The F-35 No Holds Barred topic

McNamara is vilified for (among other things) the F-111 program. Disparate requirements, both between the services and within the service, particularly the Navy (there was never any chance of meeting both its weight and original mission requirements). As Aerofranz notes, a winner-take-all competition tends to produce unrealistic specification commitments by the competitors. One tends to forget that the McNamara practices, albeit with at least one significant modification (one service designed the airplane and the other had the option of buying it) resulted in a very successful program that subsequently became joint service in fact with a beneficial set of product improvements. It was a winner-take-all competition with a fairly tough set of requirements, certainly from a business standpoint. Vought won with what became the A-7. It came in on cost (at least according to the government's share of the bill) and schedule (a challenging one), and very close to weight. It was a worthy successor to the AD Skyraider.

One interesting aspect of the specification development process is that the Navy originally wanted its new light attack airplane to be supersonic. McNamara agreed to fund the program but only after the Navy had justified the requirements with a very extensive set of mission analyses. After reluctantly doing so, the Navy wound up deleting the supersonic requirement.

So it has been done.

The F-22 vs. the F-18E/F is another example. The Navy opted out of the F-22 program early on. The F-18E/F is certainly not the airplane that the F-22 is or even the F-14 was. On the other hand, while it doesn't have the inarguable wonderfulness of the F-22, it is affordable and has been getting up and going to work everyday, including being used for combat strikes on its first deployment, since July 2002. (The Air Force declared that the F-22 was operational in December 2005; its first assignment was defending the US east coast. As of this date, its bright future in actual combat is still before it.)

I think that a successful program results in large part from the thought that went into the original requirements and specifications: better is the enemy of good enough. Beware manufacturers (particularly their marketers) desperate for a production program who whisper in your ear during the specification development process that they can deliver everything you want and more; they are writing checks that their engineers can't cash.

From personal experience, I know that the V-22 barely survived the specification challenge that resulted from its genesis, not to mention some of the dingier procurement fashions incorporated in its original contract, and is the worse for it, although it's pretty good. I hope the F-35 does as well.
 
Jsport - Clarification: The DAS sensors (360 degree) are as good as you will get for a long time, because IR focal plane array element size is getting to a physical limit (I believe it has to do with edge diffraction at IR wavelengths). The only ways around it would be a larger array (dimensions) or maybe hyperspectral (near-IR/low light) but to achieve this without making the hardware bigger (very expensive) is difficult.

The HMD sensor is low-light, not IR, and has a smaller FOV than DAS, both differences that permit higher resolution.

Tailspin -

I think that a successful program results in large part from the thought that went into the original requirements and specifications: better is the enemy of good enough. Beware manufacturers (particularly their marketers) desperate for a production program who whisper in your ear during the specification development process that they can deliver everything you want and more; they are writing checks that their engineers can't cash.

A-bloody-men! One real problem is that we have overstressed management and systems integration at the expense of good, disciplined preliminary/configuration design expertise, and this gives the marketeers and the bosses unrestrained license to sell things that can't be built at all, let alone for any known amount of time and money.

Most of the cost and time involved in development, manufacture and (yea) sustainment is baked in by the requirement and the preliminary design. Cost as an independent variable (CAIV), the big juju that was supposed to trade JSF performance against cost, was a fallacy for that reason. Once you'd drawn the X-32 and X-35 in outline, tinkering with a few nm of range, a few dB of RCS and a few pounds of payload was merely going to affect the margins.
 
Published on Aug 9, 2012 by NAVAIRSYSCOM

On Aug. 8, an F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter test aircraft completed the program's first aerial weapons release. The aircraft (BF-3) dropped an inert 1,000-pound GBU-32 Joint Direct Attack Munition over an Atlantic test range from an internal weapons bay. Internal weapons carriage allows the F-35 to maintain a low-observable profile when combat loaded. The F-35B is a short take-off and vertical landing-capable fighter aircraft, designed for use by the U.S. Marine Corps as well as defense partners in the United Kingdom and Italy.

http://youtu.be/cbSinROAtHI
 
A F-35 Joint Strike Fighter test pilot discusses new flight control software
to aid in carrier approaches. Video courtesy of Lockheed Martin.

http://youtu.be/jlqRo3oBYZ8
 
Did not say that, except rhetorically in the case of the Guadalcanal mythos. (Fletcher was right!)

Tell you what LO, I am more than willing to concede that Fletcher was right, good onto him for making the right call, if you are willing to concede that the USMC is predicting they will "make the right call" again and abandon them yet again so they need an independent airwing, and that airwing needs to have the versatility of STOVL. ;D If Fletcher was right before given the circumstances, how can the navy not repeat the (as you pointed out) correct decision in the future?

Very odd to say "They were right to leave you but why do you have abandonment fears?"

It goes beyond the Canal also: Inchon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa have all been used as examples.

So I agree with you, Fletcher was right and the next guy will be too and the CVN force will withdraw and leave the Marines. You can't fault the USMC for preparing for the inevitable correct decision.

They may need CAS.

Marines do not have a lot of artillery, we retired the 8 inch guns a while ago, and have only 155MM and not much of it. it takes 8 hours to set up from ship to shore and be ready to fire. 8 hours is not acceptable. With the retirement of naval gunfire, Marines rely on the air wing heavily.

The question is whether a six-pack of complex and expensive aircraft crammed on to a boat with helos, landing craft, trucks and marines is a sensible way to provide it. We are discovering the answer, which is that it is not.

Which is bizarre, because the USMC seems to keep doing it that way, and it keeps working. I thought the whole MEU(SOC) thing had been pretty well proven, and if its not, don't tell the navy--they dedicate a lot of money, ships, and personnel to it.

"Lying offshore, ready to act, the presence of ships and Marines sometimes means much more than just having air power or ship's fire, when it comes to deterring a crisis. And the ships and Marines may not have to do anything but lie offshore. It is hard to lie offshore with a C-141 or C-130 full of airborne troops."
-Gen. Colin Powell, U. S. Army

Look I can quote Colin Powell too!!

The ships and aircraft (IE F-35B) are only getting more advanced and capable as time goes on as well. We have seen even four harriers make a difference, so six F-35Bs should be even better. MEUs are not hard and fast sets of units either, they change constantly, and thanks to the flexibility of the USMC/USN they can carry more than just six should they feel they are needed. Remember with the F-35B its not so much where it starts (No reason why it can start from a regular runway some distance away) And land in a very tight spot closer to the action as well. Flexibility is great.

Who is "we" anyway? The folks who ignore military history, cut out all the good news, conveniently forget to give credit where it is due, think that victory happens by magic, that the military doesn't know how to do its job, and don't bother to ask those involved who have better first hand knowledge than "we"?

If "we" means airplane nerds who conveniently forget anything that doesn't fit their preconceived narratives that makes sense. And believe it or not "we" is a pretty small group, not a group I belong to thankfully. The rest of us that serve/served and have to work for a living know a lot better than the internet bloggers, sad but true.



2. the F-35 is a poor performer

We know that it is a cost and schedule failure. Flight performance is not a significant advance over aircraft that it replaces. Everything hinges on stealth, which adversaries will have had 20-25 years to anticipate by IOC.

any new opinions to add?

The procurement process, exploited by greed and unwillingness to acknowledge failure and move on.

That will solve everything! I bet the next fighter project (started from scratch) will be a smooth, on time machine, of low cost. Again cutting the F-35 doesn't solve that problem anymore than firing your doctor "cures" your cancer.

Great news!

F-35 completes first airborne weapons separation

http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.NAVAIRNewsStory&id=5091
 
Fletcher was right given the scenario and the background.

Carriers had proven in the first months of the Pacific war to be strategically decisive and at the same time vulnerable to attack. The US Navy had started the war with seven carriers and (nine months later, in August 1942) had lost two of them. Two more would be lost before the first anniversary of Peal Harbor and before the commissioning of another new carrier.

This scenario is most unlikely to be repeated, and if the survival of a CVN is threatened in a future conflict, there is unlikely to be any place for slower and more vulnerable ships nearer the coast.

"A six-pack of complex and expensive aircraft"... The Marines do not "keep doing it that way" because the Harrier is relatively small and simple, and has never been as costly as the F-35B relative to other aircraft. The back-and-forth decision over the inclusion of a well deck on LHAs is a pointer to the problem. Since the well deck was removed from LHA-6/7 to remedy shortages of aviation facilities and fuel storage (associated with JSF and V-22), these problems will return on LHA-8 and later ships.

Great news, a bomb release at 400 kt went off OK. (Better than the C-model hook tests, at least!)
 
LowObservable said:
Jsport - Clarification: The DAS sensors (360 degree) are as good as you will get for a long time, because IR focal plane array element size is getting to a physical limit (I believe it has to do with edge diffraction at IR wavelengths). The only ways around it would be a larger array (dimensions) or maybe hyperspectral (near-IR/low light) but to achieve this without making the hardware bigger (very expensive) is difficult.

The HMD sensor is low-light, not IR, and has a smaller FOV than DAS, both differences that permit higher resolution.

..would have to say you didn't watch the Yale optics video..therefore would say we haven't reached the phyiscal limits and a great deal might well be done to the sensor head w/o larger holes in the fuselage & huge costs.. not claiming expertise here.
The below patent specifies "staring" and image "stitching" hardly something needed if only rudimentary sensing is the goal.
http://www.google.com/patents/US20060066730
 
F-35 Testing Turned Full Circle
(Source: BAE Systems; issued Aug. 9, 2012)

After successfully completing the static test programme on the F-35 (known as AG-1) we have now returned the aircraft back to Lockheed Martin, Fort Worth.

The static test programme broke all records for the speed of testing having applied more than 150 different loading configurations in just over nine months.

Having proven the strength of the aircraft is now beginning the 4500 mile journey back to the US after almost three and a half years in the structural test facility at Brough.

Static testing the F-35 means that the aircraft has been ‘flown’ to its limits with loads applied to it replicating the effect of high gravitational forces far beyond any conditions likely to be flown in actual flight. This is done with the airframe nesting in a multi-million pound rig kitted out with over 4000 strain gauges, 170 actuators and over 50 miles of wiring at our Brough site in Yorkshire. Brough is home to a world leading facility for putting aircraft through their paces to ensure they are strong enough and resilient enough to perform in the harshest environments in the world.

Tim Bramhall runs the F-35 structural test programme at Brough said “We certainly don’t give the aircraft an easy ride here. We push it to its limits so that we can be confident that each of the 3000+ aircraft that have been ordered will perform safely and effectively. The real challenge is keeping aircraft weight at a minimum whilst maintaining the strength of the plane within certain specified limits”

With this set of tests complete Tim added “We still have another F-35 CTOL airframe in the facility undergoing fatigue testing along with the remaining horizontal and vertical tails from the Carrier variant. Work on those continues on schedule and are shining examples of the long term future the structural test facility has ahead.”

Over 3,000 F-35 Lightning II aircraft stand to be produced, based on current requirements from the US and other international partners, with planned rates of production set to reach 200 per year (or one a day) by 2015.

-ends-
 
Fletcher was right given the scenario and the background.

Carriers had proven in the first months of the Pacific war to be strategically decisive and at the same time vulnerable to attack. The US Navy had started the war with seven carriers and (nine months later, in August 1942) had lost two of them. Two more would be lost before the first anniversary of Peal Harbor and before the commissioning of another new carrier.

And I agree with you, didn't we cover this?

And that was before anti ship missiles that could be fired from land, sea, and air. before aircraft became faster and more capable and before submarines could stay undersea for months armed with nuclear tipped torpedos and mines... Its a more dangerous world. CVNs are going to keep a very healthy distance in the future.

This scenario is most unlikely to be repeated, and if the survival of a CVN is threatened in a future conflict, there is unlikely to be any place for slower and more vulnerable ships nearer the coast.

Unfortunately, the Marines refuse to give their umbrella to someone who promises it will never rain.

It doesn't matter if the scenario is replicated play by play to perfection-- There will always be risk to carriers, and if that risk is excessive the navy will leave. Carriers will always be rare and valuable. CVNs are the most expensive piece of american military hardware not even counting its aircraft or personnel. The USN will never have enough of them. There is talk of bringing the USN down to as little as 8 with one in reserve. CVNs have only become more expensive with time and the enemy will be just as dedicated to sinking them now as they were then. But now the enemy has Anti Ship Missiles that can be fired from many platforms. Submarines that have mines and torpedoes that can carry nuclear warheads. Satellites to find them. The navy is more likely to run away now, not less.

CVNs have never been in more danger. luckily another fun feature of the F-35B is it can land on other ships. Whats wrong with spreading the aircraft to other ships? And if we have to risk, (and I have a feeling we will, if you want to hit the other guy you have to expose yourself a little) The Navy would probably prefer to lose the smaller Gator Navy vessels than the one of only 8 CVNs. The F-35B can make 32 more ships in the Naval Arsenal "aircraft carriers" of one sort or another. The whole fleet will be at risk in a future conflict. And they may have to risk, they may not have the choice of cruising away next time.

Its versatility that counts.

"A six-pack of complex and expensive aircraft"... The Marines do not "keep doing it that way" because the Harrier is relatively small and simple, and has never been as costly as the F-35B relative to other aircraft. The back-and-forth decision over the inclusion of a well deck on LHAs is a pointer to the problem. Since the well deck was removed from LHA-6/7 to remedy shortages of aviation facilities and fuel storage (associated with JSF and V-22), these problems will return on LHA-8 and later ships.

But of course other ships besides LHAs have well decks and not only LHAs have room for aircraft right?

Great news, a bomb release at 400 kt went off OK. (Better than the C-model hook tests, at least!)

Indeed, as of right now that lousy Marine F-35B is the only variant we know that can land a ship... probably best to cancel it.
 
And thus the destruction of Western airpower commences - not through declared enemies, but through an influential community of macho men who won't think jointly, even with the service of which they are a part, because it's so much more fun to hang on to a myth that says that other people who serve their nation honorably are just not as brave as they are.

I'm not going to try to convince you any more. If the fact that Marine ambitions have driven US airpower planning into a ditch (after helping to wreck the helo industry) hasn't sunk in by now, it never will. The commandant is always right, OK?
 
LowObservable said:
And thus the destruction of Western airpower commences - not through declared enemies, but through an influential community of macho men who won't think jointly, even with the service of which they are a part, because it's so much more fun to hang on to a myth that says that other people who serve their nation honorably are just not as brave as they are.

Make sure you lay it all at the USMC's feet. Don't blame a poor system of procurement that created the need for a JSF concept you don't agree with. Don't blame the USAF that created massively expensive small fleets of aircraft that couldn't be exported. Don't blame the Navy for its micro management of Marine Air. Don't blame the UK which voluntarily gutted its own aircraft industry years ago, along with the rest of Europe.

LowObservable said:
I'm not going to try to convince you any more. If the fact that Marine ambitions have driven US airpower planning into a ditch (after helping to wreck the helo industry) hasn't sunk in by now, it never will. The commandant is always right, OK?

Dont forget the Royal Navy and Italian Navy. They get credit too.
 
Just as predicted. The only way to justify going away from the F-35 is by declaring STOVL isn't required. Crash and burn.
 
AeroFranz is logically correct (indeed, to the point of tautology).

All materiel planning is zero-sum. I may want a Veyron, but won't buy it if it means that I have to live in a refrigerator carton. The B-2, F-22 and DDG-1000 were all desired in larger quantities but were cut back because they cost more than expected. Maintaining the original numbers would have meant cutting elsewhere in the defense budget and the choice went against them.

So no "expert" would agree that any one capability should be acquired "at all costs".

I don't hear any argument that JSF costs are higher than predicted. Had we known at the beginning that "oh by the way, the B is going to wind up costing 80 per cent as much as the last batch of 20 F-22s, and that's off a 130-per-year JSF line, and after F-22 gets chopped for breaking the bank" we would assuredly have seen different decisions.

At this point, declaring the B to be sacrosanct is poor planning and bad logic.
 
Had we known at the beginning that "oh by the way, the B is going to wind up costing 80 per cent as much as the last batch of 20 F-22s, and that's off a 130-per-year JSF line, and after F-22 gets chopped for breaking the bank" we would assuredly have seen different decisions.

Whoa, you mean if we could predict the future we might have done things differently? What an original idea.

Its worth remembering that we still don't know what the final cost of the JSF will be. Optimists and pessimists are welcome to guess in to infinity. Even then, the F-22 would not have the strike capability of the F-35, would be non-exportable, and would ignore the USAFs "Hi-lo" concept, Wouldn't be able to take off a carrier, and wouldn't be compatible with the USMC. So the only difference you might see is the USAF wanting more of them (Which they always did). Even then an aircraft needs to be judged not just on the "original sticker price" but on its maintainability and cost of operation. The F-22 is hugely expensive in this and as I have already noted, we are seeing F-35 improvements retrofitted onto F-22s to try and save cost.

Maybe the F-35 costs more because it does more for more people? And again only after final serial production will we know the "true cost" of the F-35. Seeing as only after 187 units the F-22 was already dropping in price, and thousands of JSFs are to be produced, I bet the price goes down a tad. Its also easy to forget that aviation articles were lousy with the exorbitant cost of the F-22 (cleverly lumping R&D into the mix the price was often reported at the $300 milllion mark, the actually price is less than half that) now of course we didn't buy enough!
 
Whoa, you mean if we could predict the future we might have done things differently? What an original idea.
No.

This is about being realistic in planning, being realistic in requirements. To get the occasional project wrong might be an incident. To consistently underestimate cost and time needed to realize your goals indicates fundamental flaws in procurement processes - as you have pointed out yourself. V-22. Sea Wolf SSN. EFV. F-22. JSF. LCS. DDG-1000. XM2001 Crusader.
 
LowObservable said:
AeroFranz is logically correct (indeed, to the point of tautology).

Well except for the "at all costs" part. The services aren't cancelling everything else to buy the F-35. ::)

[/quote]
 
Arjen said:
To consistently underestimate cost and time needed to realize your goals indicates fundamental flaws in procurement processes - as you have pointed out yourself. V-22. Sea Wolf SSN. EFV. F-22. JSF. LCS. DDG-1000. XM2001 Crusader.

and the band plays on and on and until it doesn't.
 
sferrin said:
Well except for the "at all costs" part. The services aren't cancelling everything else to buy the F-35. ::)


Maybe not cancelling, but perhaps not fully funding, which in the end ends up costing even more. Or maybe not starting other promising programs, because, how are you going to pay for them?
If my memories of Econ 201 serve me right, I'm talking about this.
 
AeroFranz said:
sferrin said:
Well except for the "at all costs" part. The services aren't cancelling everything else to buy the F-35. ::)


Maybe not cancelling, but perhaps not fully funding, which in the end ends up costing even more. Or maybe not starting other promising programs, because, how are you going to pay for them?
If my memories of Econ 201 serve me right, I'm talking about this.

Any *viable* alternatives that met ALL requirements would be even more expensive.
 
sferrin said:
AeroFranz said:
sferrin said:
Well except for the "at all costs" part. The services aren't cancelling everything else to buy the F-35. ::)


Maybe not cancelling, but perhaps not fully funding, which in the end ends up costing even more. Or maybe not starting other promising programs, because, how are you going to pay for them?
If my memories of Econ 201 serve me right, I'm talking about this.

Any *viable* alternatives that met ALL requirements would be even more expensive.

yes absolutely, but if procurement doesn't change Mr. LO is right... the end of Western aviation preeminience is gone and soon.
 
jsport said:
sferrin said:
AeroFranz said:
sferrin said:
Well except for the "at all costs" part. The services aren't cancelling everything else to buy the F-35. ::)


Maybe not cancelling, but perhaps not fully funding, which in the end ends up costing even more. Or maybe not starting other promising programs, because, how are you going to pay for them?
If my memories of Econ 201 serve me right, I'm talking about this.

Any *viable* alternatives that met ALL requirements would be even more expensive.

yes absolutely, but if procurement doesn't change Mr. LO is right... the end of Western aviation preeminience is gone and soon.

Which again comes down to a lousy system, not a lousy airplane (though the opinion on this will differ I know) Even the most die hard opponent of the F-35 would hopefully concede that the F-35 is the symptom and not the disease. Thats why all these calls for cancellation and beginning anew are odd to me. If the system doesn't get fixed how would the next aircraft avoid the exact same fate?
 
Ok, I have been largely out of the picture for the last week or two. Reading over all the responses since I asked my original question, it appears the following are the key issues raised:

The F-35 is too expensive.

Is the F-35 expensive? Well yes. However, is it vastly any different from other equivalent weapons programs? I would say no. Moreover, I would also challenge anyone to point out an equivalent program that is not expensive. It comes part and parcel with the development of these complex systems. You might also be surprised to find out what some other platforms such as the Super Hornet, Rafale or Typhoon actually cost.

In part, one could say that this is a result of the risk-adverse nature of the customers (i.e. the Governments involved) and by default the developers (Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, Pratt & Whitney and their multiple suppliers - please remember that this is not a one company job!). Any program such as this is going to be complicated. Because of this, an inordinate focus is expended upon ‘getting it right’. This results in ever increased development costs. Certainly when so many are ready to ‘tear you down at ever stumble’! Is this a fault of the Western acquisition system… quite possibly; however I would point out that I don’t see any other regions producing equally complex weapons systems for low costs and in large numbers quickly.

Another aspect here and one that leads directly to the perception that costs have been increasing is that those same customers are driven by price right from the start. Like it or not, but typically the best (i.e. lowest) price is always selected. Sure we may use terms like “best value” but in my experience something like 95% of the time this always equates to lowest price. As a result, companies are effectively forced to ‘low ball’ price (and often schedule) estimates. If you don’t, you don’t win the work - simple! Now this might be acceptable on an off the shelf fully developed product where there are very few, if any unknowns, however to do so for a developmental program is ridiculous - there are simply too many unknowns (in fact there are even unknown unknowns!). That said though, it does unfortunately happen usually because that is how the ‘game is played’ – as I said, if you don’t then you won’t win any work at all!. BTW, this is not a case of business development staff (those bloody marketers) or company managers (their evil bosses) setting out to deliberately mislead or to “sell things that can't be built at all, let alone for any known amount of time and money”, it is just a case of trying to do your job!

Yet another aspect that causes apparent price rises is the fact that the numbers of aircraft ordered LRIP to LRIP, year to year is being kept low. This automatically results in higher prices because you are automatically buying items (right down to individual piece parts) in the upper ends of price curves. For those who don’t understand what I mean, a price curve (also called a demand curve - see diagram below) is generated by the connection between production numbers and price – usually, the more of a certain item you order at one go, the better the individual price able to be achieved. This is a real issue too: larger numbers allow investment in more effecient production techniques, better amortisation of non-recurring costs such as tooling, programming etc, better buying power with suppliers and the like. However, when you are only dealing with single year buys of small numbers, companies are unable to take advantage of any of these aspects and as such the prices remain high. For example, the slowing of LRIP production numbers from the originally planned 100 per yr to something between 30 – 40 per yr results in the lower production quantity aircraft costing something in the vicinity of an extra $10M per aircraft. This is because the program’s planned economies of scale are not able to be realised.

ped_1.png

BTW, another aspect that has been getting a lot of press time this last year, though which I note interestingly has not been raised recently, has been the much vaunted bogey man of “concurrency risk”. To explain, concurrency risk refers largely to the cost of retro-fitting/modifying early production aircraft to the same standard as latter production aircraft. This is especially of concern when those modifications are for major aspects that cost significant money and time to implement. It should also be understood that such a risk is inherent in all programs where development is occurring concurrent to production. In the case of the F-35 though, the reporting of this risk and the cost supposedly involved has been blown out of proportion. Why do I say this? Well for one, the way these items have been costed does not reflect the way things happen in the real world. In much of the reporting the costs used for this are based upon each issue being corrected individually as a stand-alone event. In the real world though, you try to resolve as many issues as possible at the same time and often where possible at scheduled maintenance downtime. Think of it as though you were taking your car in to be serviced and at the same time wanted them to fix some minor squeaks and rotate and align the tyres. Where possible you try to get all of these things done at once. You certainly don’t have the car serviced on one day, schedule another session for the tyres on another day and lastly schedule each squeak/repair to be done on a separate day(s) yet again. However, with the concurrency costs reported to date for the F-35, that is just what people are expecting to happen!

One last point: Anyone who thinks the companies involved with the F-35 program aren’t under considerable pressure to reduce costs has obviously never spoken to any of those involved in the program. The price targets expected are extremely difficult to meet and are only becoming increasingly so. There is no-one from the lowest hardware provider right up to the likes of Lockheed Martin having an easy time of it and/or making a huge profit on this program.

The F-35 has taken too long.

Has the F-35 taken longer to enter full service then originally desired? Well, once again possibly yes. Is this entirely the fault of the companies developing it? Once again I would have to say no. Just look at the history of the program, especially these last few years. The majority of the delays to production numbers (which after all, ultimately drive when squadrons and the like can stand up) have been driven by the customers, especially in terms of sliding production schedule. If you don’t buy enough aircraft, then you can’t enter service fast enough. Trust me, all of the companies involved would very much like to see larger production orders sooner – it does no-one’s balance sheet good to have orders only growing slowly.

There have certainly been no major delays caused by aircraft technical issues (despite what some in the popular press would have you believe!). For instance, there have been no crashes - something that if you look at historic programs (including the F-22) should have occurred by now from just a statistical point of view. That in itself should stand testament to the success with which this program has been run to date. Sure, some of you will point to some of the various reports that have been released highlighting various technical concerns, however, how many of you have actually even fully read those reports or investigated what the issues are? For one, they were identified when they should have been identified (in development and testing) and in virtually every case, there was already a technical solution at hand. Hardly a cause for concern or for significant delays. And let’s just take a closer look at just one of those supposed technical problems – the tail hook issue. From what I understand, one of the problems was that the design team tried to re-use the hook design from the Super Hornet with minimal change but have discovered during testing that it requires more specialised designing. If anything, these people should be praised for trying to reduce costs and not "reinvent the wheel". Unfortunately, during testing (which is why you test!!!) they found that sometimes one has to...

Another aspect here that shouldn’t be overlooked, and one that links directly to schedule, has been the extraordinary time taken these last few years to agree each LRIP contract. LRIP4 took almost a year to negotiate and agree a contract. LRIP 5 something similar. LRIP 6 still hasn’t been agreed. Delays such as this flow directly into the production delays – no-one will produce a single aircraft without an agreed order or price for it.

BTW, looking beyond the USA aircraft, many of the apparent delays to partner nation aircraft have been because the partner nations have consistently/collectively not wanted to get ahead of the USA when it comes to introducing these aircraft into service. As a result, whenever the USA slides purchase orders (and thus operational service) the partner nations tend to also automatically slide their service entries and thus aircraft buys. The end result is that the apparent schedule delays are not necessarily the result of the aircraft developers but rather the customers yet again...

Also when looking at development timeframes one needs to keep in mind that the F-35 is not alone in taking a long time. Just look at the development timeframes for some of its contemporaries (using a simple first flight to service entry measure – note however that this is an admittedly crude measure that excludes pre-first flight development which in most cases is considerable):

  • Typhoon: 9 years, 4 months, 8 days
  • F-22: 8 years, 3 months, 8 days
  • Rafale: 14 years, 5 months
  • JAS-39 Gripen: 8 years, 10 months, 23 days

Now given that the F-35 carried out its first flight on 15 December 2006 and it is, as of today, only some 5 years, 7 months, 29 days down the track, I hardly think criticising on schedule is fair! But maybe that’s just me… ::)

Finally, another aspect not to be over looked in all this is the overall effect of the Global Financial Crisis (and related). This cannot be ignored, and IMHO has added a lot of additional scrutiny to the program. If nothing else, because countries’ budgets are hurting and because democratic governments’ policies are often driven by short term populist considerations, programs such as the F-35 are easy targets. What does this mean? Well, to use Australia as an example (something I am very familiar with), the government is facing a very high likelihood of being voted out at the next election (for a variety of reasons). One way they hope to avoid this situation is to be able to paint themselves as good economic managers at the next election. Part of their strategy to do this is to be able to have their budget back in surplus at the next election. And a part of their way of doing this has been to delay the purchase of many of the first RAAF F-35s by a couple of years. This saves them from paying for these aircraft in the short term and thus they are able to exclude this outlay from their budget. However, this delay has nothing what-so-ever to do with the performance of the F-35 itself or even of the ability of the aircraft to be produced to schedule.

The F-35 is too complicated.

By this, I mean the issues raised such as “the X-32 solution would have been better” or “what we really need was the modern day equivalent of the F-5 or MiG-21” type argument.

In responding to these I would first of all point out that this really is a feature of what I will call “The Western Way of Warfare”. By this I mean, the fact that for at least the last 70 odd years, those countries such as the USA, UK, Western Europe, Canada , Australia etc (i.e. those we tentatively refer to as “The West”), have tended to place greater emphasis upon quality rather then quantity when it comes to weapon systems. As a result, platforms such as the F-35 (and F-22 before that …and F-15, F-14, F-111, F-4, Typhoon, Rafale etc, etc) have sacrificed quantity in favour of quality. The F-16 in its original form was an attempt to reverse/change this philosophy, but in service, it too has fallen lock step into the same mould. The result is that you end up with smaller quantities of more complex, though arguably more capable platforms rather then large quantities of relatively simple platforms. Reversing this pattern/philosophy is not something anyone will do in one program. Nor is it even necessarily desirable. Go ask any soldier, sailor or airman/women whether they would be happy with a weapon equal to that of their potential competitors. I think you will find that almost unanimously, they will say that they always want something better! Even if you did want to go head-to-head with the enemy using large numbers of low cost, simple weapons systems, all you are doing is potentially heading for a war of attrition along the likes of WW1…does anyone here really think that is a smart idea?! Really?!!

As such, the concept of developing a modern day equivalent to the F-5 or MiG-21 that is simple, inexpensive, does away with the modern sensors etc (probably the only way to achieve the former) and is able to be procured in huge numbers as a result is simply not going to happen. If you think it is, you need to wake up now!

Now looking at some of the other specific simplicity issues/proposed (implicit or otherwise) solutions to this apparent problem:

  • The Boeing X-32 would have been a better solution since it only had the single engine providing lift & propulsion for the STOVL mission rather then the lift fan + engine from the X-35/F-35. First up, I think this perception only exists because people know it worked for the Harrier family. However just as equally, just because it worked there does not mean it is the only or indeed the best solution. Moreover, don’t you think that all the parties involved (Lockheed, Boeing, and McDonnell Douglas if you look wider) would have taken as a starting point the Harrier solution? These people are not idiots after all (despite what some here might like to imply). The lift fan+engine solution of the F-35 was only decided upon after a lot of careful consideration and analysis. This included fly-off tests using the X-32 and X-35 which the X-32 lost… or is that somehow forgotten.

    Moreover, regardless of the actual technical solution, what makes anyone think that any of the supposed delays afflicting the F-35 wouldn’t have also afflicted a mythical F-32? After all, just look at Boeing’s development of the 787 airliner over roughly the same period – it isn’t as though Boeing have had this proceed smoothly with no delays or technical issues…
  • The cause of all the problems is the STOVL variant (also known as the “Blame the USMC solution…though one might cautiously like to point out that the RN FAA have also wanted the STOVL variant for just as long…). Either way, this solution postulates that the F-35 would be proceeding without any problems and would be cheaper, better etc if only the design wasn’t encumbered by the need to also accommodate the STOVL mission. This is a difficult issue to prove one way or another…without a time machine that is. In attempting to do so though, I would ask people to point out exactly what aspect(s) of the STOVL variant has driven inordinate cost or schedule or performance compromises. After all, the avionics in all three variants are identical. The cockpits are the same. Wouldn’t the strengthened structure for the CV version be just as compromising on the CTOL version? Sure the engine for the STOVL mission has a greater thrust allowance, but when it comes to the other two variants this can be traded for increased performance and/or lower lifecycle operating costs. It’s not as though the STOVL birds are blocking up the production system or delaying testing. Really, I would like someone to point out where the STOVL is causing these supposed compromises.
  • “Jointness” is bad. This flows on from the point above and postulates that the problem with the F-35 JSF is all because of that (J)oint part. If only the services were all allowed to go their own way and develop separate CTOL fighters, separate STOVL fighters and separate CV fighters with no commonality or linkages between any of them. Adherents to this philosophy often like to point to the F-111 as justification for their case. Once again, I would like to challenge this assumption. Given the majority of the costs with any combat aircraft these days is with the subsystems, sensors, engines etc all of which are essentially identical in the case of the F-35, taking the Joint approach is actually extremely beneficial for the F-35, especially in terms of cost. This goes back to the Cost Curve argument raised above. If you are buying the same systems for all three platforms you are getting to higher production numbers faster which in turn mean that the costs come down faster. Simple! Moreover, I fail to see how the requirements from any one service or mission is driving the requirements for the other services/missions in any adverse direction. After all, it’s not like the sensor suite for the CTOL is not also wanted by the CV/STOVL operators. As stated above, the increased propulsion demand driven by the STOVL can have beneficial results for the CTOL/CV versions. Likewise, structural weight considerations driven by the STOVL also benefit the CV/CTOL. Even the increased structural strength driven by the CV requirement could be viewed as increasing the strength/fatigue life of the other version.


The F-35 will be outdated (especially in terms of Stealth) by the time it enters service and that somehow its enemies will have already developed perfect countermeasures for it.

This argument line ties into the delayed service entry one above and also tries to argue that by the time it enters service, much of its capabilities will be easily countered by the Russians, Chinese or someone else. Often, the aspect given most focus here is its Stealth/Low Observability (LO) features. Often proponents of this line of thought go so far as to try to argue that the Stealth/LO aspects will be totally negated and thus aren’t needed now. I find this line of argument especially amusing since on one hand it shows that the proponents don’t really understand why these features are valued and on the other hand are easily discounted by the fact that the likes of Russia (with T-50) or China (with the J-20) are also seemingly wanting to include these aspects (what do they say about Imitation being the sincerest form of flattery) or maybe they are also misguided…poor fools.

Now let’s look at the Stealth/LO aspect a bit more. First up, no-one within the industry has ever claimed stealth technologies make an aircraft completely undetectable. It is usually only the general media that claims that. Moreover, the combination of features generally thought of as 'stealth' is intended to make detection as difficult as possible. In one sense this is no different to the various camouflage techniques used for decades now. If the enemy can't see you or if they are not able to fully discern which way you are headed or whether you are friend or foe until it is too late then that could provide the few extra minutes or even seconds necessary to get in a first shot. The OODA Loop (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop) is what it is really all about here - see more below on this!

Now some here might like to point to examples such as the Serbian shooting down of a USAF F-117 to justify their position that Stealth technology has had its day. However, people need to understand that this example was not so much a failing of the Stealth technology (30 odd yr old in that case) or of the concept behind stealth, but rather the failing of bad operational tactics. Flying the same route, at the same time night after night against well trained, intelligent enemies is plain stupid!

BTW, when one considers the issue of Stealth, one needs to do it in conjunction with the capability of the Sensor Suite available and also the way the output from those sensors is processed and presented to the Pilot Mission System Manager (far more accurate term for the F-35!). This is an area that hasn't often been discussed in the general media. It is however, IMHO, the area where the F-35 truly outshines all it's rivals, including the much vaunted F-22 (in fact, as already mentioned, there are hopes to try to retro-fit some the F-35 capability to the F-22 to bring it closer to the state of the art!). The F-35 has it's own AN/APG-81 AESA-radar along with the Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) mounted under the nose. These are complimented by 6 additional passive infrared sensors distributed over the aircraft as part of Northrop Grumman's AN/AAQ-37 distributed aperture system (DAS). When combined with the EW System and also the data linking capability (which brings all sorts of additional sensors/information sources to the mix) and more importantly, the onboard processing/sensor fusion/data presentation tools (led by the Helmet Mounted Display - remember the F-35 does not have a HUD but rather all relevant information is constantly right in front of the pilot's eyes), this puts the F-35 pilot at a distinct advantage over his/her rivals. This once again goes back to the OODA loop - the F-35 pilot not only is able to Observe the enemy first, they are able to Orientate themselves without being seen and then Decide (supported by more information) faster before finally Acting - all faster then their enemy. It is this ‘speed’ which puts the F-35 at a real advantage in a fight.

Now, even if you don’t believe/accept the points I have detailed above, let’s just look at some of the possible alternative solutions proposed:

The entire F-35 program outright! The dream scenario for some here I am sure. Let’s assume that this suddenly happened. To begin with let’s focus upon the US Armed Forces requirement since they are by far the greatest user of the F-35 (and have the greatest need for a replacement with aircraft average ages getting well up there). What would the US be left to do then:

USAF:

  • Buy more F-22s? - Well that will go down nicely for the budget! Anyway, the F-22 is actually a less capable platform than the F-35 when it comes to the full spectrum of roles as well as un-refuelled range.
  • Keep existing or even buy more F-15s/F-16s? - sure that will go down well. Whilst everyone else is getting 4+ and 5th gen platforms, they have 30+ yr old aircraft design!
  • Super Hornets? - yeah, like hell the USAF will ever by another pure Navy jet unless they are forced to. Anyone who thinks that has never experienced USAF/USN rivalry!
  • Buy Typhoons or Rafales? - again, like hell that will happen outside the realm of whiffing!
  • Start a new 5th or even 6th Gen Fighter program (maybe even with UCAS)? - What, reset the JSF clock to Day 1? Well that makes sense...NOT!!! What makes anyone think the same supposed delays that have impacted the F-35 won't raise themselves again? What's more, you just pushed back the in-service date another 10 - 15yrs at least. Smart!!!
USN:

  • Keep with the Super Hornet? Whilst a possible, the USN would fight this due to it almost making them a second rate player (only last year, the USN publicly stated they were looking at the F-35 to actually replace the Super Hornet), and would start to therefore put their precious carriers at risk from budget cuts etc.
  • Start a new 5th Gen Fighter program? - Again, not a sensible move!
USMC:

  • Keep the Harriers and Classic Hornets going? - Same issue as the USAF with F15s/F-16s. In fact, possibly even worse given the platforms' capabilities and the fact that neither is in production anymore.
  • Accept Super Hornets - possible, but an extreme compromise that is totally at odds with years of tactics/concepts of operation and extremely limiting. I would also hasten to add that this would risk seeing the USMC Air Wings simply being re-absorbed into the USN.
  • Start a new 5th Gen, VTOL Fighter program? - Again, not a sensible move and one unlikely to ever get support.
Now let’s also look at the non-US partners (and existing/future FMS operators – Israel, Japan, Spain, Singapore, South Korea etc.). Well to begin with, for the US Govt to try to cancel the F-35 (and it would take nothing less then the US Govt) means pissing off a lot of their allies (not to mention their own domestic industries - hundreds of which, employing tens of thousands of staff, would be impacted – great thing to do to your high-tech industry in the middle of the GFC!). These would then mostly go to the Non-US competitors: Typhoon, Rafale etc. Boeing might pick up a couple with Super Hornet, but most would be too pissed off with the USA to give them anything.

Cancel the STOVL Version!

It has been suggested that the solution to the supposed problem is to cancel the STOVL variant. However, quite apart from the counters to it even being a problem that I have already provided above, if this were cancelled not only are the USMC left wanting, so to are the RN FAA (especially given the debacle of the on again/off again variant switch already gone through) as well as the Marina Militare and eventually most likey the Arma Aerea de la Armada Espanola. Without the F-35B on the cards, there are going to be a lot of current Harrier users getting quite nervous about their long term prospects.

I could go on, but that would just be reiterating the points raised above already... ::)



BTW, as for comments such as “Why don't you acknowledge that critics have been right about cost and schedule so far”, let’s just say that you critics really need to focus your efforts on selling your services to the companies involved, the Governments and military services and most of all the treasuries of the world. It would be nice to always be correct and to be able to refer to your crystal balls. Those mere mortals amongst us simply have to make do with using prior experience, best and educated guesses, careful planning and forecasting… ::)
 
I agree with most of your points Greg, but the problem I have is it seemed pretty obvious to everyone except Lockheed Martin and the various governments that the F-35 was pretty f****ing unlikely to be

1) on time
2) on cost

given its awesome complexity.

Lockheed assured everyone they had the magic juju beans to square the circle and make something very complicated relatively cheap. It was going to leverage all that the F-22 technology (developed over 20 years at cost of billions) off-the-shelf to speed development and reduce costs.

Now it seems in retrospect to have been hogwash. Most of the F-35 technology seems new, not off the shelf, and if anything more advanced than the technology on the F-22. Which was quite expensive. Add STOVL, just to keep things interesting. The USAF couldn't afford F-22s - but can afford a new fighter which is actually more complex and advanced in most of the critical areas?

The F-15 was downgraded and key components removed to remain affordable. EO tracker? Removed. HMS, new gun? All sacrificed. On the F-22 the IRST, side facing radar arrays and STO /thrust reverser capability - sacrificed to save money. What capability on F-35 has been sacrificed to keep costs down?

Just because something is achievable doesn't make it necessary or affordable.

Maintainable and exportable stealth? Hard, complex. Supersonic STOVL? Hard, complex. Advanced avionics? Hard, complex.

If you want all that and the kitchen sink, its going to be expensive and difficult, no matter how much the individual companies are trying to meet aggressive cost goals or how competent the engineers.

If the USAF wanted more advanced fighters, they should have built an F-22B. If they wanted *affordable*, then they should have set a price and designed the best plane you can get for the money.

"Hey, I need me a cheap car. Got to be cheap. But it must have air conditioning, 200mph top speed, 0-60 in 4 seconds, be made from carbon fibre, have alloy wheels and designer interiors".

Its too late in my opinion to do anything much else than finish F-35. I think the fault lies not with Lockheed Martin but the requirements they were given.
 
It will be at least a week before I have the time to read all that stuff. Do not infer that silence means that I am stunned into agreement.

I would point out though that "first flight to service entry" does not equal "first flight to some point in flight-test, with no IOC date set" and to trumpet JSF's status as an achievement indicates a lack of logical discipline.

And while there is a lot of blame to be laid on the customer's side (some for lack of competence, some for want to sell good-news stories to higher leadership and Congress, some for disregarding outside warnings) the fact remains that LMT bid a design that it could not build at all, and that (even when redesigned) could not be built for the time and money promised.

However, I do find this paragraph to be telling:

As a result, companies are effectively forced to ‘low ball’ price (and often schedule) estimates. If you don’t, you don’t win the work - simple! Now this might be acceptable on an off the shelf fully developed product where there are very few, if any unknowns, however to do so for a developmental program is ridiculous - there are simply too many unknowns (in fact there are even unknown unknowns!). That said though, it does unfortunately happen usually because that is how the ‘game is played’ – as I said, if you don’t then you won’t win any work at all!. BTW, this is not a case of business development staff (those bloody marketers) or company managers (their evil bosses) setting out to deliberately mislead or to “sell things that can't be built at all, let alone for any known amount of time and money”, it is just a case of trying to do your job!


In the real world, submitting a price-and-schedule bid that you know is bogus (in the knowledge that once the true costs are apparent, the customer will have to choose between paying up and losing the sunk cost) has a simple name. Fraud.

Can anyone explain how there is any daylight between the legal definition of fraud and what is being described above? Again, this is not a simple matter of an estimate gone wrong - what GTX is describing is a situation where the contractor knows that the estimate is low and worthless.

And if the customer's representative or manager accepts that bid, knowing or believing it to be bogus, that person is guilty of collusion in fraud.

The implied excuse here is "everybody does it, so if you don't, you won't get the work". It does not hold water because you don't know that your competitor is doing it, let alone to what extent.
 
During conceptual design activities, engineers are responsible for assigning risks to different tasks. If you have no previous experience in one particular complex task, then it's a significant risk and you should assign a proportionally significant safety margin. That's not even Systems Engineering 101, it's common sense.
If it turns out your margins were too small, then either:

a) you did not recognize the risk (poor engineering)
b) you recognized the risk and assigned too low a margin because you were trying to win the competition (you were gambling, poor engineering/management decision)

besides the obvious ethical problem of option b), in either case you can't blame no one but yourself if Murphy rears its ugly head. This is my problem with the current state of affairs with F-35: we are nowhere close to where we should be at this point of the program and LM claims innocence from any wrongdoings. LM wrote a check they could not cash and the US taxpayer is fronting the costs. Now that's just me, but in any other type of transaction it would be hard not to feel like you're being taken for a sucker.
 
AeroFranz said:
During conceptual design activities, engineers are responsible for assigning risks to different tasks. If you have no previous experience in one particular complex task, then it's a significant risk and you should assign a proportionally significant safety margin. That's not even Systems Engineering 101, it's common sense.
If it turns out your margins were too small, then either:

a) you did not recognize the risk (poor engineering)
b) you recognized the risk and assigned too low a margin because you were trying to win the competition (you were gambling, poor engineering/management decision)

besides the obvious ethical problem of option b), in either case you can't blame no one but yourself if Murphy rears its ugly head. This is my problem with the current state of affairs with F-35: we are nowhere close to where we should be at this point of the program and LM claims innocence from any wrongdoings. LM wrote a check they could not cash and the US taxpayer is fronting the costs. Now that's just me, but in any other type of transaction it would be hard not to feel like you're being taken for a sucker.

Offer an alternative that meets all requirements at a lower cost and sooner.
 
Offer an alternative that meets all requirements at a lower cost and sooner.

That's a simplistic and illogical challenge.

After all, we have now proven that the original JSF requirement can't be met at the original cost and schedule.

The argument made here is that attaining parts of the requirement (specifically STOVL) is now so expensive as to be a misallocation of resources, and that the better option - again, in view of the actual costs of the B - is to divide Marine CAS between CV-based air and a system for lower threat levels. (And before anyone else screams, the Marines have a lower-threat-level combat aircraft in the shape of the AH-1Z, so this is not new.)

It may also be (as the CNO seemed to be implying) that better weapons for the SH would be a better investment for CV-based air.

If correct, these don't meet JSF requirements, for sure - because that's a prescription for banging your head against the same wall. But do they meet military requirements?
 
AeroFranz said:
During conceptual design activities, engineers are responsible for assigning risks to different tasks. If you have no previous experience in one particular complex task, then it's a significant risk and you should assign a proportionally significant safety margin. That's not even Systems Engineering 101, it's common sense.
If it turns out your margins were too small, then either:

a) you did not recognize the risk (poor engineering)
b) you recognized the risk and assigned too low a margin because you were trying to win the competition (you were gambling, poor engineering/management decision)

besides the obvious ethical problem of option b), in either case you can't blame no one but yourself if Murphy rears its ugly head. This is my problem with the current state of affairs with F-35: we are nowhere close to where we should be at this point of the program and LM claims innocence from any wrongdoings. LM wrote a check they could not cash and the US taxpayer is fronting the costs. Now that's just me, but in any other type of transaction it would be hard not to feel like you're being taken for a sucker.

Thats is as LO would say "simplistic and illogical"

What about when NAVAIR Gives you improper info that causes tailhook problems? we aren't even getting into political and global downturn issues, or a worker strike, government budgeting, elections, etc. its a helluva more than engineering that causes delays. As GTX just posted, its not engineering anyway.


LowObservable said:
But do they meet military requirements?

No, As long as the USMC and allied Navies that will use the B are considered military. ;D And seeing as JSF requirements were set by military input, this is an argument in semantics. Again you seem to be discluding the UKs large investment in the JSF program from the start, with the understanding that a STOVL Variant would be in the offering.

Fun game though LO! Lets play it with the F-35C: We cancel the C and the USN can buy the F-35A. In low intensity conflicts they can use helicopters and stand off munitions, and in high intensity they can just take off of air force bases. Sure it doesn't meet the JSF requirements, but does it meet military requirements?

How does one cancel an international program anyway?

I also fail to see how after all the feats of engineering built into the other models to accommodate a STOVL version we cancel it and it make the other variants better somehow.

I urge everyone to read GTX's post becuase he covers this all already.
 
LowObservable said:
Offer an alternative that meets all requirements at a lower cost and sooner.

That's a simplistic and illogical challenge.

Not at all. You and others are arguing the F-35 should be cancelled because there's a better solution. Let's hear it.
 
Sure.

Reprieve the F-35A because it will probably do its design job (super F-117 with moving target/in weather capability and self-defense) and because the USAF has been left with nowhere to run. However, don't expect 80 per year. (Even so, LockMart still has the world's biggest fighter program.)

Supplement the F-35A with Boeing-Saab Gripens for the Guard and Reserve. CAS? How about a shorter runway than JSF?

The Navy has an all-round strike fighter that still has development potential. Overall, going Ultra Bug will provide greater combat capability for the CVs until the mid-2020s even assuming the C does what it says on the tin.

The F-35B is a misallocation of resources to a niche mission, on a strategic scale. Marines re-equip for now with Super Hornet and life-extend the Harrier with the aid of the low-time UK airframes.

Removing the B and C greatly simplifies test and stand-up of operational units and increases the chance that the A will arrive on time.

Invest the money saved ($40-$50 million for every B and C you don't build) in (1) a new airframe built around the F414 and existing avionics subsystems, and without the IPP and more-electric cr*p. Neo-F-14 in program terms, (2) a robust weapon development and acquisition program and (3) technology for advanced propulsion, sized for the new airframe.
 
" What about when NAVAIR Gives you improper info that causes tailhook problems?"


I hadn't heard of improper info, but i'll look it up if you give me a link. I still don't understand how you can screw up something that depends essentially only on your aircraft's geometry and specifications of an arresting system that hasn't changed much in 60 years. BTW, TT has a pretty good overview of this topic on his very informative blog.


http://thanlont.blogspot.com/search?q=tailhook
 
LowObservable said:
Sure.

Reprieve the F-35A because it will probably do its design job (super F-117 with moving target/in weather capability and self-defense) and because the USAF has been left with nowhere to run. However, don't expect 80 per year. (Even so, LockMart still has the world's biggest fighter program.)

Supplement the F-35A with Boeing-Saab Gripens for the Guard and Reserve. CAS? How about a shorter runway than JSF?

The Navy has an all-round strike fighter that still has development potential. Overall, going Ultra Bug will provide greater combat capability for the CVs until the mid-2020s even assuming the C does what it says on the tin.

The F-35B is a misallocation of resources to a niche mission, on a strategic scale. Marines re-equip for now with Super Hornet and life-extend the Harrier with the aid of the low-time UK airframes.

Removing the B and C greatly simplifies test and stand-up of operational units and increases the chance that the A will arrive on time.

Invest the money saved ($40-$50 million for every B and C you don't build) in (1) a new airframe built around the F414 and existing avionics subsystems, and without the IPP and more-electric cr*p. Neo-F-14 in program terms, (2) a robust weapon development and acquisition program and (3) technology for advanced propulsion, sized for the new airframe.

And the UK and Italy do what again? Just curious. every time I bring them up you ignore them.

Its not just about time on the Harrier Frames. We have flown the bejesus out of an aircraft that was supposed to be ok until 2010 providing there was no major wars... then we got into three wars. The parts havnt been in production for years, and the UK harriers are barely enough to augment what we have now until things can be completely replaced by the B.

I remember when the US looked at the Gripen when it was called the F-20 ;D Why on Earth would the USAF Scrap its F-16s? and if it did, why wouldn't they buy Ultra or super hornets to at least pretend to keep some kind of savings? I like that your plan includes buying an exotic Swedish fighter rather than an off the shelf American design... Thats how I know you have really done your homework.

How much will the "ultra Bug" cost? And these super snazzy stand off weapons (because the thing can't survive near any real danger) get incorporated into the price right? Just to keep things fair? because in that case I'm guessing the price break, along with the additional sensors to make it a lame, quasi-F-35 with additional jamming gear, put it on par price wise with the real deal F-35.

explain to me how the Neo/Tomcat II won't slip into the same trouble we have seen with other Fifth Gen jets LO? How long will it take?

All of your plans involve fourth gen, or upgraded fourth gen aircraft who's time has passed. If we wanted to upgrade into infinity while everyone else passes us by (You know, the death of western airpower and all) There are people out there who if they had their way would have the US using the P-51Z Mod 93, and the UK the SPitfire MK XXLVI.

Its gutlessness, and it discounts and forgets the problems that fourth gen aircraft had in development themselves. The upgrades alone will be in the billions, and in the end none of the aircraft will be able to do any support without small loads of highly expensive weapons that must be deployed well away from the action. WE have those already, they're called cruise missiles.

Finally it destroys the entire concept of fleet wide savings through commanlity. You have come up with a brilliant plan to take a job that could be done with three variants of the same core aircraft and managed to make a plan that includes F-35s/Gripen, HArrier/Super BuG, and the Navy gets the Ultra Bug/Neo Tomcat (In service around 2030 if trends continue.) UK uses what? Italy uses? What about the Prowler? Do the Marines get EA-18Gs? And what do we get when the Harriers are done in ten years? Since the F-35B also gives more punch for fewer aircraft needed, This larger bunch of old legacy aircraft that will require more maintenance will cost more in men and material. Its all the same garbage that the F-35 was created to avoid. How cheap do all these aircraft have to be, (not only in initial cost but in actual operating costs) to actually save money? And we aren't talking about efficacy. An F-15 costs as much as 8 F-86s. but not even 800 F-86s have the capability that an F-15 does.

Once again your solution is to ignore real world requirements for the next twenty years, create multiple and different airframes with little to no commonality, and if your plan won't work for other air arms or military services, its their fault for existing or wanting aircraft that you feel it should never have in the first place. Your plan is perfect, its the world thats wrong!! If only the military would quit knowing and insisting on doing its job with the right tools!


Franz NAVAIR Approved of the Tail Hook. Tail Hooks are straightforward, but not if given bad info. What was the last purpose built fighter class aircraft that wasn't a Hornet or a rehash of a hornet? F-14? Its Hook was based off the A-6. No one has actually built a new design carrier fighter aircraft in an entire generation. Decades have passed. Building a house is straightforward but if the blueprints are screwed up and you follow the blue prints, the house will get screwed up. LM trusted NAVAIR to know. Oops. Most people don't bother to do the research because its easy to point fingers at LM.

http://elpdefensenews.blogspot.com/2011/12/f-35-2007-cdr-smoke-and-mirrors.html
 
Wakey, wakey boys and girls…time for some of you to leave the fantasy world of your dreams and to (re)enter the real world!!! ::)

Why do I say this? Well, by some of the comments here, it seems obvious to me that a number of people have no grasp of how the world of defence procurements/tendering and indeed complex project development really works and instead seem to be clinging to some idealistic fantasy world that they like to think exists.

I will admit that I perhaps used a misleading term when I referred to ‘low balling’ price and often schedule estimates. Please let me clarify.

In the real world, companies (and indeed the engineers, planners, managers, business development staff…right through to the trades-people/technicians that make them up) are often forced to work with the best information at hand. This goes for both the inputs (i.e. specifications, customer requirements etc) and the outputs (predicted development requirements, cost estimates, schedules etc). No one, I repeat NO-ONE, has a complete, perfect view of the ‘picture’. Moreover, the reality of our style of business (and this goes not just for the aerospace business) is that it is a win-loss scenario. In other words, if you win a contract you get to do the work, employ people, do interesting things, deliver products/services…and to hopefully make some money. If you don’t win the contract, you don’t get any of this. Oh, and by the way, although at the end of the day you may find out that you would have been better of not winning a certain contract or package of work, not trying to do so at the start is not an option (no business operates by not doing anything!!!).

So what you may say. Well, when I say that companies “low ball estimates” or that “this is how the ‘game’ is played”, what I mean is that people (those poor, imperfect creatures that we are, ruled by emotions and the like that actually make up companies) work with the best information at hand. Often this means that they are working with incomplete requirements or an incomplete understanding of the future political/economic environment or an incomplete understanding of what will be required to do something in the future (remember those unknown unknowns) or often all of the above. Unfortunately though, the option of waiting until you have a perfect picture and all the information is not possible…no time machines or crystal balls again folks! So what do they do? Well, they make the best predictions they can. They use experience. They might even conduct trials or studies (remember those odd things called the X-32 and X-35?) to try to firm up estimates/fill in knowledge gaps. At the end of the day though, they do the best they can with the information/knowledge at hand.

Now another part of the picture here is that people tend to take a favourable view when making predictions. Things will always go faster, work out better, be done cheaper…etc. This is not a case of being fraudulent! It is simple human nature. Moreover, in a cut-throat business environment such as the aerospace industry, this is compounded even further. The company that takes the pessimistic view when making its predictions/estimates (i.e. assumes things will always take longer, costs will be higher, be more expensive) will not be the one who wins the orders/signs the contracts. It simply doesn’t work that way. Remember there are no prizes for being second or last…even if you are later proven to be right (“I told you so” does not pay the bills!). Because of a combination of these factors you will find that companies do indeed provide positive predictions/estimates with respect to cost, schedule, what is technically achievable. Let me reiterate: This is not a case of being malicious or of deliberately providing bogus information. Nor is it fraudulent! It is reality!

Now when it comes to comments such as “everyone knew…” or “it seemed pretty obvious to everyone except Lockheed Martin and the various governments…” or “we have now proven…”, I would ask for some proof of these absolute statements. Where exactly were all of these experts at the start of these programs? I think there are a lot of people saying “I told you so” now, but back at the time, they are actually pretty quiet. Remember also that hindsight is always perfect but that unfortunately, we don’t currently have a time machine that allow us to flit back and forth to always be right in all decisions/predictions.

With respect to my use of the durations between first flight to service entry as a measure of progress, you will note that I did say right at the start that this is a simple, admittedly crude measure (part of the reason I did this was that trying to establish a firm start date for the development programs of many programs can be quite difficult. For instance, to use the Eurofighter Typhoon as an example, which of the following dates should I use:

  • Mid 1970s - France, Germany and UK initiate the European Combat Aircraft programme (ECA)?
  • 1983 - The UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain launch Future European Fighter Aircraft (F/EFA) programme?
  • 8 Aug 1986 - EAP demonstrator makes first flight?
  • 23 Nov 1988 - Contracts signed for production of demonstrator engines and airframes?
  • 27 March 1994 - Maiden flight of first development aircraft, DA1 from DASA at Manching with RB199 engines?
  • 4 June 1995 - Maiden flight of Italian DA3, the first with EJ200 engines?

Or any one of many other potential start dates???

What I am trying to do is to provide a relatively consistent basis of measure to compare programs. If someone else wants to provide an alternate, then by all means please do so. Regardless, what I was trying to highlight though is that when people start acting as though the F-35 is some sort of extreme case on its development schedule, they need to actually have a reality check and to compare it to similar programs. In this respect, I still believe that the measure I provided and the examples used remain valid.

Moving on, I would also ask for the proof that the F-35 program is so grossly “off the rails”. Proof means real numbers, facts etc…not opinions or hearsay. Moreover, when providing comparisons between numbers, please make sure you use a consistent baseline other wise it is meaningless.

In addition, when you do assert a particular fault to blame (e.g. the STOVL variant), please use some facts to back up your assertion. For example, please provide the evidence that the STOVL variant has caused such disastrous, avoidable program delays or technical compromises or cost increases so as to warrant its cancelling out right.

Oh, and by the way, when it comes to the issue of the STOVL variant, please remember that as I said above, the USMC are not the sole planned/predicted user. As such, please explain to me how other planned/predicted users (e.g. RN FAA, Marina Militare and most likely the Arma Aerea de la Armada Espanola) are supposed to get around there being no viable Harrier replacement.
 
Why not fix the current procurement? The transition to all 'Firm fixed' is a start but what about
an independent (non-corp captured govn types) assessment of primes and subs business/cost.

Eventually, even these prime's stock is going to suffer when these planes are cancelled curtailed.. No follow on within reasonable cost..etc. The smell of sh-t too close to the dog food bowl.

ANTHONY CAPACCIO "acapaccio@bloomberg.net' knows the degree of transparency or lack there of on this .. ..Citi might well have a person on this as well.
 
TT, well, it's pretty screwed up that the overseeing organism did not catch the problem at CDR. I realize there haven't been new tailhook designs since LBJ was in office, but for crying out loud, how hard is it to design a piece of steel with a bent end? We have got worse problems than just the -C model not catching wires if we can't design a tailhook.
Surely if we can spend millions of hours doing CFD, thousands of hours in a wind tunnel, FEA-the bejezus out of the F-35, you can also do some dynamic analysis that tells you if you're going to catch a wire.


GTX, I mentioned this before - not having a perfect picture of the situation is still not an excuse for blowing estimates. If you can't estimate something you allocate a margin of error. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the margin. As your analysis improves, you can decrease the margin.
If you eat up all the margin, then you failed to evaluate the risk properly. And even the unknown unknowns get an allocation.
At least that's how we do weight estimation and track weight at my company. So if you blow estimates it's either poor engineering or you have gambled that everything will turn out as lightweight as it can, and we know how often that happens.


The bit about human nature and making rosy predictions, well, the whole point of engineering is to be as rigorous as possible, use the best, verified, methods available, and then trust your numbers (including the aforementioned margins). If we decide that instead we go with whatever makes you look good, then there is no point in performing all the analysis, and what's more, you are lying to yourself. In nature, F=m.a uses the real m, not what management says it should be.


As far as how the VSTOL version "ruined" the other two, the commonality requirements have subtle but pervasive cascading effects. Just to name one, the fact that the -C model can't catch a wire is the -B's fault. For elucidation of this piece of trivia, i recommend reading Tailspin Turtle's link posted previously.
 
For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.
Report from the Rogers-commission on the Challenger disaster - Appendix F - Personal observations on the reliability of the Shuttle by R. P. Feynman
Link
 
Moving on, I would also ask for the proof that the F-35 program is so grossly “off the rails”.

Take current projected cost of R&D/procurement of 2440-some US aircraft. Subtract planned cost of 2800+ jets in 2001 (BY2012 dollars for both, it's all in the SAR). Divide by number of days since program start.

Now define "off the rails" for me, given the fact that we also have no IOC date at this time.

Otherwise, I have real life things to do and probably won't be able to address most of your writings for another few days.
 

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