Tangredi Arsenal Ship

Triton

Donald McKelvy
Senior Member
Joined
14 August 2009
Messages
9,707
Reaction score
2,049
Website
deeptowild.blogspot.com
"Breaking the Anti-Access Wall"
by Captain Sam J Tangredi, United States Navy (Ret.)
Proceedings May 2015

Source:
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-05/breaking-anti-access-wall

EXCERPTS

Go to the link above to read the complete article.


index.php


In this artist’s concept, the arsenal ship’s upper hull features stealth technology, while the lower hull, of traditional hydrodynamic design construction and form, would typically cruise at a lower waterline for relatively high-speed transit. In combat the ship would be ballasted down to the higher waterline, presenting only its stealth surfaces to enemy sensors and a much smaller profile.

NOTIONAL DESIGN

The best design for a ship that can provide the volume of ordnance required follows Metcalf’s initial inclinations. To describe it as “spartan” should be an understatement. A long series of VLSs encased in a largely submerged hull would be optimal.

For the purpose of reducing its radar signature, the ship’s freeboard should be as low as possible and not have a substantial superstructure—think of an iceberg with its top flattened. The most efficient method of doing this is by having the capability of ballasting down, similar to that of amphibious warships. With ballast tanks, voids, and fuel tanks along its underwater hull, and an internal double hull, a modicum of protection might be achieved against torpedoes and mines. However, its primary protection should be a large inventory of surface and underwater decoys, chaff launchers, jammers, and overall physical and electronic deception systems. Short-range point-defense systems against cruise missiles or aircraft could be installed, but with decks nearly awash, its most vulnerable exposure—like that of an armored tank—would be to plunging fire, not so easy to achieve with cruise missiles as might be commonly perceived. There could be three alternative—or combined—methods of targeting the arsenal ship’s ordnance. It could receive an ever-updating target set from a real-time satellite downlink or other Fleet network; it could fire its missiles at already preprogrammed targets relying on terrain mapping or GPS; and/or it could simply fire its ordnance to be controlled by another ship, an airborne controller, or be targeted by the force commander. (If preprogrammed for fixed targets, mobile targets would be the focus of other joint-strike assets.)

In any event, it should have an alternate target set already programmed so that if the arsenal ship took a severe hit, the entire inventory could be ripple fired to some meaningful effect before the ship became mission-incapable. The arsenal ship’s damage-control suite should be fully automated. The crew would be expected to conduct damage control only to the point of ensuring as many missiles as possible were launched. Similarly, the crew would be expected to perform only routine maintenance under way. In the event of a fatal hit, the arsenal ship’s minimally sized crew, perhaps less than ten sailors, would be provided with escape pods.

To reduce electronic detection, it should be a recipient—not a full participant—in Fleet network links. With no long-range sensors, it would not have any information to contribute to the net, except for when/where the missiles were launched. Once the missiles were launched, they would be completely autonomous of the arsenal ship itself. This would minimize electronic transmissions from the ship, thereby reducing the possibility of detection. The arsenal ship would be optimized so that the enemy could not hit the archer—or, at least, not until the quiver is empty.
 

Attachments

  • TangrediAS-2View.jpg
    TangrediAS-2View.jpg
    16.8 KB · Views: 1,006
  • TangrediAS-34V.jpg
    TangrediAS-34V.jpg
    15.6 KB · Views: 538
It would likely cost more to arm the ship than it would to build it.
 
SpudmanWP said:
It would likely cost more to arm the ship than it would to build it.

And a couple hits an there goes 10 years of TLAM production down the drain.
 
sferrin said:
SpudmanWP said:
It would likely cost more to arm the ship than it would to build it.

And a couple hits an there goes 10 years of TLAM production down the drain.

A couple of hits there goes a $14 billion carrier and air wing?

I love this idea but you would have to, IMHO, produce a larger VLS and missile combination that outranged China's IRBM's. That would put many hundreds of thousands of more square KM's in action and you would force Chinese SSN's further out which would, I believe, put US SSN's at an advantage to hunt them down.
 
bobbymike said:
sferrin said:
SpudmanWP said:
It would likely cost more to arm the ship than it would to build it.

And a couple hits an there goes 10 years of TLAM production down the drain.

A couple of hits there goes a $14 billion carrier and air wing?

A carrier is WAY harder to sink than an arsenal ship (which is essentially a barge), and much more heavily defended. A surface arsenal ship is just a bad idea any way you slice it. A submersible one on the other hand. . . The SSGN Ohios are exactly what an arsenal ship should be. (Though I still wish they'd found a way to stack TLAMs two-deep in each cell.)
 
sferrin said:
bobbymike said:
sferrin said:
SpudmanWP said:
It would likely cost more to arm the ship than it would to build it.

And a couple hits an there goes 10 years of TLAM production down the drain.

A couple of hits there goes a $14 billion carrier and air wing?

A carrier is WAY harder to sink than an arsenal ship (which is essentially a barge), and much more heavily defended. A surface arsenal ship is just a bad idea any way you slice it. A submersible one on the other hand. . . The SSGN Ohios are exactly what an arsenal ship should be. (Though I still wish they'd found a way to stack TLAMs two-deep in each cell.)

My concern is how close a carrier has to be to the Chinese and now their "New" island chain to be able to hit strategic targets in depth. I would rather stand off 3000km or so with hundreds of precision strike weapons prior to moving the carriers so close.

Maybe a whole new concept of operations with carriers protection of these new missile ships ONLY in the first stages of the conflict and after Chinese offensive shore forces have been seriously degraded move the carriers closer???
 
sferrin said:
bobbymike said:
sferrin said:
SpudmanWP said:
It would likely cost more to arm the ship than it would to build it.

And a couple hits an there goes 10 years of TLAM production down the drain.

A couple of hits there goes a $14 billion carrier and air wing?

A carrier is WAY harder to sink than an arsenal ship (which is essentially a barge), and much more heavily defended. A surface arsenal ship is just a bad idea any way you slice it. A submersible one on the other hand. . . The SSGN Ohios are exactly what an arsenal ship should be. (Though I still wish they'd found a way to stack TLAMs two-deep in each cell.)

So here's a question the article's author says it would cost about $1 billion to convert further Ohios to SSGNs would you forgo a carrier for 6-8 more SSGNs??
 
Why is it that most arsenal ship designs are really big, feature ballasting to reduce surface profiles, and usually feature a double or triple hull?

If the role is truly a mobile missile magazine, why not a more distributed approach? The basic qualifier is it must keep up with the ships providing the targeting (but doesn't that go out the window once in hull down mode anyways?) so you are already favoring a slim hull. Doesn't that start pushing towards something like those older WW2 IJN fast destroyers? A slim hull with a single line of VLS cells? Which makes for a potential application of a strut+torpedo hull layout like HYSWAS or the proposed PHM mod, if the strut is wide enough to accept a VLS cell. You need cutter level manning since the crew are mostly univolved with weapon use. If people are serious about the all eggs in one basket issue, then increasing the hull count is the only viable option. Though that may lend itself to USV ops and going fully unmanned. It's not like these will stray very far from a fleet except to go home and reload.

SSGN is nice, and keeps china on its toes. Though that is based on the ability to hide, which interferes with the ability to be on call. The ability to hide is getting harder as well, as current ocean LIDAR advancement may soon lead to the ocean becoming transparent to those with the sensors. Once SSGN's lose their ability to hide, we are back to arguments surrounding surface arsenal ships. Which leads to the interesting question, is there enough of a need to justify semisubmersible or low depth littoral submersible ship designs similar conceptually to SSGN? Which would be an interesting back door development path for diesel sub AIP hardware. Assuming the water is there to protect, and the enemy doesn't respond in kind with torpedo payload cruise missiles...
 
Floating Arsenal to be 21st Century Battleship Jul 1996 pg44-47

.....The Navy and Marine Corp in Regional conflict in the 21st century , the (Naval Studies) Board noted that current weapons for long range fire support are inadequate. The reality is that Bottom Up Review constrained surface warship forces cannot meet the joint warfighting requirements identified in last years Surface Combatant Force Land Study by the USN's Director, Surface warfare, Naval Surface Fiere Support (NSFS) capabilities have long been a shortcoming in the USN's ability to support USMC operation. ...Meanwhile , the proliferation of cruise missiles --40k are expected to be in the worlds armories in 2000. and TBMs....
Using a 1993 Rand study Project Air Force study, The New Calculus , as baseline, the USN argued that any combination of existing in theatre and continental US based rapid reaction forces, with the capability to destroy 2k tanks and armored vehicles on the first day of an assault, would be prohibitively expensive. Given a notional MRC can include 15k mobile targets the Project Air Force study concluded that 5.5k armor kills would be necessary for assured defense. According to the study the 20 B-2s force, along w/ in theatre USAF tacair , and a on station carrier battle group , could destroy only 730 tanks and armored vehicles in the opening 24 hrs another six days of combat would be needed to reach 5.5k kills.
USN analysts assert that 500 cell LCMs w/ BAT munitions could attain 2k armor kills in the first day of a war and another 2k by Day 4. "Assured defense" ...The navy concluded that an in theatre LCM is the obvious choice to provide early firepower to halt an invasion. It exploits freedom of the sea, can hit an enemy hard on Day 1, frees airlift for other needs, and allows USAF and USN manned airpower to focus on traditional roles : CAP, CAS, SEAD. BAI, and strategic strike.
(RAND Pacific Study would add all the hardened TBM , SAM sites and aircraft shelters of the late 2030s)
.....
There are submarines variants being discussed for future Arsenal Ships. By 1997 , the USN will have 18 Ohio class BMSs in operation. The first eight of the class (SSBN 726) carry the C-4 Trident I missiels and the USN plans to retire from strtegic service, or convert the first four Ohio class SSBNs Ohio Michigan Florida and Georgia rather than upgrade them to launch the D-5 trident II missiles. Due to the 1995 BUR decision to reduce the nuclear attack submarines force to 45-55 units and, beginning in 1998, the construction of the new Attack Submarine Class, the USN is continuing to decommission the early units of the Los Angles-nuclear attack submarines many with half their service lives remaining.
There is a possibility of converting the first four Ohio Class C-4 equipped SSBNs into special purpose submarines including a "Large Stealth Combatant". The USN has determined that there are no engineering issues that would preclude extending the service lives of the Ohio Class vessels from 30 to 40 yrs. A program to modify an SSBN-726 submarine for conventional strike/fire support would require about $500m per ship but would provide a platform w approx 25 yrs of operational life, and which would retain all other submarine warfare capabilities (less strategic strike) inherent in the ship. .....
 
Back
Top Bottom