Moving the Goalposts: when the customer is not always right.

pathology_doc

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Browsing through BSP 1 (redux) last night, I came upon the unhappy story of the P.1083 Hunter development.

Brief background: this is a developed Hunter with a 50 degree swept wing and an afterburning Avon on steroids for supersonic performance and climb to rival a Lightning.

Full go-ahead is given on 12 December 1951, and design churns happily along... until April 1953, when the Air Staff decides it wants the armament to be Firestreaks. Four of them. So of course the numbers get run, and it's clear that with four missiles, the guns and all the missile support gear around, there's (a) not that much room for fuel and (b) less than sparkling performance.

Naturally the only solution is a full redesign but there's no money for prototypes for that, so the Air Staff says no, it's missiles or nothing, go away.

The irony: parts of the fuselage and tail make it into the Hunter F.6 (without afterburner) so the effort is not completely wasted, but this sort of changing horses midstream isn't going to be limited to Hawker. We see it later with the thin-wing Javelin being cancelled in favour of the CF-105, which is in turn cancelled because it won't be ready all that much before the supposedly better F.155T, which... well, we know what happened to that. And that's before we get to TSR.2 mysteriously growing from a Canberra replacement into something more semi-strategic...

(This post is in the Bar because the discussion revolves around the fickleness of the customer's requirements, not a plausible alternative history. But if you want that, it involves P.1083 actually getting built as first specified... and maturing in time to receive AIM-9B, with its relatively trivial support requirements. The fact that AFAIK no Hunter ever carried missiles in British service outside of trials firings makes the irony doubly distasteful.)

One can talk about the Sandys Axe all one likes, but it is just as informative to look at the malignant effect of specification creep... except the creep in this case is a massive jump!
 
Hawker had plenty of cash at the time, ample to fund the P.1083 privately for export. So whilst the Ministry does deserve criticism for its decisions, so too does the manufacturer's board for their lack of initiative.
 
Hawker had plenty of cash at the time, ample to fund the P.1083 privately for export. So whilst the Ministry does deserve criticism for its decisions, so too does the manufacturer's board for their lack of initiative.
But is anyone else going to pick it up if the RAF doesn't?
 
Right up to the present day the UK suffers from uninspiring decision-making in both private and public sectors.
Numerous threads here illustrate the wrongheadedness at senior levels in government and industry.
 
I posted this video to the 'Ultimate Battleships' thread, but it nicely shows the same process as described in the OP occurring in both the United Kingdom (Where the last designs were attempts to 'square the circle'.) and the Soviet Union (Where bad inputs from intelligence were fed into the mix, along with 'squaring the circle' attempts).

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WStdZfpVyCY
 
That's why Sir Sydney Camm used to say "follow the specs and you are dead".
“In the course of any project, at a certain time it becomes necessary to shoot the engineers and build the damn thing.”


That was the signature line of a poster on NavWeaps a few years ago.

Still seems true to me - if you include anyone attempting to revise the specs.
 

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