Aircraft Carrier Hangar Design Discussion

The Forestall and Enterprise fires indicate that a single division of the hangar deck is not a significant threat to a carrier in the event of a fire.
 
The early configuration of the three Midway class CVs is unknown to me, but after her major 1966-70 modernization Midway had only two hangar bays, with one subdividing door.
There was a long discussion about the extent of Midway's armour including the hangar doors over on the NavWeaps forum two yeras ago that you might be interested in.
 
Based on drawings from The Floating Drydock site:

USS Hornet CV-12 after modernization had two hanger doors
USS Midway CV-41 after 2nd modernization had one hanger door
USS Ranger CVA-61 had one hanger door
USS Constellation CVA-64 had one hanger door
USS Enterprise CVN-65 had likely one hanger door (Cross section drawings label No.1 and No.2 Hanger Bays)
USS John Fitzgerald Kennedy CVA-67 had one hanger door
 
I must have been completely ignorant to this detail up to now, but do i understand correctly that the US WW2 fleet carriers had a SINGLE level hangar, while most japanese and british carriers had double, superimposed hangars? Makes me wonder how the US carriers could carry so many planes, presumably deck parks playing a large part.
To summarise:
1. Bigger hangars
2. Permanent Deck park
3.Suspending planes from the ceiling
 
To summarise:
1. Bigger hangars
2. Permanent Deck park
3.Suspending planes from the ceiling

The Essex class CVs had three hangar bays, with two subdividing doors.

The early configuration of the three Midway class CVs is unknown to me, but after her major 1966-70 modernization Midway had only two hangar bays, with one subdividing door.

The Forrestal and Saratoga had three hangar bays, with two subdividing doors - likely due to their original axial flight deck configuration.
Ranger and Independence had only two hangar bays, with one subdividing door, and were designed from the start with an angled flight deck.

Kitty Hawk and Constellation had only two hangar bays, with one subdividing door.
I don't know if America and JFK had two or three hangar bays.

Enterprise had only two hangar bays, with one subdividing door.


CV-41 hangar deck plan official USN:

View attachment 706420


CV-60 Saratoga:

View attachment 706421


CV-62 Independence:

View attachment 706422
 
On moderate tonnage limiting air wings, I would point to the Yorktowns. At Midway, three of them carried more aircraft than the four Japanese carriers, whcih did not use deck parks. The other interesting point is that the RN adopted armored flight decks and limited hangar stowage just as radar appeared; radar made it possible for a carrier to beat off land-based air attacks -- if she had enough fighters on board, and if she had effective fighter control (developed ca 1942). The USN thought it had a way of controlling fighters earlier than that, which explains the additional fighters planned for the Essex class (at a time when the USN did not really understand what radar would bring). My understanding of the Illustrious specification is that it reflected what could be done, not what was wanted (this is from a U.S. attache report written in 1940). Once the Germans were using heavy bombs on Stukas, deck penetration was nearly inevitable, and if the ship survived whe was out of action for a long time. I'd add that the flimsy U.S. flight decks were adopted precisely so that they could be repaired in action -- as was done by, I think, Yorktown at Midway. No heavy flight deck, armored or not, could have been repaired during combat. US carriers were conceived with other combat survivability features, most of hwich did not work out in practice: double-ended arresting gear and hangar deck catapults (planned for Yorktowns, actually on board early Essexes). These points emerged frfom war gaming at the NavaL War College ca 1930-31, when the Yorktowns were being conceived.

I shoudl add trhat the 23,000 tons int he 1936 treaty was almost certainly put forward by the British because they coudl build an armored carrier on that tonnage. The RN did not understand how important carrier aircraft numbers would be, but they probably knew that the Air MInistry would not allow them to have enough aircraft. .
 
The US planned to adopt hangar deck catapults from CV-4 Ranger. The theory was to allow a carrier to remain operational if it's flight deck was torn up by enemy bombs. They were not fitted to her as a cost saving measure. They were fitted from CV-5 to CV-8 plus the first 5 Essex class.

The Illustrious class were designed in 1936, taking account of RN Med Fleet experience during The Abyssinian Crisis. At that point radar was little more than a theory and it had yet to be shown how it could be shrunk to something that could be fitted to a ship. It would have taken a very brave soul to have pinned hope on radar in 1936.

The RN began radar controlled fighter control in Ark Royal in 1940 off Norway. Radar reports from other ships were plotted by a chap in the corner of the bridge. The RN set up a Fighter Direction School in 1940/41 which was attended by USN officers. They returned to the USA and set up A similar school in Sept 1941. At that point in time the Britain led the world in fighter direction techniques both on land and sea.

There were cases of repairs being made to British armoured flight decks. See the results if the kamikaze attacks on Indefatigable & Formidable in particular. Decks were dented but quickly patched with steel plate & concrete to allow flight operations to continue.

In 1939/40 when the Essex was being designed the objective of the increased size was to allow a return to an air group of 90 aircraft. That was what the Yorktowns had been designed for but with the passage of time had had to be reduced as aircraft size increased. SB2C, TBF and F4U were being designed at the time.

The British wanted a 22,000 ton limit for the 1936 London Treaty, with 23,000 tons being a compromise. That limit was settled before the Illustrious class was designed.

The USN were so impressed with how Illustrious and Formidable stood up to bombing in 1941 when they saw them at Norfolk that they adopted it for the Midway design having previously rejected it during the Essex design process.

Edit- the 1935 London Naval Conference started on 9 Dec 1935 and the London Naval Treaty 1936 was signed on 25 March 1936.
 
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Its need to be also point out that the armor carriers like the Illustrious class also had Armor Side walls for their hangers. Which the USN was not impress at all with.

Which limited the amount of planes that could be ready at any one time due safety. Cause until jets became the norm, piston planes needed like a 15 minute warm up period.

And well, running engine, enclose space, you can see the issue.

And while the RN did try to use electric warmers to get around it, all I can find is complaining bout them...

Also the Armor sidewall was what really screwed up when a bomb penerated. They contain the explosion inside the ship and basically warped the ship structure. Which is bad and play part of the reason for the early scrapping of those carriers.
And the damage those hits caused the Illustrious and Formidable basically lamed the carriers to the point that if tge War ended the next day they been scrapped. Cause even if the RN greatest Enemy allowed it, they just couldn't be fix without building a new vessel.
 
Its need to be also point out that the armor carriers like the Illustrious class also had Armor Side walls for their hangers. Which the USN was not impress at all with.

Which limited the amount of planes that could be ready at any one time due safety. Cause until jets became the norm, piston planes needed like a 15 minute warm up period.

And well, running engine, enclose space, you can see the issue.

And while the RN did try to use electric warmers to get around it, all I can find is complaining bout them...

Also the Armor sidewall was what really screwed up when a bomb penerated. They contain the explosion inside the ship and basically warped the ship structure. Which is bad and play part of the reason for the early scrapping of those carriers.
And the damage those hits caused the Illustrious and Formidable basically lamed the carriers to the point that if tge War ended the next day they been scrapped. Cause even if the RN greatest Enemy allowed it, they just couldn't be fix without building a new vessel.
The armoured sides were not the reason for the RN generally warming up its aircraft on the flight deck. It was the fact they were a "closed" design, in common with previous RN carriers. Having said that I've come across one photo which clearly shows a Seafire having its engine run up in an RN hangar, so it was done.

When the RN was debating the open/closed hangar design for the Malta class between 1943 & 1945, the ability in an open hangar to warm up the aircraft engines was identified as a plus.

Again we have the nonsense about Illustrious and Formidable being "warped" by the bomb damage. It has been debunked many times. The problem is that very little is written of their post war service other than for thecreconstrufred Victorious. Illustrious was extensively refitted 1945/46 and served as the trials and training carrier until Feb 1955. Only Formidable saw no service after March 1947 and was poorly maintained. They were too costly to man in a post war world.
 
Open hangars did no better than closed in venting explosions. See the USS Enterprise damage report for what happened in May 1945. The flight deck was bent upwards by up to 3.5ft. Photos at end of Report.
 
Open hangars did no better than closed in venting explosions. See the USS Enterprise damage report for what happened in May 1945. The flight deck was bent upwards by up to 3.5ft. Photos at end of Report.
I'm not sure how you'd balance "strength deck" with "blow off panels" with "armored deck" on a carrier...
 
I'm not sure how you'd balance "strength deck" with "blow off panels" with "armored deck" on a carrier...
Yet that was what the Japanese did in the upper hangars of the unarmoured Shokaku class and the Armoured Taiho.
 
Yet that was what the Japanese did in the upper hangars of the unarmoured Shokaku class and the Armoured Taiho.
Don't think that did them much good.

The problem boils down to not being able to use the deck materials as part of the load-bearing structure, despite their fairly heavy thickness (if armored). I'd need to look up how thick a plate you need to support a 60klb or greater aircraft (for modern use), and how thick the blow off panels are on tanks.
 
Again we have the nonsense about Illustrious and Formidable being "warped" by the bomb damage. It has been debunked many times. The problem is that very little is written of their post war service other than for thecreconstrufred Victorious. Illustrious was extensively refitted 1945/46 and served as the trials and training carrier until Feb 1955. Only Formidable saw no service after March 1947 and was poorly maintained. They were too costly to man in a post war world.
You are partially right there was no warping. However in Formidable’s case (at least from what I’ve heard) by the end of her career her keel was Being held together by her flight deck.
 
You are partially right there was no warping. However in Formidable’s case (at least from what I’ve heard) by the end of her career her keel was Being held together by her flight deck.
Problem is, that after 1947 very little seems to have been done to maintain her while she was in Reserve. When surveyed in 1949 her “poor condition” meant that she was passed over for reconstruction in favour of Victorious. But beyond that statement I’ve never come across any further explanation of her condition.

Do you have a source for what you’ve heard? Is it a primary source or merely heresay?

Given the various statements that have been made about her condition over the years I’m surprised that firm evidence of it has not been turned up over the last 70 or so years. All we seem to have is unsupported statements. I’d love to get something more conclusive.
 
Problem is, that after 1947 very little seems to have been done to maintain her while she was in Reserve. When surveyed in 1949 her “poor condition” meant that she was passed over for reconstruction in favour of Victorious. But beyond that statement I’ve never come across any further explanation of her condition.

Do you have a source for what you’ve heard? Is it a primary source or merely heresay?

Given the various statements that have been made about her condition over the years I’m surprised that firm evidence of it has not been turned up over the last 70 or so years. All we seem to have is unsupported statements. I’d love to get something more conclusive.
I’ve definitely seen it somewhere I can’t find it though
 
This damage on Formidable do look hideous though. It might have been repaired but have to bare in mind the hull stress/bending etc. of actually sailing with that damage to reach port/repair facility. So imo that might at least in part account for it's poor overall condition.

 
This whole notion of hangar deck catapults sounds like a great way to integrate drone warfare into modern ships. Instead of having to use a straight line at launch, maybe build a curve like a Nike whoosh symbol to fit more length in the catapult. May be able to integrate them crossbeam on a large ship like a carrier, rather than lengthwise, for pretty large throw-weights. Your eggs in one basket strategy may make carriers obsolete if they do not stay creative to keep them relevant. Loading and launching from internal space like that should be conducive to automation. You already removed the pilot, look for ways to simplify hangar crews, too.


Automatic hangars came to smaller drones. Certainly would be more handy on larger ones.
 
Don't think that did them much good.

The problem boils down to not being able to use the deck materials as part of the load-bearing structure, despite their fairly heavy thickness (if armored). I'd need to look up how thick a plate you need to support a 60klb or greater aircraft (for modern use), and how thick the blow off panels are on tanks.
This from Taiho vol1 by Lars Ahlberg & Hans Lengerer

“......The side walls in the upper hangar had 25mm DS plates as, mainly, splinter protection. Between the frames were openings of about 1.5 x 0.7 m which had lids made from 25mm DS. The purpose of these openings had remained unchanged since the Shokaku class, and were installed in case gasoline vapour should be ignited or if a bomb should reach the hangar, then the lids would give way and the excess pressure would be discharged. These explosion and detonation wave absorbers fulfilled their purpose to such a trifling degree, as well as the 10mm DS plates fitted underneath the deck beams, that the gasoline vapour explosion on the 19 June 1944 ripped open the flight deck.....”

In the British Armoured carriers the Armour on the flight deck and hangar sides WAS structural. Their structural design was considered a feat of engineering in those pre-computer days.

In Taiho too the flight deck was the main strength deck of the ship and was comprised of two layers - 75mm CNC on top of a layer of 20mm DS. The CNC was attached to the bedding by armour bolts. As it was the main strength deck there were no expansion joints.

The Midway followed US practice with the hangar deck being the strength deck and everything above it superstructure. Her flight deck had a number of expansion joints along its length.
 
This whole notion of hangar deck catapults sounds like a great way to integrate drone warfare into modern ships. Instead of having to use a straight line at launch, maybe build a curve like a Nike whoosh symbol to fit more length in the catapult. May be able to integrate them crossbeam on a large ship like a carrier, rather than lengthwise, for pretty large throw-weights. Your eggs in one basket strategy may make carriers obsolete if they do not stay creative to keep them relevant. Loading and launching from internal space like that should be conducive to automation. You already removed the pilot, look for ways to simplify hangar crews, too.


Automatic hangars came to smaller drones. Certainly would be more handy on larger ones.
Aircraft Carriers as they are are probably the most adaptable ships to unmanned aircraft. They already operate manned fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, it won't be all that much more difficult to have them launch unmanned fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. To get the best performing aircraft (manned or unmanned), it's better to take advantage of already existing capabilities on board the aircraft carrier.

Catapults within the hangar are going to impact on hangar flow, even if straight, and curved decks are going to add even more problems. Not to mention you're cutting even more holes in the side of the ship (unless you use those for the aircraft elevators), and the jet efflux from the aircraft you're launching needs to go somewhere.

Consumer electronic drones are irrelevant to this discussion, the aircraft that will be launched from carriers will have much more in common with existing combat aircraft, with similar, albeit lesser maintenance requirements.
 
The US planned to adopt hangar deck catapults from CV-4 Ranger. The theory was to allow a carrier to remain operational if it's flight deck was torn up by enemy bombs. They were not fitted to her as a cost saving measure. They were fitted from CV-5 to CV-8 plus the first 5 Essex class.

Some good photos of the cross-deck hangar catapults can be seen in this thread:


Regards,
 
Aircraft Carriers as they are are probably the most adaptable ships to unmanned aircraft. They already operate manned fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, it won't be all that much more difficult to have them launch unmanned fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. To get the best performing aircraft (manned or unmanned), it's better to take advantage of already existing capabilities on board the aircraft carrier.

Catapults within the hangar are going to impact on hangar flow, even if straight, and curved decks are going to add even more problems. Not to mention you're cutting even more holes in the side of the ship (unless you use those for the aircraft elevators), and the jet efflux from the aircraft you're launching needs to go somewhere.

Consumer electronic drones are irrelevant to this discussion, the aircraft that will be launched from carriers will have much more in common with existing combat aircraft, with similar, albeit lesser maintenance requirements.
Depends on the size of the drones.

Even a Reaper is too small and weak to be launched off a steam catapult (minimum launch weight being over 20,000lbs), or be recovered onboard by the arresting gear.

This was actually one of the reasons for EMALS and AAG on the Fords, so that they could launch drones that were significantly lighter than traditional naval aircraft.
 
A question on the issue of deckparks on japanese carriers. The issue is a bit confusing, most claim they didn't use deckparks, but in this thread there is reference to images showing them using deckparks before the war. But IF they had the planes and IF they used permanent deckparks, how many more planes would the japanese carriers carry, compared to the known maximum figures they carried, such as 72 for Kaga and the Shokakus, 66 for Akagi, 57 for Hiryu/Soryu etc. How many planes could they carry in a deckpark?

And the same question regarding british armoured carriers as well as US such as prewar ships or Essex or Independence classes. Looking on the www it's said in some places that as much as half the Essex complement was carried in a deck park, which is something like 40 planes plus, is that accurate? The british carriers were carrying over 20 and even 30 planes over their rated capacities looking at numbers posted here and elsewhere.

I realize there are lot of factor in play such as folding vs nonfolding, aircraft size, flight deck size, but i'm trying to get a rouch idea of how many planes were or could have been carried in deckparks.

If i would add an extra 10-12 planes for a Hiryu and 15-18 for the larger Shokaku or Kaga or Akagi as deckparks, would that be accurate? And for CVLs such as Zuiho, maybe an extra 6-8 planes over the 30 usually cited?
Again it's a bit unclear, but did the japanese carriers carry permanent deckparks at the Marianas battle? From what i read it seems Taiho at least did?
 
Isn't the permanent deck park meant surely extra planes but more dangerous storage? You could easily lose or minimum damage those planes in a storm or in a surprise attack? Eg more strike capacity vs danger of losing the extra planes?
 
Haven’t much time for a full answer just now, but a couple of points do immediately come to mind.

Essex class. Their designed air group was 90 (36 fighter, 36 dive bomber & 18 TB). By the summer of 1945 they were carrying about 75 fighters, 15 dive bombers and 15 TB for a total of 105. There were then complaints that this was too many aircraft to handle efficiently.

Deck movements. It is all very well piling more aircraft aboard as a deck park, but these were the days of the axial deck. For sending off a strike deck spares need moved below or pushed aft. When landing on any deck spares need moved below or pushed forward. Aircraft under maintenance in a hangar might not be easily moved.

So the deck crews then have a lot more work to do.

With larger airgroups and more personnel required all navies found their carriers increasingly overcrowded.
 
Thanks for your replies. Looking on the www i found this US postwar document on IJN carriers, on page 11 it is stated that about 12 aircraft could be carried as a deckpark for both a fleet carrier (Shokaku or Taiho) and a light fleet carrier (Unryu). However it states that for a fleet carrier 72 aircraft were carried in the hangar (so plus 12 on deck it's 84), but for Unryu only 45 were carried in the hangar (plus 12 on deck being 57). Perhaps that would be the figure for the newer larger planes.

However on japanese wiki there are various figures for the Unryu, from 53 to 73 aircraft. The lower figurer apply for new generation planes such as A7M and B7A, while the higher must apply to older aircraft A6M, D3A, B5N and probably including a deckpark. Presumably most of the numbers for Unryu would apply to Hiryu and Soryu as well, though i'm still a bit uncertain if say Hiryu could carry it's normal complement 54, plus another 12 or so as a deckpark. Perhaps in "overcrowed mode" such as the Essexes went to as shown above (from about 90 to 105), might be doable?

PS: Incidentally, the highest number of embarked aircraft i found in literature for a Shokaku is 76 planes at the Marianas for Shokaku itself, made of 34 Zeros, 27 D4Y variants, 12 B6N and 3 D3As.
 

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For the Unryu class air group see the article in Warship 2010 on the class. He gives the following (figures in brackets are Reserve aircraft):-

As designed:-
12 (+3) Zero fighters
27 (+3) Val dive bombers
18 (+2) Kate TB
Total 57(+8) aircraft.

He then continues “ Because the volume of the hangars was too small to accommodate this number, eleven planes were to be carried permanently on the flight deck, a practice the IJN did not adopt until 1943. However as new types of aircraft were developed plans were modified, and the final air complement was to be:

18(+2) Reppu fighters (Allied code-name ‘Sam’)
27(+0) Suisei dive bombers (‘Judy’j
6(+0) Saiun reconnaissance planes (‘Myrt’j
making a total of 51 (+2) aircraft, of which the Myrts were to be carried on the flight deck.”

BUT as the Sam & Myrt were not ready for service their temporary equipment was to be

27(+0) Zero fighters
9(+0) Judy dive bombers
3(+0) Judy recce aircraft
9(+0) Tenzan (Jill) torpedo bombers.
Total 48 aircraft.

But none of these was ever carried as none of these carriers never reached the stage of being operational carriers.

As for comparison with Soryu & Hiryu, their flight deck flight deck and hangar layouts were different. The Older pair had 3 lifts, the Unryus had 2 larger lifts which affects the hangar floor space. I can’t find my book on the older pair just now.


I have a plan for Shokaku showing hangar layouts with aircraft. These show

Lower hangar:-
18x Kate TB (including one in the after lift we’ll)
9x Val DB (including 1 in each of the forward and midships lift wells)
5xZero

Upper hangar:-
9xKate TB
18xVal DB
13xZero

So 27 Kate, 27 Val & 18 Zero, total 72 which corresponds with her original air group EXCEPT it makes no provision for the 5,5,2 Reserve aircraft to be carried in the hangar. BUT the latter were to be partially disassembled, probably in the hangar overhead.

This air group was less than when the initial requirement was drafted when it was 96. In the interim new types introduced were larger than the types they were replacing. The same thing was also happening with both British and US carriers in the late 1930s.

When you see the hangar layouts for Japanese carriers the aircraft are much more intertwined than on RN & USN ships. That must have made extracting a particular airframe much more difficult. So I could see a situation where aircraft might be left on deck from time to time. Not really a deck park as such. And during operations the Japanese did refuel and rearm aircraft on the flight deck between missions.

In late 1943 the organisation of Japanese air groups changed after which an air group was attached to a carrier group. So the 601st Kokutai, organised in mid-Dec 1943 was posted to the 1st Carrier Division comprising Taiho, Shokaku & Zuikaku. It theoretically had 81 Zero, 72/9 Judy/Val DB, 54 Jill TB and 9 recce aircraft. So each carrier had a complement of 27 Zero, 24 Judy DB, 3 Val DB, 18 Jill TB and 3 Judy recce aircraft for a total of 75 on each carrier, in theory.

Elsewhere the strength of the 601st Kokutai is given as 214 aircraft:-
91 Zero
9 Val
70 Judy
44 Jill

The strength of the Taiho air group on 13 & 19 June 1944 were as follows

22 / 19 Zero
22 / 20 Judy incl 4 recce aircraft
3 / 1 Val
18 / 16 Jill
Total 65 / 56

These represented losses in deck landing accidents as well as search plane losses and a fighter which landed on Junyo.

So lots of things to consider in determining just how many aircraft could be fitted into any hangar.
 
You are partially right there was no warping. However in Formidable’s case (at least from what I’ve heard) by the end of her career her keel was Being held together by her flight deck.

Problem is, that after 1947 very little seems to have been done to maintain her while she was in Reserve. When surveyed in 1949 her “poor condition” meant that she was passed over for reconstruction in favour of Victorious. But beyond that statement I’ve never come across any further explanation of her condition.

Do you have a source for what you’ve heard? Is it a primary source or merely heresay?

Given the various statements that have been made about her condition over the years I’m surprised that firm evidence of it has not been turned up over the last 70 or so years. All we seem to have is unsupported statements. I’d love to get something more conclusive.

I suspect that it might be rust... the RAN lost a planned Type 15 Frigate conversion over this, and it is possible that Formidable had a similar issue.

In 1943 the Royal Navy lent to the Royal Australian Navy the destroyers Quiberon & Quickmatch, and 1945 Quadrant, Quality, & Queenborough. After the end of the war, Quadrant and Quality were placed in reserve in Australia, while the RAN kept the other three in service.

They were transferred permanently in June 1950 when it was announced they would be converted to fast anti-submarine frigates similar to the British Type 15, the conversions being effected at Williamstown (Quadrant) and Cockatoo Island (all others) dockyards, but only four of the ships were reconstructed, with Quality serving as spares ship.

Quality commissioned into the RAN on 28 November 1945, and paid off into reserve on 25 January 1946. The destroyer was to be converted into an anti-submarine frigate: to facilitate this, Quality and her four sister ships were gifted to the RAN in May 1950.

Quality was designated as the last of the five ships to undergo the conversion. While waiting for conversion, the destroyer underwent refits in 1948 and 1950, and had to be docked for repairs to her hull in 1954. On 14 August 1956, one of the reserve fleet shipkeepers noticed that Quality was sitting lower in the water than normal. It was discovered that the hull had become corroded at the waterline, with the ship taking on water. Quality underwent an emergency dry docking that day at Garden Island, with the superstructure cut off to increase the ship's freeboard.

The deterioration of the ship while waiting for modernisation, combined with post-War reductions in RAN personnel numbers, the increases in both time and cost for the other four Q class conversions, and the need for the RAN to cut back spending in order to support the navy's new aircraft carriers, meant that the conversion of Quality was cancelled and the ship was marked for disposal. Quality was sold for scrap to the Mitsubishi Company of Japan on 10 April 1958 for breaking up as scrap.
 
I suspect that it might be rust... the RAN lost a planned Type 15 Frigate conversion over this, and it is possible that Formidable had a similar issue.

In 1943 the Royal Navy lent to the Royal Australian Navy the destroyers Quiberon & Quickmatch, and 1945 Quadrant, Quality, & Queenborough. After the end of the war, Quadrant and Quality were placed in reserve in Australia, while the RAN kept the other three in service.

They were transferred permanently in June 1950 when it was announced they would be converted to fast anti-submarine frigates similar to the British Type 15, the conversions being effected at Williamstown (Quadrant) and Cockatoo Island (all others) dockyards, but only four of the ships were reconstructed, with Quality serving as spares ship.

Quality commissioned into the RAN on 28 November 1945, and paid off into reserve on 25 January 1946. The destroyer was to be converted into an anti-submarine frigate: to facilitate this, Quality and her four sister ships were gifted to the RAN in May 1950.

Quality was designated as the last of the five ships to undergo the conversion. While waiting for conversion, the destroyer underwent refits in 1948 and 1950, and had to be docked for repairs to her hull in 1954. On 14 August 1956, one of the reserve fleet shipkeepers noticed that Quality was sitting lower in the water than normal. It was discovered that the hull had become corroded at the waterline, with the ship taking on water. Quality underwent an emergency dry docking that day at Garden Island, with the superstructure cut off to increase the ship's freeboard.

The deterioration of the ship while waiting for modernisation, combined with post-War reductions in RAN personnel numbers, the increases in both time and cost for the other four Q class conversions, and the need for the RAN to cut back spending in order to support the navy's new aircraft carriers, meant that the conversion of Quality was cancelled and the ship was marked for disposal. Quality was sold for scrap to the Mitsubishi Company of Japan on 10 April 1958 for breaking up as scrap.
All ships suffer corrosion especially if not maintained properly in Reserve.

Having said that, I have read that that the quality of the steel that was used in wartime built ships like the Q class destroyers (ordered 1940 with construction starting from Aug that year) was not so good as that used in pre-war built ships. Less in the way of additives (like Chromium) in the smelting process to aid corrosion resistance. I’ve seen a photo of one of the British Type 15 frigate conversions underway with all the waterline plating removed. Also less in the way of corrosion coatings applied by shipbuilders to cut costs and speed production on what were ships expected to have a short life in the wartime fleet.

But Formidable was a prewar ship so far as construction of her hull was concerned (laid down June 1937 & launched Aug 1939) so the quality of the steel used would have been better.

The point remains however that no concrete evidence of Formidable’s condition in 1949 has been able to be produced by those claiming twisted keels or keels rusted through. The published comments from reliable sources that I have seen refer only to poor material condition, with no explanation of exactly what that meant.

Other pre-war built ships seem to have survived better in a post-war world. I’m thinking of Cruisers like the Town class in particular.
 
For the Unryu class air group see the article in Warship 2010 on the class. He gives the following (figures in brackets are Reserve aircraft):-

As designed:-
12 (+3) Zero fighters
27 (+3) Val dive bombers
18 (+2) Kate TB
Total 57(+8) aircraft.

He then continues “ Because the volume of the hangars was too small to accommodate this number, eleven planes were to be carried permanently on the flight deck, a practice the IJN did not adopt until 1943. However as new types of aircraft were developed plans were modified, and the final air complement was to be:

18(+2) Reppu fighters (Allied code-name ‘Sam’)
27(+0) Suisei dive bombers (‘Judy’j
6(+0) Saiun reconnaissance planes (‘Myrt’j
making a total of 51 (+2) aircraft, of which the Myrts were to be carried on the flight deck.”

BUT as the Sam & Myrt were not ready for service their temporary equipment was to be

27(+0) Zero fighters
9(+0) Judy dive bombers
3(+0) Judy recce aircraft
9(+0) Tenzan (Jill) torpedo bombers.
Total 48 aircraft.

But none of these was ever carried as none of these carriers never reached the stage of being operational carriers.

As for comparison with Soryu & Hiryu, their flight deck flight deck and hangar layouts were different. The Older pair had 3 lifts, the Unryus had 2 larger lifts which affects the hangar floor space. I can’t find my book on the older pair just now.


I have a plan for Shokaku showing hangar layouts with aircraft. These show

Lower hangar:-
18x Kate TB (including one in the after lift we’ll)
9x Val DB (including 1 in each of the forward and midships lift wells)
5xZero

Upper hangar:-
9xKate TB
18xVal DB
13xZero

So 27 Kate, 27 Val & 18 Zero, total 72 which corresponds with her original air group EXCEPT it makes no provision for the 5,5,2 Reserve aircraft to be carried in the hangar. BUT the latter were to be partially disassembled, probably in the hangar overhead.

This air group was less than when the initial requirement was drafted when it was 96. In the interim new types introduced were larger than the types they were replacing. The same thing was also happening with both British and US carriers in the late 1930s.

When you see the hangar layouts for Japanese carriers the aircraft are much more intertwined than on RN & USN ships. That must have made extracting a particular airframe much more difficult. So I could see a situation where aircraft might be left on deck from time to time. Not really a deck park as such. And during operations the Japanese did refuel and rearm aircraft on the flight deck between missions.

In late 1943 the organisation of Japanese air groups changed after which an air group was attached to a carrier group. So the 601st Kokutai, organised in mid-Dec 1943 was posted to the 1st Carrier Division comprising Taiho, Shokaku & Zuikaku. It theoretically had 81 Zero, 72/9 Judy/Val DB, 54 Jill TB and 9 recce aircraft. So each carrier had a complement of 27 Zero, 24 Judy DB, 3 Val DB, 18 Jill TB and 3 Judy recce aircraft for a total of 75 on each carrier, in theory.

Elsewhere the strength of the 601st Kokutai is given as 214 aircraft:-
91 Zero
9 Val
70 Judy
44 Jill

The strength of the Taiho air group on 13 & 19 June 1944 were as follows

22 / 19 Zero
22 / 20 Judy incl 4 recce aircraft
3 / 1 Val
18 / 16 Jill
Total 65 / 56

These represented losses in deck landing accidents as well as search plane losses and a fighter which landed on Junyo.

So lots of things to consider in determining just how many aircraft could be fitted into any hangar.
Thanks for the comprehensive reply.

I was looking in First Team for details of US airgroups in 1942. In preparation for the Guadalcanal campaign, Enterprise and Saratoga were carrying 90 aircraft each (37 F-4F, 37 SBD, 16 TBF), while Wasp had 71 (30 F4F, 30 SBD, 10 TBF and 1 J2F), a grand total of 250 carrier planes, though a few of these aircraft were reserves (dismantles/hoisted overhead?).

Further in the text on the eve of the Guadalcanal operation they had 237 ready aircraft of which 234 operational. In the interim there were a few operational losses, but most of the difference might be taken by the spares. Additional figures might be further in the text but on average it works out to about 85-86 ready aircraft on Enterprise and Saratoga, and about 66-67 on Wasp.

Also, the SBD had no wing folding at all, so it must have been a space hog. Obviously such large numbers of aircraft imply a large deckpark.

Getting back to the japanese carriers, given the above, and while it may not be as straighforward as that, would it not be reasonable to assume that a Shokaku could carry at least as many aircraft as the smaller Enterprise, say just over 80, IF they used deckparks and IF the aircraft were available? And the Hiryu and Soryu could carry about the same number as the smaller Wasp, say a bit over 60? And extrapolating, Akagi could carry just over 70 and Kaga maybe close to 80?

In regards to the Marianas, reading through the japanese wiki, apart from Taiho starting with 65 planes as you detailed above, it seems both Shokakus started with 77 apiece (no doubt including a deckpark), but just like Taiho's case, operational losses reduced those numbers somewhat. Also, regarding the types, it seems the non-folding D4Y might have taken a bit more space compared to the D3A (10,93m span folded), while the B6N was a bit longer than the B5N but folded span seems to be smaller at 6,3 metres, though i can't find clear info for B5N yet, which seems to be 7,3 metres folded.

So if the D4Y (and B6N?) take a bit more space compared to D3A (and B5N repectively?), then the Shokakus should be able to carry a few extra 1942 planes over the 77 it did carried at the Marianas?








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The D4Y (37.7ft x 33.5ft) takes up a bit less space than a D3A (47ft x 33.5ft) unfolded. It was a particularly compact aircraft for its role. While I can't immediately find the folded span of the D3A, using your figure of 10.93m which equates to just under 36ft means there isn't a huge difference.

As for the B5N2 (51ft x 34ft) and the B6N2 (49ft x 35.5ft) there is again not much difference in size. What I can't find for these is the folded width.

So dimensionally the overall differences are relatively small. But as I noted, with Japanese carriers it is all about how they dovetail together within the hangar space. And why did the Japanese limit their deck park to 12 aircraft? It seems a rather arbitrary figure independent of the size of the individual ships.

This is the hangar layout of Shokaku with her original 72 aircraft air group (excl reserves)

1698690706047.jpeg

Compare that with the full hangar of an Illustrious class as designed (11 rows of similarly sized Albacores & Fulmars)


1698690979615.jpeg

Or Indomiitable in 1943 when she had 40 Seafires aboard.

1698691202278.jpeg

To turn this on its head, has anyone actually stopped to work out how many aircraft could fit in the hangar of each US carrier class? Nobody bothers because we all know they used deck parks as a standard operating procedure.

The USN dropped the idea of storage of spare airframes in the hangar overhead during 1942. Enterprise, Hornet & Wasp all suffered from fires either in or caused by such aircraft falling onto aircraft stored below and causing fires that proved difficult to fight. As early as March 1942 the design of the Midway class was authorised with the note:-

"reserve airplane stowage to be provided, if practicable, on the same
level as and adjacent to the ends of the hangar to eliminate
plane stowage overhead".


So they were built with an aircraft storage area at hangar deck level aft of the after lift but unprotected by the armoured flight deck. By the time of their completion policy had changed again and no spare aircraft were being carried and it became another part of the hangar.
 

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