Alternative Royal Navy post 1997

If you could redesign the Royal Navy after 1997 what ships would you build and why?

Not the carriers.

Keep Harriers and helos. Build Illustrious replacement.

CNH said:

Not the carriers.

Keep Harriers and helos. Build Illustrious replacement.

Click to expand...

In addition, nuke the Astute program and revive the W-Class. Design & build nuclear powered surface combatants including a heavy cruiser class.

Grey Havoc said:

CNH said:

Not the carriers.

Keep Harriers and helos. Build Illustrious replacement.

Click to expand...

In addition, nuke the Astute program and revive the W-Class. Design & build nuclear powered surface combatants including a heavy cruiser class.

Click to expand...

Why deep six the carriers. A replacement Invincible would have much the same power plant and electronics as the CVF which are the expensive items. The only thing that would be larger is the hull itself which accounts for only 10-15% of the total cost of the vessel and would result in a much more flexible ship. The RN spent from the 70's onwards trying to squeeze quarts in pint pots.

Why replace the Astutes with the W's, what additional performance did the W's bring. I have never seen much regarding the designed performance of the W's other than it was supposed to use the PWR2 of the Vanguards. This was then to be replaced by an updated T class with the control system of the PWR2 combined with the PWR1 giving IIRC 90% of the W class for 75% of the cost.

Regards

The carriers can only cope with VTOL aircraft. They are incredibly expensive. As a consequence, the RN will probably be reduced to subs, one carrier [the other mothballed] and half a dozen type 45s.

My extra pointer questions, for what they are worth?

The carrier programme: Could the UK have designed and built better ships? or is the requirement itself simply too expensive in manpower and resources?

The Escort fleet: In concentrating on the Type 45 programme, did the UK put too many eggs in one basket? Australia chose the alternative route.

The SSN fleet: Building a good SSN is central to the UK@s status as a maritime power, but was Astute a step too far?

Should the RN have grasped the nettle, as Healey did, and choose between carriers and SSNs (Nott tried to do the same).

We could have opted for more multirole ships instead of AAW only ships.

In essence combining AAW and ASW into a UK RN Arleigh Burke type with PAAMS, Sampson etc.... Call it a Type 85

Then just keep building them.

Sad in a way that 1997 as a start point prevents any real changes for the AAW, ASW ships and I think allows us to make a mess of things with Ocean, but leaves just the CVF issue open....

Easy really - stop studying new ships and actually build some. Not spending a decade studying a requirement to death then dragging out construction once ordered would give a significantly larger fleet of modern ships sooner.

Strictly speaking the CVF process was somewhat drawn out, probably to deferred the cost until later. Even if it actually raised costs.
But the design is good as are the requirements behind that.
If I was to raise any criticism of the design itself, the parsimony of not mounting UK-PAAMS on it is the most obvious one.

Truth is you need x crew on any warship to support y number of specialist but that y+1 or frankly y+10 barely raises supporting staff at all. Rather in the way maintaining 2 helicopters per ship doesn't raise supporting staff numbers bar a couple of extra flight crew.
So the efficiency of larger more multirole warships is notable, especially over time and over numbers of ships. However initial costs are higher and the UK has deferred that to lower cost single mission ships. Even at the expense of higher overall costs for a fleet of given capabilities.

If we look at WR.21....its an ophan, no one else has bought.

Other navies stuck with the marine Spey or waited for the MT30. Such that now RR doesn't seem to tout the product at all.

So looking back it's a shame there wasn't an effort to produce a successor marine GT to the Spey, either sourced from the Eurojet EJ200 or the BR700 series.

As is, RR has the MT30, AG9140, RR4500, and MT7.

WR.21 sits in the 20-25MW range. but (if I've read things correctly) is 8m by 2.642m by 4.826m.
Notably smaller than MT30 (35 - 40MW), or AG9140 (3MW) or RR4500 (3.9 - 4.3MW)

Lets turn this around, why 1997, beyond the obvious change of government, and still why then as they had declared they'd stick to the previous spending limits for the next three years..?

Really you should pick say 2001, or 1983 or even 1993. As then you can implement major changes across the board.

Consider.....stretched Type 23 for example, ideally some 4 ships within the total 16 could have been run off as larger and more capable vessels. But these are laid down between 1993 and 1999.
Or.....HMS Ocean said to have been built for too little and built very tightly.
Both these really need changes in 1993.

A true successor to Trafalgar class ought to have been driven forward from 1993 after the final SSBN of the Vanguard class was laid down.

1997 is a bit late..

Equally as I think someone suggested elsewhere here, post Falklands a very different path could have been taken.

As a date to reassess spending and requirements 1990 seems to be a good fit. From the 1960's through to 1990 the UK sustained defence spending at between 5 and 6%. After the fall of the Berlin Wall we went hell for leather for the "Peace Dividended". Then within the next two years we had deployed a substantial force to the Balkans and a force of 50,000+ to Iraq and been fighting ever since.

Regards.

I chose 1997 because the Labour Government unlike the Conservatives undertook a very thorough Strategic Defence Review. Events soon overtook the plans but they still shape the balance of the RN.

Yes 1990 is a good fit, and there could have been different choices made then.
Some were even prescient of the sort of changes that ultimately came about, at least on the CV side of things.

I am not objecting to a new thread from 1990, just suggesting you start one.

I stick with 1997 as the Blair Government for all its faults did try to do a Whitehall wide look. The Conservatives
in 1990 were only interested in cost-savings and as far as I can remember were only keen to put off difficult procurement
decisions (LPDs, new escorts and SSNs) as much as possible

On the original question from 1997 the choices to shape the RN are mostly limited to the new carrier, T45 and subs. From a policy POV the sub program as is has little potential for worthwhile chwnge unless you were to build the Astute class as a multi-role SSN/SSBN. Maybe a class of 12 with Astute like capabilities but with eight reconfigurable Trident capable vertical tubes. Could sail as a nuclear deterrent boat or land attack (TLAM in the vertical tubes) or SOF (SBS in the tubes). Carriers are always about the aircraft and JSF requires something like the QEC. Is there an alternative aircraft? Not really. Maybe you could go all helo. Build a Sea Apache to provide anti ship/boat/insurgent and use SAMs for air defence. SM6 with a Merlin/AESA AEW would be quite capable for fleet defence. If you go this way then something like a 21st century through deck cruiser could be built in place of T45 and CVF. Eight of these each with two T23 consorts and an air group of 12 Sea Apaches, 6 Merlin ASW and 6 Merlin AEW would be quite impressive. Fitting the CAH or a conventional T45 with AEGIS is a much better solution than PAAMS. Anyway the multi role sub and multi role cruiser/carrier are radical solutions so hard to sell and result in an end to naval carrier strike. But they retain and spread capabilith making for a lower cost and more resiliant (to political threats) force.

"Carriers are always about the aircraft and JSF requires something like the QEC. Is there an alternative aircraft? Not really."

What's wrong with Sea Harriers on the new carriers?

The main problem for the Royal Navy is the attempt to defeat the logic of Healey's decision in the 60s that the
UK could have an SSN fleet or a Carrier force, but not both.

France attempted to prove him wrong with the Charles De Gaulle, but ended up with neither a very effective carrier nor an
adequate SSN force. We have managed to end up getting into a similar position. Replacing the Trafalgars with fewer and
more unreliable Astutes.

Quite what a single carrier is expected to do against a well prepared enemy is unclear to me. SSNs on the other hand have proven their
value both as shipkillers and as over the horizon cruise missile launchers with a global reach.

I could also add the uselessness of British Aerospace and its monopoly as a supplier

With the end of the Cold War, what really happend and what was impinging on the minds of many by 1997 was that that very cold war had placed innumerable disputes into a deep freeze. With the refrigeration turned off, these disputes were defrosting and coming alive again.

Hence Yugoslavia. With a disturbing worry it would drag Hungary in and reignite the biggest problem in the Balkans.

Iraq, which was a problem before the Gulf War, and had been a short term stopgap after the fall of the Shah.

Right now we're still seeing the fallout from the end of the USSR, including a very longstanding business that goes back to the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth....aka Ukraine.

CVF is born out of the realisation, that shorn of the threat of the USSR, we're back to a world where UK power needs to be project-able beyond Europe.

Zen
I agree that the RN impressed the Government that it had provided a valid contribution to allied air operations over Yugoslavia and that a carrier offered a mobile platform for supporting operations out of area.
My point, however, is that the cost of CVF has skewed the force structure of the RN in the same way as CVA01. A combintion of SSNs and effective frigate/destroyer mix remains what we can actually afford.

Not really going to agree with you there uk75.

Besides what is a large frigate/destroyer force going to achieve without aircover?

The decision which caused the issues with new SSNs is rooted in cancellation and atrophy of capacity from Options for Change and the early 1990s. Long before 1997 and even longer before CVF became what it is.

" Sea Harrier (or any Harrier variant) doesn't even come close to offering the capability an F-35B does."

Indeed. But owt's better than nowt. When will those F35s be ready?

uk 75 said:

SSNs on the other hand have proven their
value both as shipkillers and as over the horizon cruise missile launchers with a global reach.

Click to expand...

The second part is not a particular great claim to fame. A tramp steamer with some Tomahawk ABLs could do the same. Without offboard targgetting the TLAMs on an SSN are worse than useless.

zen said:

Besides what is a large frigate/destroyer force going to achieve without aircover?

The decision which caused the issues with new SSNs is rooted in cancellation and atrophy of capacity from Options for Change and the early 1990s. Long before 1997 and even longer before CVF became what it is.

Click to expand...

Totally agree. A "fleet unit"* these days (since the 1930s) requires naval airpower. Anything less (ie doesn't have a carrier) is only capable of supporting roles or combat in reduced intensity naval war.

It seems to me that the Falklands War was a significant lost opportunity for the RN to turn around the atrophy inflicted in the 1960s and 70s. That is the turning back of the entire Nott Review (restoration of Type 43, Sea Dart 2, etc not just the amphib force) and the acquisition of a purpose built aircraft carrier and air wing not the retention of the "through deck cruiser" and sea legged, combatised VTOL demonstrator as the naval aviation capability. This does not need to mean a 1980s CVA-01/CVF and CTOL aircraft but say a Hermes sized new build STOVL carrier (with proper hangar, lifts that don't interupt the flight deck and so on) plus the P.1216 in place of the SHAR FA.2 (and if the RAF was going to learn anything from the Falklands it would be that such a plane would be far more deployable in expditionary warfare than the Eurofighter so should be their Phantom/Jaguar replacement, but of course they didn't!) and a clean sheet(ish) AEW platform (ie Merlin with desgined for role radar). But instead it just got a stop to the decommissioning and four Type 22 Batch III new ship for sunken ship replacements (which could have been the funds for the first four Type 43s). The clearest lesson of the naval side of the Falklands was that the RN had to improve their AAW capability. Yet all they got was a lash up AEW helo, a MLU for the SHAR and improved last ditch defence.

In terms of the submarine problems I also accuse the Falklands War as a lost opportunity of a different sort. The RN was thinking about replacing the Oberons with SSNs but rethought this based on the belief that you need diesel electrics for inshore and SOF deployment roles as in the Falklands (but really it was cost as the original requirement was for 12 boats). So rather than order the Vickers Type 2400 as the Upholders if the RN had ordered a Traflagar follow on with a design focus on inshore and SOF deployment there would have been continuation of SSN building between the Ts and the As. Sure numbers would have been cut with the "peace dividend" but at least four could be underway if Cammel Laid were invovled. They also would have had a much better boat than the Upholder and could be kept in service rather than flogged off to Canada.

This of course requires more money but post Falklands was the time when this money could be voted with minimal rucus.

* The minimum capability required to provide naval operations in war.

I still have to make the point that apart from the US Navy no navy has been able to make carrier aviation other than a stovl or stobar one ship big target money guzzler.
The finacial realities which forced us to give up CVA01 are if anything greater now than they were in 1966.
A task group is an expensive way of deploying one squadron of F35s. Apart from the Falklands other theatres of conflict have airports able to host typhoons and tankers.

uk 75 said:

The finacial realities which forced us to give up CVA01 are if anything greater now than they were in 1966.

Click to expand...

No they aren't. The UK is spending now around half of the slice of GDP on defence that it was spending in 1965.

Abraham

You make my point for me, the UK has no appetite for big defence expenditure. Not least because there is no clear
threat for the Navy to focus on.
Putin may be a general menace, but the US have such a weight of seapower available, our one carrier task group is neither here nor there.
China and India are the next big naval powers. Neither poses a threat to us that would not already have provoked a US response.
That leaves wars of choice. Post Iraq and Libya there is no public support for interventionism.

In other words although the detail is different we are in shape to deploy a carrier based RN. I suspect that QE will now be deployed but that D of E will spend most of its early life in reserve, or possibly sold, if Brazil has the money.

JC Fuller hit's the nail there I think uk75.

Still waiting for what a large surface fleet without a CV is 'for' once Russia is no longer the threat it was.

I am genuinely confused by your enthusiasm for the QE.

I admit I may have missed a few things, but all we are talking about is an unarmed platform for F35 aircraft in uncertain numbers (8? 16? 20?).

In any threat environment it will require a full task group just to escort ( 2 Type 45s a few T23s and an SSN).

Who is this going to be used against? In most cases, the RAF will be able (as in the current Syrian case) to deploy Tornados, Typhoons and even F35s forward
to allied bases, with AWACS and tanker support.

If we are simply showing solidarity, an Astute with Tomahawks is sufficient of a gesture and provides some accurate capability over the horizon.

Most of the day to day work needs a modern day Leander class frigate. Ie a ship with a gun, a helicopter and some presence.

One can simply not say where our forces will be used next.
It is not always guaranteed or affordable to gain HNA, sometimes a CV able to cope with a large airwing will be the more practical and politic solution.

Syria cannot be the benchmark of all future operations.
France despite its proximity to Lybia still used CdeG and her airwing.

I must admit that the twelve year old in does get a kick out of the computer graphics of a QE task group at sea or even the 1/1250 scale models of same by an excellent UK firm MOUNTFORD.
I hope that you are proved right but the realist in me still frets about workmanlike numbers of escorts and the killer blow of enough SSNs to take on the big boys.
Gentlem, as ever, thanks for your help and a good debate.

I think these kinds of scenarios make the wrong conclusions because they assume that warship programme spring up fairly rapidly. In fact since the 1960s most RN classes have had very long gestation periods. The initial Oberon replacement dates back to 1971 and the Invincibles are products of what was initially the Escort Cruiser which began life in 1960. Much chewing over of requirements were undertaken during this time. The results were probably the optimal that could be achieved given the economic conditions of the time.

I don't agree on comments made regarding the Upholder Class and the SSK/SSN mix.
There had already been a 1980s study that showed Britain only had the industrial capacity and resources and manpower to maintain 24 nuclear submarines (including the Resolutions), so effectively 20 SSNs. By 1991 current plans would see the fleet at 18 SSNs and the Admiralty realistically felt only 2-3 additional SSNs could be commissioned by 2000. Replacing Resolution enforced a break in SSN production anyway and of course the Valiant and Churchill classes needed replacement so its likely another class of 6-7 improved Trafalgars could have followed the Vanguards with construction starting in 1997. That's would probably should of happened but the Cold War ended and in any case Britain was in recession and the Tories kicked a lot of heavy spending downfield and fudged decision making.

Upholder was designed partly because of the littoral reconnaissance and insertion roles (the SSNs did some insertion work in the Falklands, it took the Oberons an age to get that far down south) but also because diesel subs were so quiet. Even Whiskey class subs had remained undetected at times and it was felt that the SSK was an ideal anti-submarine weapon. The Upholders were meant for the GIUK gap, Barents Sea, Iberian area and NW approaches. They were every bit as sophisticated as the SSNs but were cheaper, able to be built in other non nuclear yards, be quieter and offer cheaper training options and even perhaps earn a bit of export cash. Had the Cold War carried on, they may well of had longer lives though I suspect only 6 would ever have been built.

Shipbuilding capacity is another constraint. CVA-01 was probably just beyond the capacity of the industry considering the needs of the SSBN programme. The Invinicbles were lucky as they fell into the lean 1970s and even they took quite a time to build. A Hermes-sized carrier in any post 1982 scenario isn't likely to materialise until 1990-92, precisely when the Cold War ends. There was barely enough engineers, manpower and resources to have two nuclear yards for the SSBN programme and Cammel Laird never made the grade, they simply lacked the managerial skills and the Trade Unions saw it as a golden opportunity to milk the bosses for high wage claims in the process. It got so bad the Admiralty considered towing the incomplete hulls to Barrow for completion. By the 1970s and beyond a two nuclear yard industry would be impossible.

As to what the future holds, who knows. I guess a floating airbase asset is good to have but the cost to get a dozen (or two dozen at the most) F35s somewhere seems high. Its hard to really pin down whether you need it or whether its just nice to have. Did France really need to use CdG for the Libya Campaign or was it a case of the Admirals wanting in on the action and justifying the existence of their expensive pet project? The RAF has done well in all its tasks in Europe and Middle East. UK intervention on a large scale East of Suez now seems highly unlikely as that's a US sphere and I'm not really sure how well a CVF taskforce could work with a US carrier group effectively and logistically. Also, as uk75 point out, an RAF force has logistic backup from AWACS and other recon assets and Allied forces. Any CVF operations are going to rely on other land-based assets like AWACS and Sentinel to effectively support any strike operations overland. However as the RAF now owns and mans the aircraft in real terms, its win-win for them!

As to air defence, I remember jingoistic comments during the Falklands spat a couple of years ago that a single Type 45 could easily wipe out the Argentine air force. A media simplification as ever, but given the highly capable Type 45 any force it escorts is well protected, a carrier airwing offers longer-range punch and vital visident of the threat, but depending on the exclusion zone your operating in, the enemy might not be that far away before you can legally down the attacker. 95% of modern navies do not have carriers and only a handful have effective carrier airwings. The Type 45 and the F35 are touted as the best of modern technology, both are potent killers of aircraft. So you have to ask, do you need both given both cost a lot of money? What is more cost effective if you want to ensure air defence of a surface fleet? Invincible originally had its own air-defence system and could add AA and ASW punch to any fleet it was deployed with. CVF adds strike punch and long-range air defence but it now relies on the force to protect it.

I can see the escort numbers dropping to a dozen beyond 2020, the Type 23s are already past their original design lives and will need further refits and upgrades beyond that. Will the Treasury cough up while the Type 26 is floating around as the "cost effective" replacement just (always!) around the corner?

This thread generated a lot of useful information and comments.
In retrospect I was wrong to give it a fixed point of 1997.. As some have pointed out 1983 or 1990 could be included usefuly.

My considered view (well challenged above) remains that the 1966 choice between building new carriers or nuclear submarines as the RN's "capital ships" was a necessary one to make.

The present RN is stuck with two badly designed and built STOVL carriers and an eventual seven badly designed and built SSNs.

Or is the above an unfair slur based on harsh media reporting. Apart from the USN no other navy has the capabilities offered by the CVs and SSNs available to the RN?

I must admit to finding some truth in both statements.

The "enemy fleet in being" was the traditional measure of what major units the RN needed. In modern times this was Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union (between 1919 and 1931 one might add the US and France!).

Today, Russia's Navy is hard to measure as a serious threat apart from some modern subs. China builds vast numbers of units but it has no modern naval tradition or experience. Iran menaces the Gulf but noone seems to care much, even the Saudis bave called it a day.

Most navies outside the UN Security Council members and Japan's still quaintly named Maritime Self Defence Force contain a few frigates/destroyers and conventional subs with a token helicopter/vstol carrier now and again.

Set against this picture the RN is probably doing as well as anyone, the T26 and T31 plus the T83 in due course will probably give us about 12 to 16 escorts compared with 4 to 8 in most navies.

A single SSN or two or three in the case of helping the US with China copes with the worst cases.

I remain sceptical about the role of carriers in hot war. Most simulations of WW3 against the Sovs saw Nimitzes, Forrestals, Kievs, Invincibles and Clemenceaus sunk in short order and their airgroups flown off to Iceland or Japan or wherever. But in limited wars they are useful and politicians seem to understand them more easily than SSNs.

It's a mixture of things.
The positive, is the RN has a broad spectrum of assets and can operate in a wide spectrum of actions. From peacetime patrols and showing the flag, to police actions, support for other countries and political influence. To outright war against a almost anyone and almost anywhere.

The wartime issues depend on the war and if we're honest then we have to admit we don't know when, where or why we might yet go to war in future. But we do know we will.
It's a 'when' not an 'if'.

The negatives resolve around capacity to execute certain tasks and to sustain them.

But the answer to those problems is it cannot be assumed to be based upon reliance on others.
Others, like the Christian God, help those who help themselves.

The problem of the visible stick verses the invisible stick, is not solved by the absence of sticks.

Sometimes the visible stick will prevent a war happening and when used meets the expectations of others. Who can see the mechanics of it's operations. It reassures and meets approval and generates respect through the acknowledgement of it's power.

While the invisible stick is reserved for the truly dangerous and desperate moments, when it's actions emerge suddenly to the shock of even those who suspected it was there. It must as swiftly disappear leaving only the horror of it's acts and the disturbing threat of it's confirmed existence.....somewhere out there.

It is the opposite of reassuring, and it's use raises questions of legitimacy.
It generates fear and paranoia.

Abraham Gubler said:

On the original question from 1997 the choices to shape the RN are mostly limited to the new carrier, T45 and subs. From a policy POV the sub program as is has little potential for worthwhile chwnge unless you were to build the Astute class as a multi-role SSN/SSBN. Maybe a class of 12 with Astute like capabilities but with eight reconfigurable Trident capable vertical tubes. Could sail as a nuclear deterrent boat or land attack (TLAM in the vertical tubes) or SOF (SBS in the tubes). Carriers are always about the aircraft and JSF requires something like the QEC. Is there an alternative aircraft? Not really. Maybe you could go all helo. Build a Sea Apache to provide anti ship/boat/insurgent and use SAMs for air defence. SM6 with a Merlin/AESA AEW would be quite capable for fleet defence. If you go this way then something like a 21st century through deck cruiser could be built in place of T45 and CVF. Eight of these each with two T23 consorts and an air group of 12 Sea Apaches, 6 Merlin ASW and 6 Merlin AEW would be quite impressive. Fitting the CAH or a conventional T45 with AEGIS is a much better solution than PAAMS. Anyway the multi role sub and multi role cruiser/carrier are radical solutions so hard to sell and result in an end to naval carrier strike. But they retain and spread capabilith making for a lower cost and more resiliant (to political threats) force.

Click to expand...

Your suggestion of an SSN/SSBN interchangeable type design was looked at by the Royal Navy when they started to to at the adoption of Polaris. This type of vessel was ruled out as an SSN is there to hunt and destroy enemy vessels whereas the SSBN‘s job is to ‘disappear’ in the vastness of the oceans.
regrettably, the two rows do not lend themselves to a single unit type design.

The primary problem with the RN and HMGovernment is that you spend forever designing a ship, instead of making a design that you can build for 4-6 hulls right now and while those are building you work an improved design to build for 4-6 ships that will start building as soon as the ways are clear from the last class, rinse and repeat.

The current process means that you don't keep the shipyards busy (and all the economic activity related to the workers flowing), instead you leave the yards idle for way too long. So the yards lay off their workforce, and when the next ships come to be built the newly hired workers don't have a clue. Workers not having a clue means that the ships have build quality issues. All those new workers needing to have a security background check done on them also slows down the start of construction.

Compare the UK to Japan. In 1997, the UK's GDP was $1.5T, while Japan's GDP was $4.5T. However, Japan only spends 1% of GDP on their military at most*, while the UK could realistically spend 3% and call it a spending reduction from the 5.6% they had been spending. So the UK could build ships like Japan does, constantly having one ship of each type under construction and alternating which yards are building. There's also the possibilities of buying production rights to a US design, say the FFG-7s or even Burkes, making a couple modifications to them and running with those. Japan did that with their Kongo class DDGs, and then further iterated on that design for the following Atago and Maya classes. The Kongos were built starting in 1990, first ship commissioned in 1993, even, so the Japanese pretty quickly decided that they wanted an Aegis ship and just bought the current production US plans.

IIRC, Japan has been slowly growing their navy, but since I'm having a hard time finding an online reference for what they had in 1997, I'll go with their current fleet.

• 22x (diesel-electric) submarines.
• 4x "Helicopter Destroyers", "Through-deck cruisers", or baby aircraft carriers (2 are 19k tons, 2 are 27k).
• 3x LSTs; the stern has a huge flight deck and should really be classed as LPDs.
• 8x DDGs, and 28x DDs.
• 10x frigates.
• 22x minesweepers.
• 6x patrol boats.

Yes, the baby carriers are a recent addition to the fleet, but they were still built under the unofficial 1% spending cap.

In comparison, the RN currently has:

• 4 SSBNs,
• 6 SSNs,
• 2x QE-class carriers,
• 3x LPDs,
• 6x DDGs,
• 11x Frigates,
• 8x OPVs,
• 9x minesweepers, and
• 18x patrol boats that I don't even think have a weapon onboard.

* Japan's spending as a % of GDP has finally increased, but that was in the 2010s.

Pirate Pete said:

Abraham Gubler said:

On the original question from 1997 the choices to shape the RN are mostly limited to the new carrier, T45 and subs. From a policy POV the sub program as is has little potential for worthwhile chwnge unless you were to build the Astute class as a multi-role SSN/SSBN. Maybe a class of 12 with Astute like capabilities but with eight reconfigurable Trident capable vertical tubes. Could sail as a nuclear deterrent boat or land attack (TLAM in the vertical tubes) or SOF (SBS in the tubes). Carriers are always about the aircraft and JSF requires something like the QEC. Is there an alternative aircraft? Not really. Maybe you could go all helo. Build a Sea Apache to provide anti ship/boat/insurgent and use SAMs for air defence. SM6 with a Merlin/AESA AEW would be quite capable for fleet defence. If you go this way then something like a 21st century through deck cruiser could be built in place of T45 and CVF. Eight of these each with two T23 consorts and an air group of 12 Sea Apaches, 6 Merlin ASW and 6 Merlin AEW would be quite impressive. Fitting the CAH or a conventional T45 with AEGIS is a much better solution than PAAMS. Anyway the multi role sub and multi role cruiser/carrier are radical solutions so hard to sell and result in an end to naval carrier strike. But they retain and spread capabilith making for a lower cost and more resiliant (to political threats) force.

Click to expand...

Your suggestion of an SSN/SSBN interchangeable type design was looked at by the Royal Navy when they started to to at the adoption of Polaris. This type of vessel was ruled out as an SSN is there to hunt and destroy enemy vessels whereas the SSBN‘s job is to ‘disappear’ in the vastness of the oceans.
regrettably, the two rows do not lend themselves to a single unit type design.

Click to expand...

Agree with Pirate Pete, an SSBN's job is to be at sea 24/7, with no-one knowing where it is. The US Ohio class manages to be at sea for 3/4 of the year by using two crews and a lot of planned replacement of parts before their expected failure actually happens. The deterrence mission just flat requires permanently assigned units to it.

The reason the USN turned old SSBNs into special ops and Tomahawk boats is that they had SALT and START treaty obligations on the number of deployed launchers they could have, but the Ohio boats still had 20 years of hull life left in them. All of the strategic missile control systems had to be ripped out of the hulls, and an amendment to the treaties negotiated in the definition of what defined a strategic missile tube. The treaties originally defined the strategic tubes by diameter, the US requested an amendment for either diameter or depth. A Polaris missile is 33 feet long, but a Tomahawk is only about 25 feet long. Any missile tube over whatever the magic diameter was, that was less than something like 30 feet deep, was not considered a strategic tube. Completely different situation.

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That said, there is absolutely no excuse for the RN taking an 11-year break between completing the Vanguard class and starting production on the Astutes. Having trouble with the shore-side tech demonstrators? Do another run of Trafalgar class boats to keep the yards working while you fix the Astute design! It's vastly cheaper than letting the shipyard idle. Even the US had to do this when the Seawolf class was canceled after two ships with nothing to build for 3 years before the Virginia class started construction. Bill Clinton was explicit that the 3rd Seawolf was halfway a jobs program to keep the yard busy! Admittedly, USS Parche was getting close to retirement and did need a replacement, so taking one of the quietest ships in the world and installing a plug for spooky shenanigans was a good plan. Saved sawing a 688 in half and installing a plug.

Since the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors lost its primary design function when the role was essentially privatised and handed over to industry your criticisms are certainly valid to some extent. The RCNC certainly had worked in terms of batches - think Leanders, even Type 22. Today the only 'batch' ships are the River-class OPVs. (The first batch had been a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) on 5-year lease from industry before than experiment was ended and the ships acquired lock stock and barrel by the MOD at the end of the first contract.)

The hull number issue is more complex than just churning out ships. First you need the operational requirement to justify building them, the industry to actually build them, the money to pay for them and the personnel to crew them. The industry has shrunk, Japan and South Korea famously stole much of the world shipbuilding market and now China has - no surprise then that those three nations are better placed to maintain naval construction.
The Type 23 build programme went from 1985-2002 - 17 years for 16 ships (Type 22 had been 15 years for 16 ships). Type 45 was 10 years (2003-13) for 6 ships. Type 26 is likely to be something like 18 years for 8 ships (2017-35ish) and Type 31 11 years for 5 ships (2019-30).
The Batch 2 Rivers filled the 2016-21 gap (assuming warmed up OPVs really count as serious warships...) plus the two carriers. I'd argue that the T26 and T31 programmes are probably the pinnacle of shipbuilding load we've had since the T42/T22 boom days of the late 1970s.
You might argue FSC should have resulted in a T22 replacement alongside the T45 build programme - or that another 2 or 6 T45s should have been built as planned to fill the gap. I wouldn't argue against another half-dozen Batch 2 T45s with a strike length Mk 41 added but it didn't happen.

But there is no doubt that the continual fall of escort numbers in successive defence reviews have removed the basic need for more construction while the T23s had 25-30 year life spans to be used up. Sure we could have built another dozen frigates or so in the 2000s-2010s but only at the cost of selling off nearly-new T23s.
Export construction has fallen off the cliff, BAE Systems messing up the Brunei contract in the late 1990s terminated all light frigate exports sadly. Until T26 came along we had no exportable ship design (and even now there are questions exactly how the design came to be selected by Australia).

The break in SSN construction was more unforgivable apart from the semi-legitimate excuses of reduced need in the 1990s happy years and the massive sprawling multinational conglomerate forming at that time (see my recent posting in the Dassault-Aerospatiale AU thread) which caused a lot of churn in industry and lost some key expertise. Its a mistake unlikely to be repeated (thanks to AUKUS).

Manpower: the JSDMF currently has around 50,800 personnel (plus ? reserves) with 154 vessels, the RN has 33,390 plus 3,610 reserves with 70 vessel (including the RFA). Plus Japan has a Coast Guard of 13,740 with 455 vessels including 121 patrol ships - a lot of which are armed and carry helicopters. In contrast the UK has no such organisation.

Hood said:

Since the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors lost its primary design function when the role was essentially privatised and handed over to industry your criticisms are certainly valid to some extent. The RCNC certainly had worked in terms of batches - think Leanders, even Type 22. Today the only 'batch' ships are the River-class OPVs. (The first batch had been a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) on 5-year lease from industry before than experiment was ended and the ships acquired lock stock and barrel by the MOD at the end of the first contract.)

The hull number issue is more complex than just churning out ships. First you need the operational requirement to justify building them, the industry to actually build them, the money to pay for them and the personnel to crew them. The industry has shrunk, Japan and South Korea famously stole much of the world shipbuilding market and now China has - no surprise then that those three nations are better placed to maintain naval construction.
The Type 23 build programme went from 1985-2002 - 17 years for 16 ships (Type 22 had been 15 years for 16 ships). Type 45 was 10 years (2003-13) for 6 ships. Type 26 is likely to be something like 18 years for 8 ships (2017-35ish) and Type 31 11 years for 5 ships (2019-30).
The Batch 2 Rivers filled the 2016-21 gap (assuming warmed up OPVs really count as serious warships...) plus the two carriers. I'd argue that the T26 and T31 programmes are probably the pinnacle of shipbuilding load we've had since the T42/T22 boom days of the late 1970s.
You might argue FSC should have resulted in a T22 replacement alongside the T45 build programme - or that another 2 or 6 T45s should have been built as planned to fill the gap. I wouldn't argue against another half-dozen Batch 2 T45s with a strike length Mk 41 added but it didn't happen.

But there is no doubt that the continual fall of escort numbers in successive defence reviews have removed the basic need for more construction while the T23s had 25-30 year life spans to be used up. Sure we could have built another dozen frigates or so in the 2000s-2010s but only at the cost of selling off nearly-new T23s.
Export construction has fallen off the cliff, BAE Systems messing up the Brunei contract in the late 1990s terminated all light frigate exports sadly. Until T26 came along we had no exportable ship design (and even now there are questions exactly how the design came to be selected by Australia).

The break in SSN construction was more unforgivable apart from the semi-legitimate excuses of reduced need in the 1990s happy years and the massive sprawling multinational conglomerate forming at that time (see my recent posting in the Dassault-Aerospatiale AU thread) which caused a lot of churn in industry and lost some key expertise. Its a mistake unlikely to be repeated (thanks to AUKUS).

Manpower: the JSDMF currently has around 50,800 personnel (plus ? reserves) with 154 vessels, the RN has 33,390 plus 3,610 reserves with 70 vessel (including the RFA). Plus Japan has a Coast Guard of 13,740 with 455 vessels including 121 patrol ships - a lot of which are armed and carry helicopters. In contrast the UK has no such organisation.

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As near as I can tell, the Japanese build their ships with a shorter expected service life deliberately, particularly looking at their submarine classes, and basically just keep the most recent two classes in service. Build for maybe a 20 year hull life because you're going to be replacing them more quickly than that. At least for anything smaller than the DDH/DDGs, since the DDGs are still in service from 1993. That can even apply to the SSNs, since it's much easier to build a 20yr lifespan powerplant than a 30+.

I would have to find out what the Japanese do with their old ships, though. I know some are kept as training ships, but others are scrapped. I would like to know what they do with the scrapped components. Obviously, some can be recycled into new construction, like torpedo tubes, maybe guns. Electronics would likely be reprocessed but not in China. Steel would likely need to be carefully segregated between different sources to be most easily recycled, as there's quite a difference between HY80 and whatever steel they use for surface ships.

I just had a look at France - 37,000 personnel and 180 vessels (larger even than the JSDMF) - though most of these must be smaller boats. 4 SSBN, 6 SSN (the 6th due this year - 4 of them 1980s vintage), 1 carrier, 3 LHD, 2 DDG (classified as frigates but Horizon is more akin to Type 45), 8 FFG, 11 smaller frigates, around 10 OPVs/corvettes.

Arguably France suffered from exactly the same gaps in naval construction in terms of timing as the UK did and the same kind of cutbacks (Horizon and FREMM both curtailed. The Triomphants building from 1986-2010 kept the submarine flow going post Rubis (last commissioned 1993).

It is perhaps hard now that Russia is rampaging to remember the 90s and the first decade at least of the 21st.Century when the West was focussed on the Middle East and terrorism.

At the same time costs for education and healthcare had elbowed defence budgets out of the top of financial management in the West.

In the UK's case the end of the Vanguard programme was supposed to see a modest SSN programme to replace some but not all the existing force.

The Italian carrier seemed to me to show what the RN could have provided for its F35s and Merlins. Three ships to replace the Invincibles and Ocean. The QE/POW only make sense if we could have made them.CTOL.