An interesting discussion thus far. From my limited experience and involvement with US soldiers and Officers the problem appears to me that both lack discipline. Dowunder, our attitude to discipline is more relaxed than say the British army's. We have separate Officers, SNCO and OR's messes. You don't go to a different mess, unless invited to. Usually, the invites are downwards. This allows the separate ranks to bitch and moan as much as they like about their seniors or juniors without being overheard. Some units have mixed messes but they tend to be smaller and understand the differences between the ranks. British units are far more rigid, having even a Junior NCO Mess. The ranks never talk in the British Army, unlike the Australian one where everybody knows everybody else.
Self-discipline is the key. The Australian Army is more rigid than many people realise but it is because the soldiers know and understand that is what sustains them in battle. There are larrikins, there are buffoons but one they start to climb in rank, those traits disappear. SNCOs are where the Army's knowledge is and where it is retained. I served with a WO1 who had served in Korea, Malaya, Singapore, South Vietnam. He was unusual though, most only serve 20 years. I knew one WO2 who was recalled to the Infantry Centre at Singleton because he and a few other SNCOs had the knowledge to rewrite and update the training manual for the Vickers MMG when it was reintroduced to service after the failure of the M60 for the SFMG role.
Our officers have what appears to be a unique talent to want to learn. Something I note US Officers seem adverse to, generally. They read books, something I note the US Officers I've known, rarely did. They want to learn about past conflicts/battles and how to apply the lessons learnt. I am sure there are many US Officers who buck the perceived trend of having ceased to learn after they graduated from their military academies but I found them rather rare. It is also something the SNCOs and ORs do as well, downunder, generally.
On the battlefield, this often coalesces. A good officer is one who listens to the options open to him and then decides which he believes is the best. His best confidante is his Batman (usually the senior most private in his unit who has many years of experience under his belt) who he can talk to privately and if he's smart will listen to the advice offered. His best and only real subordinate is his Platoon Sergeant, who will advise him on the best course of action. Don't think he abdicates command, however he bases his commands on good advice. There is nothing so wet as a Lieutenant fresh from ADFA/Duntroon.
All soldiers, without exception, go through Infantry IET (Initial Employment Training) where they learn Section minor tactics. Those that pay attention (and they don't really have much choice) learn how to conduct themselves in a Contact or an Ambush, how to conduct an Attack and how to prepare a Defence, as well as how to Patrol. We were once a light infantry army, nowadays because of the increased lethality of Artillery and IEDs we are a mechanised army, with light armoured support. We once walked everywhere, nowadays we ride and then walk to carry out our operations. We interact with the locals, we talk to them, we don't talk down to them. We help them when they have trouble. We are friendly, 'cause the locals are the ones who warn us about IEDs, about potential ambushers and ambushes.
What surprised me about Iraq II was when Petraeus took over the explosion of ideas and thinking that came from the lower ranks there. Suddenly new, different ways of conducting the counter-insurgency campaign appeared and were tried. Some were successful, some weren't. Obviously the US Army junior ranks had been thinking about what they had been doing was wrong and try different things they had thought about. So, obviously the US Army wasn't exclusively focused on the War of the Big Battalions.
As already mentioned, we focus on COIN or counter-revolutionary warfare but not exclusively. It's 'cause that is the sort of conflicts we are most involved with. It is the basis on which all other tactics are built. It ensures that small units know what they are doing, how to do it and from there, their commanders can co-ordinate their actions, whether the enemy is a dirty, sneaky, insurgent hiding in a tunnel somewhere or a big bad regular soldier riding around in an APC. We conduct section, platoon, company, battalion, brigade exercises regularly. Each builds on the lessons learnt in the lower level exercises. It has done us well whenever our units are invited to exercise in the US with the US Army or Marines. We have defeated the US Army's OPFOR units, something the US units they were exercising with, couldn't.
It maybe that the US Army has become lazy, as has been suggested, relying on the largess of the US treasury to cover them with expensive and specialised equipment. I know that when I went on exercise, we were constantly bombarded with stories of how US soldiers were able to write this or that off with ease, whereas we would be covered in mounds of paperwork and face disciplinary matters if we damaged rather than lost an item.