M1 Abrams in recent conflicts

lastdingo

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sferrin said:
And yet the Abrams is one of the most successful, combat proven tanks in the world. I guess they did something right.

They updated it with an all-new cannon, gave it the commander's independent sight concept developed elsewhere, added ridiculously-priced electronics in general and then benefited from their government sending troops with such tanks against marginally competent Third World armies that used monkey models and pre-1980's tank designs only.


Look at how the Saudis fare with their Abrams tanks.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B1yTb3vF35M
alalam_636053170320401205_25f_4x3.jpg

1026381586.jpg



(No tank is invulnerable, of course. But the Saudis showed that with troops only marginally better than the opposition the Abrams tank is nothing really special. The pics and video above are representing this. The Arab-Russian glee about such Abrams pics and videos is comparable to the Western glee about T-xx tanks shown with turret metres away.)
 
Of course proving a valid assessment and comparison of weapon systems you do have to assume certain 'ceteris paribus' factors. General Schwarzkopf himself said the US would have won the Gulf War with Iraq equipment because of the quality of training as opposed to equipment.

Is a Bugetti Veyron NOT an amazing car because your grandma happens to be driving it?
 
And you can only run at Vmax for ten minutes because you'll run out of gas. What a POS.
 
Send me all your Bugetti Veyrons...I will promise to take the POS of your hands. ;)
 
lastdingo said:
sferrin said:
And yet the Abrams is one of the most successful, combat proven tanks in the world. I guess they did something right.

They updated it with an all-new cannon, gave it the commander's independent sight concept developed elsewhere, added ridiculously-priced electronics in general and then benefited from their government sending troops with such tanks against marginally competent Third World armies that used monkey models and pre-1980's tank designs only.


Look at how the Saudis fare with their Abrams tanks.


The Arab-Russian glee about such Abrams pics and videos is comparable to the Western glee about T-xx tanks shown with turret metres away.)

The difference of course is that a Russian tank minus a turret means that the crew
has likely been killed or seriously disarticulated by overpressure.

For most of those attacks, the Abrams hull looks to be recoverable and the crew is
able to walk away which is precisely why the Saudis have requested M88A2 ARVs.
 
lastdingo said:
(No tank is invulnerable, of course. But the Saudis showed that with troops only marginally better than the opposition the Abrams tank is nothing really special. The pics and video above are representing this. The Arab-Russian glee about such Abrams pics and videos is comparable to the Western glee about T-xx tanks shown with turret metres away.)

Glee? Or: not this crap again.

The difference is huge. That you can completely, instantaneously destroy a T-64/72/80/90 with a hand fired anti tank weapon into its flank (and often front) is a different kettle of fish of being able to take some photos of M1s burning after an engagement.
 
marauder2048 said:
lastdingo said:
sferrin said:
And yet the Abrams is one of the most successful, combat proven tanks in the world. I guess they did something right.

They updated it with an all-new cannon, gave it the commander's independent sight concept developed elsewhere, added ridiculously-priced electronics in general and then benefited from their government sending troops with such tanks against marginally competent Third World armies that used monkey models and pre-1980's tank designs only.


Look at how the Saudis fare with their Abrams tanks.


The Arab-Russian glee about such Abrams pics and videos is comparable to the Western glee about T-xx tanks shown with turret metres away.)

The difference of course is that a Russian tank minus a turret means that the crew
has likely been killed or seriously disarticulated by overpressure.

For most of those attacks, the Abrams hull looks to be recoverable and the crew is
able to walk away which is precisely why the Saudis have requested M88A2 ARVs.

You mention the Abrams crew being able to walk away and the recoverability. Where can this be backed up? Pictures of destroyed and/or burning tanks/vehicles does not prove the crew survived, it does not even suggest this.
 
Arab M1 crews generally wear their ammunition in their laps, or some other method of loose round storage in the fighting compartment, which is why Arab M1s tend to explode into fireballs. The loose ammunition is hit by a penetrating splinter or jet and detonates, taking any rounds next to it and the crewmen with it. It's happened to Iraqi tanks as well as Saudi ones. Overall that's not really a fair comparison, since Arabs are shockingly terrible tankers, and Americans aren't half bad, and Abrams has a rather unique quality of protection for its ammunition. Most other Western armour, sans Merkava, is comparable more to T-72/T-80 than Abrams.

lastdingo said:
sferrin said:
And yet the Abrams is one of the most successful, combat proven tanks in the world. I guess they did something right.

They updated it with an all-new cannon, gave it the commander's independent sight concept developed elsewhere, added ridiculously-priced electronics in general and then benefited from their government sending troops with such tanks against marginally competent Third World armies that used monkey models and pre-1980's tank designs only.

M1 is a pre-1980's tank design.
 
Foo Fighter said:
You mention the Abrams crew being able to walk away and the recoverability. Where can this be backed up? Pictures of destroyed and/or burning tanks/vehicles does not prove the crew survived, it does not even suggest this.

I see pictures of knocked out tanks and tanks with treads that have caught on fire. A knocked out tank is typically recoverable and repairable provided it hasn't been burned out internally.

In the video posted above, you can see crew members escaping and in the photos you'll see open hatches.
 
sferrin said:
Kat Tsun said:
M1 is a pre-1980's tank design.

And?

lastdingo said:
They updated it with an all-new cannon, gave it the commander's independent sight concept developed elsewhere, added ridiculously-priced electronics in general and then benefited from their government sending troops with such tanks against marginally competent Third World armies that used monkey models and pre-1980's tank designs only.

Calling Iraqis "marginally competent" is probably giving them too much credit, though.
 
Kat Tsun said:
Calling Iraqis "marginally competent" is probably giving them too much credit, though.

Training helps a great deal. I am sure that Americans were once referred to as "marginally competent" as well. Didn't Rommel use that term after Kasserine? The Iraqis have acquired a minimum of training to operate their AFVs. Is it surprising that they aren't that competent?
 
Kadija_Man said:
Kat Tsun said:
Calling Iraqis "marginally competent" is probably giving them too much credit, though.

Training helps a great deal. I am sure that Americans were once referred to as "marginally competent" as well. Didn't Rommel use that term after Kasserine? The Iraqis have acquired a minimum of training to operate their AFVs. Is it surprising that they aren't that competent?

The Iraqis abandoned their AFVs in Gulf War 1. When they didn't, and actually tried to fight, they still couldn't succeed under the best possible conditions where everything was stacked in their favour. Phase Line Bullet comes to mind, which was perhaps the most lopsided battle of GW1 in the Iraqis' favour, and they still were missing their targets at ranges less than five hundred meters in an ambush posture.

During the Battle of the Bridges, Iraqi regulars ignored incoming fire from Kuwaiti tanks and continued pressing into the kill zone rather than attacking their ambushers. Marginal competence would demand that they at least be aware of their own surroundings, and Iraqis were not, with the Iraqis only "winning" the battle due to the Kuwaitis running out of ammunition and withdrawing.

Modern Iraqi troops are worse than their 1991 counterparts, who were worse than their Iran-Iraq War counterparts. The problems of the Iraqi military are not training related, rather it is something more basic.
 
Kat Tsun said:
Kadija_Man said:
Kat Tsun said:
Calling Iraqis "marginally competent" is probably giving them too much credit, though.

Training helps a great deal. I am sure that Americans were once referred to as "marginally competent" as well. Didn't Rommel use that term after Kasserine? The Iraqis have acquired a minimum of training to operate their AFVs. Is it surprising that they aren't that competent?

The Iraqis abandoned their AFVs in Gulf War 1. When they didn't, and actually tried to fight, they still couldn't succeed under the best possible conditions where everything was stacked in their favour. Phase Line Bullet comes to mind, which was perhaps the most lopsided battle of GW1 in the Iraqis' favour, and they still were missing their targets at ranges less than five hundred meters in an ambush posture.

During the Battle of the Bridges, Iraqi regulars ignored incoming fire from Kuwaiti tanks and continued pressing into the kill zone rather than attacking their ambushers. Marginal competence would demand that they at least be aware of their own surroundings, and Iraqis were not, with the Iraqis only "winning" the battle due to the Kuwaitis running out of ammunition and withdrawing.

Modern Iraqi troops are worse than their 1991 counterparts, who were worse than their Iran-Iraq War counterparts. The problems of the Iraqi military are not training related, rather it is something more basic.

Again, I point to the matter of training and of course, command competence. The Iraqis under Saddam had commanders chosen for their political loyalty first and foremost, rather than necessarily their martial ability. When an order was given, you obeyed that order or else you, your family and all your relatives paid the price. Hardly conducive to winning battles.

Then there is the assumption on your part that the Iraqis were provided with the best possible tanks. Their vehicles were "monkey models" and their ammunition was often plain steel, rather than being made of denser tungsten, while their FCS often consisted of a simple stadiametric marking on their sights.

Finally, you have the matter of morale. The Iraqis are often more concerned with living their lives than with fighting battles for their despotic leaders, when Saddam and his murderous family controlled the country. They wanted to survive, not kill other people who they actually admired.

You seem to be assuming that the common Iraqi soldier is some sort of super well trained, highly motivated person. I wonder why when the evidence is available which suggests otherwise?

Today, the Iraqis face a murderous enemy, they often aren't well trained and they aren't particularly motivated. Is it surprising that they fail to die in their M1 Abrams?
 
Kat Tsun said:
sferrin said:
Kat Tsun said:
M1 is a pre-1980's tank design.

And?

lastdingo said:
They updated it with an all-new cannon, gave it the commander's independent sight concept developed elsewhere, added ridiculously-priced electronics in general and then benefited from their government sending troops with such tanks against marginally competent Third World armies that used monkey models and pre-1980's tank designs only.

Calling Iraqis "marginally competent" is probably giving them too much credit, though.

Ah, the old, "Western gear only wins against untrained people in monkey models" mantra.
 
Kat Tsun said:
Modern Iraqi troops are worse than their 1991 counterparts, who were worse than their Iran-Iraq War counterparts. The problems of the Iraqi military are not training related, rather it is something more basic.


Such as...
 
sferrin said:
Kat Tsun said:
sferrin said:
Kat Tsun said:
M1 is a pre-1980's tank design.

And?

lastdingo said:
They updated it with an all-new cannon, gave it the commander's independent sight concept developed elsewhere, added ridiculously-priced electronics in general and then benefited from their government sending troops with such tanks against marginally competent Third World armies that used monkey models and pre-1980's tank designs only.

Calling Iraqis "marginally competent" is probably giving them too much credit, though.

Ah, the old, "Western gear only wins against untrained people in monkey models" mantra.

TBF, it is a bit lopsided when the Caucasian troops are basically combat veterans thanks to modern, force-on-force training regimes, while the other guys have the equivalent of Western Front 1916 training. Not even 1918, as J.F.C. Fuller would have been an improvement over the Iraqi capability in the Gulf War. Even then that's generous, since it assumes the lessons of Iran-Iraq survived when Saddam purged the officer corps in 80s. Nearly all institutional knowledge had been lost by 1991, but to be frank it was fairly meager knowledge to begin with.

Amazingly, their true nadir appears to be today, where at least the 1990s Ba'athist Army could still muster enough tanks and guns to beat some insurgents, it is not the same with the completely fucked Iraqi Army of the 2010s who have trouble dealing with Toyotas and DShKs.

A better comparison for Western troops v.s. Eastern troops is Al-Fajr vs. 1st Grozny, but that's apparently not kosher a comparison to make. Probably because it makes the Russian Army look like bumbling fools.

NeilChapman said:
Kat Tsun said:
Modern Iraqi troops are worse than their 1991 counterparts, who were worse than their Iran-Iraq War counterparts. The problems of the Iraqi military are not training related, rather it is something more basic.

Such as...

http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars

This is probably a good starting point. With all the training in the world, from the greatest armies in the world, the Iraqis are managing to perform worse against insurgents today than they did against insurgents 25 years ago. There's no real soundbite simple explanations for it, though.
 
Kat Tsun said:
This is probably a good starting point. With all the training in the world, from the greatest armies in the world, the Iraqis are managing to perform worse against insurgents today than they did against insurgents 25 years ago. There's no real soundbite simple explanations for it, though.

This is the Iraqi army which is about to recapture Mosul and is steadily beating the Daesh forces back into Syria?
 
The same Iraqi Army that took two and a half years to inch back territory it lost to a few Toyotas and a complete rout. Saddam would have had Mosul back in a month. Say what you will about it, but one area that communism vastly succeeded over Western civilization was in handling insurgents and uprisings. The whole Kurdish Uprising was suppressed in the same amount of time it took the modern Iraqi Army to capture Fallujah.

It's getting a bit off topic, but the gist is a handful of Republican Guard divisions with some T-55s, T-72s, BTR-60s, and D-30s did more work than the New Iraqi Army brigades or whatever with M1A1s, M113s, and M109s (cue "M109 is worse than D-30 huehue"), and all the training the US Army can muster, in a much shorter period of time. It really can't be explained except that the Republican Guard were simply more motivated and more aggressive than their modern counterparts in the New Iraqi Army, who are quite timid and effete. Not coincidentally, the biggest contributors of training to the Iraqi Army were the Americans, who are also quite timid, albeit their individual effeteness is balanced out by their ability to produce massive quantities of radios, howitzers, and ammunition.

For the Iraqis, this just means they have a small amount of expensive, second-hand kit and training that doesn't match their economic reality in the slightest. They are not the United States, they cannot mass produce high tech weapons and millions of tons of ammunition a year to feed a gigantic war machine that survives by turning everything into a moonscape (figuratively since smart weapons try to hit the enemy or close enough that it doesn't matter, but it was very literal in WW2 for both the USA and UK).

Hama is the Syrian example of a successful counter-insurgency campaign/battle. van Creveld was right when he said that victory in COIN is a "crime" while losing in COIN is "stupidity", though, so if the Iraqis suddenly started winning in their fight against ISIS by applying massive quantities of firepower and mechanized combined arms (which is how the Ba'athists and communism in general did it), they would be called murderers or something. Mostly because lots of ordinary people would get caught in the crossfire and die.
 
The Communists won in COIN by killing everyone. Hardly a way to "win friends and influence people". We are seeing the Russian experience in Grozny being repeated on a smaller scale in Aleppo at the moment.

I would also suggest that Creveld did not look at the experiences of the European imperialists or the ANZAC post-imperialists in how to win in COIN, without pissing everybody off to the point where it all springs back in a decade.

In the case of your continual dismissal of the Iraqis, I'd suggest that what has been rebuilt in the new Iraqi Army is somewhat more substantive than the old one was. More and better training and better equipment, not with Monkey Models means that Daesh is being pushed back much more firmly.
 
Kat Tsun said:
The same Iraqi Army that took two and a half years to inch back territory it lost to a few Toyotas and a complete rout. Saddam would have had Mosul back in a month. Say what you will about it, but one area that communism vastly succeeded over Western civilization was in handling insurgents and uprisings. The whole Kurdish Uprising was suppressed in the same amount of time it took the modern Iraqi Army to capture Fallujah.

It's getting a bit off topic, but the gist is a handful of Republican Guard divisions with some T-55s, T-72s, BTR-60s, and D-30s did more work than the New Iraqi Army brigades or whatever with M1A1s, M113s, and M109s (cue "M109 is worse than D-30 huehue"), and all the training the US Army can muster, in a much shorter period of time. It really can't be explained except that the Republican Guard were simply more motivated and more aggressive than their modern counterparts in the New Iraqi Army, who are quite timid and effete. Not coincidentally, the biggest contributors of training to the Iraqi Army were the Americans, who are also quite timid, albeit their individual effeteness is balanced out by their ability to produce massive quantities of radios, howitzers, and ammunition.

For the Iraqis, this just means they have a small amount of expensive, second-hand kit and training that doesn't match their economic reality in the slightest. They are not the United States, they cannot mass produce high tech weapons and millions of tons of ammunition a year to feed a gigantic war machine that survives by turning everything into a moonscape (figuratively since smart weapons try to hit the enemy or close enough that it doesn't matter, but it was very literal in WW2 for both the USA and UK).

Hama is the Syrian example of a successful counter-insurgency campaign/battle. van Creveld was right when he said that victory in COIN is a "crime" while losing in COIN is "stupidity", though, so if the Iraqis suddenly started winning in their fight against ISIS by applying massive quantities of firepower and mechanized combined arms (which is how the Ba'athists and communism in general did it), they would be called murderers or something. Mostly because lots of ordinary people would get caught in the crossfire and die.

I'll give you the benefit of the doubt re: some wording chosen ("effete", "timid" etc.) on the assumption that English isn't your first language.
The combination of leadership, training, equipment and motivation is key to the effectiveness of a fighting force and the Iraqi army was lacking in many of these in its early engagements with ISIS and while since improved Rome wasn't built in a day and many aspects require a collective will that can't be built or trained by foreign advisors.
The comparison in perceived performance versus Sadam's Republican Guard is rather facile, very different context and versus a very different enemy.
And if these more recent events prove anything it's that Tyrannical dictatorships don't "solve" these type of conflicts, they just store up the issue while the underlying issues and hatred fester and deepen for more extreme versions down the road.
 
Kadija_Man said:
The Communists won in COIN by killing everyone. Hardly a way to "win friends and influence people". We are seeing the Russian experience in Grozny being repeated on a smaller scale in Aleppo at the moment.

I would also suggest that Creveld did not look at the experiences of the European imperialists or the ANZAC post-imperialists in how to win in COIN, without pissing everybody off to the point where it all springs back in a decade.

In the case of your continual dismissal of the Iraqis, I'd suggest that what has been rebuilt in the new Iraqi Army is somewhat more substantive than the old one was. More and better training and better equipment, not with Monkey Models means that Daesh is being pushed back much more firmly.

1) "If it's stupid and it works, it's not stupid," comes to mind. "Win friends and influence the people" has won exactly zero insurgency campaigns, unless you conflate "winning" with "leaving and surrendering all control to the rebellious elements" or something. Algeria. Kenya. Malaya. Indonesia. Vietnam. It seems that Western democracies are doomed to failure in counter-insurgency, were it not for Israel's successes in Palestine.

2) The European imperialists lost every counter-insurgency campaign they fought post-WW2. Likewise the US and Britain didn't win the Philippines Insurrection and Boer War by playing nice.

3) ISIS is being pushed back so firmly that in the time it took the New Iraqi Army to recapture one city, the Republican Guard had recaptured the entire country from a similarly "well armed" opponent of Shiite militias and crushed Shiite and Kurdish rebellion for three years. I don't believe that's a very firm hand at all. Maybe a petite shove.

kaiserd said:
Kat Tsun said:
The same Iraqi Army that took two and a half years to inch back territory it lost to a few Toyotas and a complete rout. Saddam would have had Mosul back in a month. Say what you will about it, but one area that communism vastly succeeded over Western civilization was in handling insurgents and uprisings. The whole Kurdish Uprising was suppressed in the same amount of time it took the modern Iraqi Army to capture Fallujah.

It's getting a bit off topic, but the gist is a handful of Republican Guard divisions with some T-55s, T-72s, BTR-60s, and D-30s did more work than the New Iraqi Army brigades or whatever with M1A1s, M113s, and M109s (cue "M109 is worse than D-30 huehue"), and all the training the US Army can muster, in a much shorter period of time. It really can't be explained except that the Republican Guard were simply more motivated and more aggressive than their modern counterparts in the New Iraqi Army, who are quite timid and effete. Not coincidentally, the biggest contributors of training to the Iraqi Army were the Americans, who are also quite timid, albeit their individual effeteness is balanced out by their ability to produce massive quantities of radios, howitzers, and ammunition.

For the Iraqis, this just means they have a small amount of expensive, second-hand kit and training that doesn't match their economic reality in the slightest. They are not the United States, they cannot mass produce high tech weapons and millions of tons of ammunition a year to feed a gigantic war machine that survives by turning everything into a moonscape (figuratively since smart weapons try to hit the enemy or close enough that it doesn't matter, but it was very literal in WW2 for both the USA and UK).

Hama is the Syrian example of a successful counter-insurgency campaign/battle. van Creveld was right when he said that victory in COIN is a "crime" while losing in COIN is "stupidity", though, so if the Iraqis suddenly started winning in their fight against ISIS by applying massive quantities of firepower and mechanized combined arms (which is how the Ba'athists and communism in general did it), they would be called murderers or something. Mostly because lots of ordinary people would get caught in the crossfire and die.

I'll give you the benefit of the doubt re: some wording chosen ("effete", "timid" etc.) on the assumption that English isn't your first language.
The combination of leadership, training, equipment and motivation is key to the effectiveness of a fighting force and the Iraqi army was lacking in many of these in its early engagements with ISIS and while since improved Rome wasn't built in a day and many aspects require a collective will that can't be built or trained by foreign advisors.
The comparison in perceived performance versus Sadam's Republican Guard is rather facile, very different context and versus a very different enemy.
And if these more recent events prove anything it's that Tyrannical dictatorships don't "solve" these type of conflicts, they just store up the issue while the underlying issues and hatred fester and deepen for more extreme versions down the road.

"Timid" is exactly the word the Germans described the Americans in WW2. It's played out in every major war the Americans have fought to this day.

The Iraqi Army can't collectively will itself out of a wet paper bag, Ba'athism or not. The Republican Guard worked mostly because it was politically reliable and therefore relatively unencumbered, and had decades of experience in fighting insurgents. Iraq still functions on the tribal model beneath the veneer of modern democracy, so it still needs a Republican Guard. In almost every way, the 'Iraqi Army' is in a worse position than it was in 1991. Saying otherwise is ignoring reality.

The comparison is hardly facile when the context is the same and the enemy is actually worse in all relevant qualities, from training to equipment to motivation to morals. The enemy is even the same, from the perspective of the (former) Republican Guard: Kurds and Shiites rising against Ba'athism. Or Shiites and Kurds "united" against a common foe, i.e. Sunnis. Except this time, Ba'athism/Sunni Islam is losing because it doesn't have several tank divisions to prop itself up on. It doesn't change the fact that the most substantial difference is that Sunnis didn't flinch when men with AKs shoot at them, they shoot back with tank shells and howitzers, while Shiites rout the instant a car bomb goes off (is suicide bombing a viable form of political protest now?) anywhere in a thirty block radius.

Basically an aesthetic difference, it's 1991 in reverse. The same solution would work for both. The RG solution would work faster though, which means less people die in a campaign that's lasted two and a half years.

Recent conflicts show that government doesn't matter. Sectarian conflict will emerge regardless of government form, and democracy is simply an aesthetic that hides wounds rather than repairs them. Let's not pretend the Americans did anything more than throw gasoline on smouldering embers in 2003.
 
Kat Tsun said:
Kadija_Man said:
The Communists won in COIN by killing everyone. Hardly a way to "win friends and influence people". We are seeing the Russian experience in Grozny being repeated on a smaller scale in Aleppo at the moment.

I would also suggest that Creveld did not look at the experiences of the European imperialists or the ANZAC post-imperialists in how to win in COIN, without pissing everybody off to the point where it all springs back in a decade.

In the case of your continual dismissal of the Iraqis, I'd suggest that what has been rebuilt in the new Iraqi Army is somewhat more substantive than the old one was. More and better training and better equipment, not with Monkey Models means that Daesh is being pushed back much more firmly.

1) "If it's stupid and it works, it's not stupid," comes to mind. "Win friends and influence the people" has won exactly zero insurgency campaigns, unless you conflate "winning" with "leaving and surrendering all control to the rebellious elements" or something. Algeria. Kenya. Malaya. Indonesia. Vietnam. It seems that Western democracies are doomed to failure in counter-insurgency, were it not for Israel's successes in Palestine.

2) The European imperialists lost every counter-insurgency campaign they fought post-WW2. Likewise the US and Britain didn't win the Philippines Insurrection and Boer War by playing nice.

3) ISIS is being pushed back so firmly that in the time it took the New Iraqi Army to recapture one city, the Republican Guard had recaptured the entire country from a similarly "well armed" opponent of Shiite militias and crushed Shiite and Kurdish rebellion for three years. I don't believe that's a very firm hand at all. Maybe a petite shove.

kaiserd said:
Kat Tsun said:
The same Iraqi Army that took two and a half years to inch back territory it lost to a few Toyotas and a complete rout. Saddam would have had Mosul back in a month. Say what you will about it, but one area that communism vastly succeeded over Western civilization was in handling insurgents and uprisings. The whole Kurdish Uprising was suppressed in the same amount of time it took the modern Iraqi Army to capture Fallujah.

It's getting a bit off topic, but the gist is a handful of Republican Guard divisions with some T-55s, T-72s, BTR-60s, and D-30s did more work than the New Iraqi Army brigades or whatever with M1A1s, M113s, and M109s (cue "M109 is worse than D-30 huehue"), and all the training the US Army can muster, in a much shorter period of time. It really can't be explained except that the Republican Guard were simply more motivated and more aggressive than their modern counterparts in the New Iraqi Army, who are quite timid and effete. Not coincidentally, the biggest contributors of training to the Iraqi Army were the Americans, who are also quite timid, albeit their individual effeteness is balanced out by their ability to produce massive quantities of radios, howitzers, and ammunition.

For the Iraqis, this just means they have a small amount of expensive, second-hand kit and training that doesn't match their economic reality in the slightest. They are not the United States, they cannot mass produce high tech weapons and millions of tons of ammunition a year to feed a gigantic war machine that survives by turning everything into a moonscape (figuratively since smart weapons try to hit the enemy or close enough that it doesn't matter, but it was very literal in WW2 for both the USA and UK).

Hama is the Syrian example of a successful counter-insurgency campaign/battle. van Creveld was right when he said that victory in COIN is a "crime" while losing in COIN is "stupidity", though, so if the Iraqis suddenly started winning in their fight against ISIS by applying massive quantities of firepower and mechanized combined arms (which is how the Ba'athists and communism in general did it), they would be called murderers or something. Mostly because lots of ordinary people would get caught in the crossfire and die.

I'll give you the benefit of the doubt re: some wording chosen ("effete", "timid" etc.) on the assumption that English isn't your first language.
The combination of leadership, training, equipment and motivation is key to the effectiveness of a fighting force and the Iraqi army was lacking in many of these in its early engagements with ISIS and while since improved Rome wasn't built in a day and many aspects require a collective will that can't be built or trained by foreign advisors.
The comparison in perceived performance versus Sadam's Republican Guard is rather facile, very different context and versus a very different enemy.
And if these more recent events prove anything it's that Tyrannical dictatorships don't "solve" these type of conflicts, they just store up the issue while the underlying issues and hatred fester and deepen for more extreme versions down the road.

"Timid" is exactly the word the Germans described the Americans in WW2. It's played out in every major war the Americans have fought to this day.

The Iraqi Army can't collectively will itself out of a wet paper bag, Ba'athism or not. The Republican Guard worked mostly because it was politically reliable and therefore relatively unencumbered, and had decades of experience in fighting insurgents. Iraq still functions on the tribal model beneath the veneer of modern democracy, so it still needs a Republican Guard. In almost every way, the 'Iraqi Army' is in a worse position than it was in 1991. Saying otherwise is ignoring reality.

The comparison is hardly facile when the context is the same and the enemy is actually worse in all relevant qualities, from training to equipment to motivation to morals. The enemy is even the same, from the perspective of the (former) Republican Guard: Kurds and Shiites rising against Ba'athism. Or Shiites and Kurds "united" against a common foe, i.e. Sunnis. Except this time, Ba'athism/Sunni Islam is losing because it doesn't have several tank divisions to prop itself up on. It doesn't change the fact that the most substantial difference is that Sunnis didn't flinch when men with AKs shoot at them, they shoot back with tank shells and howitzers, while Shiites rout the instant a car bomb goes off (is suicide bombing a viable form of political protest now?) anywhere in a thirty block radius.

Basically an aesthetic difference, it's 1991 in reverse. The same solution would work for both. The RG solution would work faster though, which means less people die in a campaign that's lasted two and a half years.

Recent conflicts show that government doesn't matter. Sectarian conflict will emerge regardless of government form, and democracy is simply an aesthetic that hides wounds rather than repairs them. Let's not pretend the Americans did anything more than throw gasoline on smouldering embers in 2003.

Getting terribly close to pure trolling there.
I'm not American and I'm not one of the unfortunate US ultra-nationalists (your equivalents, apparently) that seek to dominate some of the discussion topics here.
But to describe the US Army or other US armed forces as timid is patently absurd (more than good enough to effortlessly smash the Iraqi Republican Guard you appear to rate so highly for reasons only understood by yourself.) I feel embarrassed for you.

Representatives of Nazi Germany called many different people different unpleasant things (and obviously did incalculably worse things than that.) Their perspective is not exactly neutral or even remotely reasonable.
 
Since about 6 to 7 posts, I haven't read something about the M1 ..... ::)
Please back to the topic !
 
Trying to steer this back on topic, is anyone able to provide a list of M1 losses (even if they were subsequently recovered) in combat and the causes of the destruction?
 
GTX said:
Trying to steer this back on topic, is anyone able to provide a list of M1 losses (even if they were subsequently recovered) in combat and the causes of the destruction?

530 have been lost since 2003. The exact causes and damage is classified, being removed even from after action reports released under FOIA requests.
 
GTX said:
Trying to steer this back on topic, is anyone able to provide a list of M1 losses (even if they were subsequently recovered) in combat and the causes of the destruction?

How far back do you want to go? There is the old IHS Jane's article that cites 28 Iraqi M1A1s damaged. 5 of those were penetrated, and at least 1 resulted in a K-Kill, although I don't remember if the vehicle had been captured beforehand after being abandoned, or destroyed in combat.

http://www.janes.com/article/39550/iraqi-abrams-losses-revealed

In '03, the US Army lost a few tanks to random stuff:

- #4, 2nd Platoon, B Troop, 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment of the 3rd ID had its engine destroyed by multiple 25mm penetrations along the rear hull.

- #3, 2nd Platoon, A Company, 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment of the same was disabled by a shaped charge to the side hull that penetrated the ballistic skirt, into a hydraulic fluid reservoir for the powered turret traverse.

- #4, 2nd Platoon, B Company, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment of the same was, most embarrassingly, completely destroyed by heavy machine gun rounds. The AP-I penetrated a sponson on the rear turret, into the external gasoline APU, that caused a fire. Flaming gasoline dripped into the engine compartment, and caused an engine fire that couldn't be extinguished. The crew evacuated and the vehicle was stripped of parts later by US troops.

- #2, 1st Platoon, C Company, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment was abandoned while being recovered/towed back to the battalion maintenance area for reasons I'm not sure of. The crew destroyed the tank by burning the engine and fighting compartment, and the USAF hit it with a pair of AGM-65s.

Source is a Team Abrams presentation by Mr. John P. Conway that is linked to on Wikipedia: http://www.fprado.com/armorsite/US-Field-Manuals/abrams-oif.pdf

There were some others, like the USMC tank that fell into the Euphrates, but I don't know what they were called or any details about them. There's tons more data about the Gulf War/Desert Storm M1/M2 casualties, which is basically fully documented now and available online. The bulk of Iraq War casualties are probably available, just not compiled, but that's a bit speculative. I remember something about the US Army clamming up with respect to RPG-29s in OEF. That might have just been with regards to the actual damage, though.

Somewhere in this convoluted mess of hyperlinks is a large number of Desert Storm M1 casualties: http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/du_ii/du_ii_tabh.htm#TAB%20H_Friendly-fire%20Incidents
 
Ian33 said:
GTX said:
Trying to steer this back on topic, is anyone able to provide a list of M1 losses (even if they were subsequently recovered) in combat and the causes of the destruction?

530 have been lost since 2003. The exact causes and damage is classified, being removed even from after action reports released under FOIA requests.
To enemy fire? That's almost two armored divisions worth find it hard to believe.
 
530 M1s have not been lost since 2003. 530 have suffered some kind of damage on operations over ten or so years (50 a year) so as to require fixing beyond the unit's maintenence capbility (ie knocked out). This can range from a vehicle accident to being totally destroyed by a massive UBIED. The M1 remains en par with the Merkava as being the most combat survivable tank in the world. And that is even without taking into account "kill or be killed" which is survivability by lethality.

PS Just looked up the source for the 530 figure and it is "530 M1s were shipped from Iraq to the USA for repair from 2003-2006" so it isn't just operational losses but also tanks due for their regular overhauls. Which over 3 years of operational service should include every tank you have in use, more than once!
 
lastdingo said:
Look at how the Saudis fare with their Abrams tanks.

Only 1 Sauid M1 was a total loss during combat, the one shown on the video being hit by an ATGM. In total the Saudis have lost 5 M1s, but all the other 4 were mobility kills or abandoned by the crews for some reason, but not destroyed. They were only later blown up by Huthis to prevent their recovery.

Iraq has lost 17 M1s since 2014, although at least 2 of those were vehicles which got stuck and were abandoned, and 2-3 were captured intact but unused in Iraqi bases. Most others were taken out by multiple RPG-ATGM hits from multiple directions at close range, some even by hand grenades thrown into open hatches. Some are seen in videos taking multiple hits and continuing to fight, at least one even being seen with the ammo bustle exploding, but still continuing to fight.

Hardly a bad performance compared to their neighbors in Syria (which have lost about 400-500 tanks in the same time). Which brings me to Kat Tsun's wildly inaccurate posts: is Baathists/communists/non-Westerners were so good at counter-insurgency, then explain Syria. US-backed factions against ISIS or counter insurgencies of similar fashion have made 20x the amount of territorial advance compared to Syria.
 
Do you have a source on the Iraqi and Saudi M1 casualties? Is this from Jane's, or something else?

OT parts of this post edited
 
I'd flag that both Kat Tsun and Dan Inbox are going way off topic .... I'd suggest that the moderators take a close look.

done


Back in topic I agree that some of the figures re: the M-1 appear to being taken out of context; the M-1 is clearly one of the most survivable tanks in the world, including in the counter insurgence role.
I'd suggest a more interesting question is if a larger number of smaller cheaper (to buy and run) tanks (potentialy each not quite as survivable) be better suited to the Iraqi Army's needs; would they find it more flexible and "usable" in practice? Given the cost of trading crew for an M-1, and the cost of just maintaining and fuelling it, and the fear of crew and commanders of losing one, would the Iraqi Army potentially make more vigorous/ aggressive use of a smaller lower cost complement or alternative?
In my mind I'm thinking of a German Leopard 1 or 2, or a reasonably recent Ukrainian member of the T series. As I said having more tanks that cost less to run and which they are less afraid to loose could have an effect in the mind set and approach of the Iraqi Army.
I'm not a tank expert so feel free to shoot me down guys :)
 
Kat Tsun said:
How far back do you want to go?

Right from the start of operations involving.

Ideally something alongs the lines of this:

Date
Location
Details
Type of kill
Fate
DD/MM/YYYY​
e.g. Iraq​
e.g. hit by RPG, self-destruct by crew...​
e.g. mobility, total...​
e.g. write off, recovered...​
 
GTX said:
Kat Tsun said:
How far back do you want to go?

Right from the start of operations involving.

Ideally something alongs the lines of this:

Date
Location
Details
Type of kill
Fate
DD/MM/YYYY​
e.g. Iraq​
e.g. hit by RPG, self-destruct by crew...​
e.g. mobility, total...​
e.g. write off, recovered...​

A (probably incomplete) list of American M1 tank casualties in Desert Storm:

Date
Location
Details
Type of kill
Fate
26/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1(HA)
B23
TF 1-37​
M-kill,
engine destroyed by fire,
unknown penetrator​
Tank recovered by 07/03/1991​
26/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1(HA)
C12
TF 1-37​
M-kill,
engine destroyed by KE penetrator,
unknown penetrator,
superficial damage from unknown anti-tank missile​
Tank recovered by 04/03/1991​
27/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1
B66
3-66 Armor​
K-kill,
Hit by 3 120mm DU penetrators,
TC ejected from vehicle,
Gunner KIA in turret fire/detonation,
Loader WIA and evacuated,
Driver WIA and evacuated
Tank assessed by 03/03/1991,
Destroyed due to fire​
27/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1
B22
3-66 Armor​
Not killed,
Hit by 120mm DU penetrator,
Penetrator skirted mine plow, caused superficial damage,
Penetrated front hull armour into fuel cell,
Electrical fire/explosion ignited by short circuit on exterior of vehicle,
Driver WIA, evacuated with glass injuries​
Tank operated until end of ground war​
27/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1
A31
TF 1-41​
Not killed,
Vehicle damaged by DU penetrator shrapnel,
Fuel cell penetrated,
No fire,
No KIA or WIA​
Tank operated until end of ground war​
27/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1
A33
TF 1-41​
K-Kill,
Vehicle hit by multiple penetrators in engine and turret,
Two DU LRPs or one TOW and one LRP,
Fighting compartment possibly not penetrated,
All(?) crew WIA with minor injury​
Tank caught fire, unknown damage
Assessed 03/03/1991​
 
Kat Tsun said:
GTX said:
Kat Tsun said:
How far back do you want to go?

Right from the start of operations involving.

Ideally something alongs the lines of this:

Date
Location
Details
Type of kill
Fate
DD/MM/YYYY​
e.g. Iraq​
e.g. hit by RPG, self-destruct by crew...​
e.g. mobility, total...​
e.g. write off, recovered...​

A (probably incomplete) list of American M1 tank casualties in Desert Storm:

Date
Location
Details
Type of kill
Fate
26/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1(HA)
B23
TF 1-37​
M-kill,
engine destroyed by fire,
unknown penetrator​
Tank recovered by 07/03/1991​
26/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1(HA)
C12
TF 1-37​
M-kill,
engine destroyed by KE penetrator,
unknown penetrator,
superficial damage from unknown anti-tank missile​
Tank recovered by 04/03/1991​
27/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1
B66
3-66 Armor​
K-kill,
Hit by 3 120mm DU penetrators,
TC ejected from vehicle,
Gunner KIA in turret fire/detonation,
Loader WIA and evacuated,
Driver WIA and evacuated
Tank assessed by 03/03/1991,
Destroyed due to fire​
27/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1
B22
3-66 Armor​
Not killed,
Hit by 120mm DU penetrator,
Penetrator skirted mine plow, caused superficial damage,
Penetrated front hull armour into fuel cell,
Electrical fire/explosion ignited by short circuit on exterior of vehicle,
Driver WIA, evacuated with glass injuries​
Tank operated until end of ground war​
27/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1
A31
TF 1-41​
Not killed,
Vehicle damaged by DU penetrator shrapnel,
Fuel cell penetrated,
No fire,
No KIA or WIA​
Tank operated until end of ground war​
27/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1
A33
TF 1-41​
K-Kill,
Vehicle hit by multiple penetrators in engine and turret,
Two DU LRPs or one TOW and one LRP,
Fighting compartment possibly not penetrated,
All(?) crew WIA with minor injury​
Tank caught fire, unknown damage
Assessed 03/03/1991​

Almost all friendly fire kills. Moving on.
 
Kat Tsun said:
Do you have a source on the Iraqi and Saudi M1 casualties? Is this from Jane's, or something else?

http://lostarmour.info/ But most of those individual tanks are well known to people who have been following the conflicts.
 
Arian said:
Kat Tsun said:
GTX said:
Kat Tsun said:
How far back do you want to go?

Right from the start of operations involving.

Ideally something alongs the lines of this:

Date
Location
Details
Type of kill
Fate
DD/MM/YYYY​
e.g. Iraq​
e.g. hit by RPG, self-destruct by crew...​
e.g. mobility, total...​
e.g. write off, recovered...​

A (probably incomplete) list of American M1 tank casualties in Desert Storm:

Date
Location
Details
Type of kill
Fate
26/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1(HA)
B23
TF 1-37​
M-kill,
engine destroyed by fire,
unknown penetrator​
Tank recovered by 07/03/1991​
26/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1(HA)
C12
TF 1-37​
M-kill,
engine destroyed by KE penetrator,
unknown penetrator,
superficial damage from unknown anti-tank missile​
Tank recovered by 04/03/1991​
27/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1
B66
3-66 Armor​
K-kill,
Hit by 3 120mm DU penetrators,
TC ejected from vehicle,
Gunner KIA in turret fire/detonation,
Loader WIA and evacuated,
Driver WIA and evacuated
Tank assessed by 03/03/1991,
Destroyed due to fire​
27/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1
B22
3-66 Armor​
Not killed,
Hit by 120mm DU penetrator,
Penetrator skirted mine plow, caused superficial damage,
Penetrated front hull armour into fuel cell,
Electrical fire/explosion ignited by short circuit on exterior of vehicle,
Driver WIA, evacuated with glass injuries​
Tank operated until end of ground war​
27/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1
A31
TF 1-41​
Not killed,
Vehicle damaged by DU penetrator shrapnel,
Fuel cell penetrated,
No fire,
No KIA or WIA​
Tank operated until end of ground war​
27/02/1991​
Iraq​
M1A1
A33
TF 1-41​
K-Kill,
Vehicle hit by multiple penetrators in engine and turret,
Two DU LRPs or one TOW and one LRP,
Fighting compartment possibly not penetrated,
All(?) crew WIA with minor injury​
Tank caught fire, unknown damage
Assessed 03/03/1991​

Almost all friendly fire kills. Moving on.

Is friendly fire not "in combat"? He never specified excluding that, he asked for a list of M1s lost in combat, the damage, and whether they were recovered or not.

Arian said:
Kat Tsun said:
Do you have a source on the Iraqi and Saudi M1 casualties? Is this from Jane's, or something else?

http://lostarmour.info/ But most of those individual tanks are well known to people who have been following the conflicts.

So then, by "lost" does that mean you are accounting only for write offs, rather than all vehicle kills? If so, that would be congruent with the Jane's quote of 28 M1s damaged by June 2014, which is why I asked.
 

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