolutionary!

But yes, a third axially mounted AoA sensor would be perfect.
 
sigh… one thing for sure, you dig yourself even more surely than a MAX.
But you're funnier cause you kill no one.
 
TomcatViP said:
Would you dare to enlight us?

Me ? Oh dear, no... You are the expert here. Please carry on.

Edit: btw, that "they didn't land asap" formula is genius. There should be a "land asap" system on every airliner instead of any MCAS. So many lifes saved... You have a thing there, register it.
 
tomcatvip: I find many of your contributions hard to understand. Of what I can understand, you appear to say that much of the responsibility for the recent 737 MAX crashes lies with the mechanics who serviced and with the pilots who flew both aircraft. On the other hand, the FAA - after some nudging - and many other authorities who certify aircraft for passenger services are considering inherent weaknesses in the 737 MAX design as a likely explanation to such an extent that they have stopped 737 MAX operations. I do not know your qualifications, but I have just enough trust in the FAA - even after the shambles they made of the 737 MAX's certification - to assume something is seriously wrong with the 737 MAX and with the way pilots are trained to fly it.

And do try to be clearer in your contributions.
 
Joining this thread for the first time, I am astonished to find people looking to pick holes in pilot performance, flap settings and other distractions. WTF?

Boeing themselves have at last admitted that they messed up and have apologised to the families of the victims. Although the final analysis is yet to come in, preliminary reports from both the LionAir and Ethiopian investigations conclude that the crews tried all the right things and that it was the MCAS system (or something that acts very like it) that was to blame. Failed sensors, software bugs and cutbacks on warning indicators and pilot training - all self-certified by Boeing with the blessing of the FAA - conspired to cause two fatal crashes and a host of other reported incidents. The update recently announced by Boeing addresses all the issues so far identified:
  • The MCAS will now poll both AoA sensors simultaneously and not operate unless both agree.
  • The MCAS will operate the elevator with less authority than the trim wheel, allowing crews to counteract it.
  • The MCAS will be less inclined to repeat its actions over and over just because the pilots are fighting it.
  • A warning indicator that has until now been an optional extra will be retro-fitted as standard.
  • Pilots will actually be trained in the system and its foibles before being sent to fly it.
Other than waiting to see if more Boeing gaffes might surface, do we really need to look any further?
 
Boeing admitting fault. I wonder whether THAT will convince people picking holes. Of which I count one.
 
Dear sirs, since the thread has mutated its main subject from plain "unbuilt projects" to the tragedy in which the 737 MAX is now involved, please try to avoid personal hostility and conflictive posts. Thanks
 
Antonio, I take your point and thank you. I would suggest that the not-yet-operational fixes recently announced by Boeing are relevant, and it is acceptable to query their background. Of course personal attacks should not be permitted (though sadly, some against myself have slipped through in the past), but criticism of stated opinions has to be fair game if the truth is to out. If I stray the wrong side of decency, I trust that our Admins will bring me up sharp.
 
As a end note to that digression (and i will refrain to add more until we have some new material), my opinion is very much in concern with:

- The passengers that had to endure an horrible agony and trauma (including physical) - see what happened to teh public in that 747 discussed earlier
- The pilots, the ones that dare to bring back safely a plane compromising somewhat their career with an aborted flight.

Best to all

TC
 
The latest in a series of videos about 737 Max incidents by a current airline pilot. The full list here: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL6SYmp3qb3uPp1DS7fDy7I6y11MIMgnbO

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9jNbayma9dM
 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-faa/faa-meets-with-u-s-airlines-pilot-unions-on-boeing-737-max-idUSKCN1RO2H9
 
Ethiopian Crash Data Analysis Points To Vane Detachment

[...] the aircraft’s left angle-of-attack (AOA) sensor vane detached seconds after take-off and that, contrary to statements from the airline, suggests the crew did not follow all the steps for the correct procedure for a runaway stabilizer.

Detailed analysis of the FDR trace data shows that approximately six seconds after liftoff was signaled by the weight-on-wheels switch data, the data indicate the divergence in angle-of-attack (AOA) and the onset of the captain’s stick-shaker, or stall warning. Almost simultaneously, data shows the AOA sensor vane pivoted to an extreme nose-high position.

This, says one source, is a clear indication that the AOA’s external vane was sheared off—most likely by a bird impact. The vane is counter-balanced by a weight located inside the AOA sensor mounting unit, and without aerodynamic forces acting on the vane, the counterweight drops down. The AOA sensor, however, interpreted the position of the alpha vane balance as being at an extreme nose-high angle-of-attack.

IMOHO expressed earlier, a sensor experiencing a catastrophic failures should have embedded elementary systems that prevent it to send an erroneous feed to the aircraft systems. In that case, the loss of counterbalancing could probably have been detected by a simple torque limiter (a cheap device) that would have turned mechanically the sensor off.

Source:
AviationWeek.com
 
http://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/news-trump/if-i-were-boeing-i-would-fix-the-boeing-737-max-trump-offered-his-advice-to-the-troubled-aviation-giant-after-2-deadly-crashes/ar-BBVX9fU?li=BBoPRmx&ocid=DELLDHP
 
The design decisions were just stupid, and while good pilots can work around that, they shouldn't have to. This in not going to go away. Their only stroke of luck from a litigation point of view is that none of the domestic airlines crashed one. As long as that doesn't happen, they can Just take the 393 Airframes, convert them to cargo planes.

But the current CEO probably wants to leave with his shares intact, so he'll kick that can down the road.
 
so lets see if i understand correctly
1 because of the big engines Boeing created an automated system to correct the nose down attitude
2 they did not provided a "panic button" to the pilots to disactivate the system in flight instantly
3 and at least a "warning light " to tell the pilots the automated system was in control of the plane - it was a PAYING OPTION (Southwest paid; Lyon air and Ethiopian did not)
4 yet 2 and 3 (no warning /panic button or a paying one) were tolerable to Boeing and FAA ONLY because the automated system was NOT supposed to send 737s flying into the ground
5 well, it happened, screwing 350 passengers lives... and Boeing of course.
 
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