Tactical Nuclear Weapons Against Hanoi

I don't believe this topic has been introduced before, and if so please excuse the thread.

In 1959 the Aerospace Research Projects Agency (ARPA) organized a think tank, code named JASON, composed of America's leading scientist to analyze various high level programs and topics that could influence the outcome of war. One of the studies conducted by the group was the idea of using tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) against hard targets in North Vietnam. The study concluded that specific targets could be best handled by the used of TNW, however the political fallout and the threat of escalation (the use of strategic nuclear weapons) was the study's downfall.

Just wondering what this group thought about the use of TNW against bridges, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, VC tunnels, etc in the SEA theater, and what would be the acceptable scenario for its use.

The JASON project can be found at the following link:
http://nautilus.org/essentially-annihilated/essentially-annihilated-what-is-jason/

I wonder how many hours this topic will last before Lock.

I agree, its a charged subject that requires sensitivity. I pose it, to be honest, because there are nations around the world where the idea of using nuclear weapons at the tactical level is becoming a notional part of thier military doctrine. The idea that an acceptable deployment for such weapons when being over-run (e.g. to thwart the fall of S. Vietnam) or as a method to sue-for-peace (e.g. similar to the Paris Peace Talks after Rolling Thunder B-52 strikes) might be deemed as acceptable.

The study identified the following catalog of targets for TNW in Vietnam:

1. Troop Concentrations
2. Headquarters and Communication Centers
3. Supply Lines
4. Airfields and SAM Sites
5. Mountain Passes and Trails

It suggests that VC tunnel complexes would be difficult targets for TNW. However, a strike against the Ho Chi Minh Trail (HCMT) system may prove very effective as the blowdown of trees would make trail passage very difficult and any attempt to reconstruct trails would become very visible.

What are the social and political implications at home and internationally for such an application (i.e. HCMT) for TNW? Would there have been a means to introduce such weapon with minimal political backlash? Crossing the 'nuclear threshold' would have certainly altered the course of war in Vietnam and the future of how conflicts are fought afterward.

Dynoman said:

...Crossing the 'nuclear threshold' would have certainly altered the course of war in Vietnam and the future of how conflicts are fought afterward.

Click to expand...

That question may have already been answered by Stuart Slade in his blog/essay "The Nuclear Game"
( https://gist.github.com/benders/141611 )

"..Every so often, the question gets asked "How could the US have won in Vietnam?" with a series of
replies that include invading the North,extending the bombing to China and other dramatic escalations
of the conflict. Now, it should be obvious why such suggestions could not, in the real world, be contemplated.
The risk of ending up in a nuclear war was too great"

I don't think at all, that this theme in itself is demanding to be locked, or not to be discussed here. It's just,
that such discussion quite often are lacking necessary prudence and politeness after only few posts !
So, put us right about those former experiences !

An interesting topic of course but out of the forum lines.

I think the discussion of the secret JASON project and the Vietnam War, or the theoretical application of TNW's to N. Vietnamese targets relates to the forum topic of 'Alternative History.' When addressing the idea of 'Future Speculation,' imagine a world in which the US, having decided to use TNW in Vietnam, would have to contend with the consequences of having been the only nation to use nuclear weapons in war.

The approach towards a discussion on TNW in Vietnam might be conducted as one would Operation Downfall- the plan for an invasion of Empirial Japan by a massive amphibious assault (but instead used two atomic bombs) or Operation Vulture to rescue the French at Dien Bien Phu using American B-29 raids.

History:
North Vietnam's economy is taking severe blows from the aerial bombing campaigns in 1966-1967. The three parties in the Communist regime were at odds as how to continue prosecuting the war. Many of the party members favored moving towards a position of peaceful coexistance with the south, however, there were those within the party that favored continued military campaigns in the south (Beijing advocated Moaist guerilla war fearing that they could be drawn into the conflict if the N. Vietnamese engaged in a convetional war in the south). Knowing that they could not defeat the US by using conventional forces the Communist planned a strategy of protracted guerilla war to wear down US forces. A planned offensive in the south against towns and cities developed and a buildup began in the fall of 1967. In January of 1968 200,000 troops from N. Vietnam had moved down the HCMT system to the south and prepared for the invasion. On January 30, 1968 the first wave of VC/NVA attacks take place. By the end of the offensive 14,000 are killed and 24,000 wounded.

The Tet Offensive was a turning point in the war. Many America's believed the war was unwinable or at least would be a protracted conflict ending in a stalemate. General Westmoreland asks for 100,000 more American troops and President Johnson looks for a strategy from the new Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford (McNamara's replacement in 1968). Clifford decides that de-escalation and a negotiated peace is the best approach to ending the war and halts bombing campaign in the north.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tet_Offensive

Alternative History:
Viewing the Tet Offensive as a large scale invasion effort (and popularized as such through the media), Clifford is given the plan to use a TNW to strike the HCMT and block any addtional troop movement south. Seeing that the North's industrial capacity is crippled and that most of N. Vietnams weapons are coming from Russia and China, through port cities and a few railways, he authorizes the strike on these rails through mountain passes. A campaign of combined arms of conventional weapons (e.g. B-52's, F-105's, A-6's) against major harbors (e.g. Hai Phong, Cat Bai) are also authorized.

N. Vietnamese reaction- NVA forces fall back to rebuild N. Vietnamese infrastructure. Party officials seek assistance from its allies to arm themselves with TNW's. Russia, who advocated negotiations for coexistance, remains steady on its policy. China, who advocated military strikes in the south and who did not want to get in to a conflict with the US advocates negotiation.

US and World Reaction- Condemnation of the US for the use of TNW against a 'low-tech' foe. The US indicates that the primary targets of TNW were not population centers but the HCMT and mountain passes. The harbors were destroyed by conventional attacks. The US signals that the war is nearing an end with the destruction of the N. Vietnamese industrial complexes and its allied military logistics network.

CIA paper on scenarios for the use of TNW in Vietnam.

CIA scenarios for using TNW in North Vietnam. Scenario (C) an invasion from the north by PLVN and Chinese forces maybe characterized by the Tet Offensive.

General Westmoreland had an alternative strategy for the course of the war following Tet. He believed that the destruction of N. Vietnam's logistical infrastructure (i.e. flow of weapons and supplies from China (via rail and port) and Russia (primarily via port)) anlong the HCMT would allow the US options. In the past the two primary options appears to have been to bomb N. Vietnam to the point of submission and negotiation or an invasion of the North by US troops.

Westmorelands alternate strategy, developed with General Wheeler, comprised a false amphibious assault near Vinh, just north of the DMZ. This may draw forces and supplies towards the coast and off the HCMT. In the meantime, Westmoreland would commit troops to cut off the HCMT, extending the DMZ across Laos. His proposal was not submitted to the Johnson administration or JCS when the President sought de-escalation, especially after his March 31, 1968 speech announcing de-escalation, halting of B-52 strikes and his decision not to run for re-election.

On October 10, 1969, Nixon sends a secret signal to the Soviets by having his generals place all of their nuclear assets on a "readiness alert" status. The signal was intended to notify them that the US was about to do something that the world would condemn and the retribution from which may escalate to all out nuclear war.


Known as the "Madman Theory," Nixon's advisers believed that the signal would force Moscow to pressure Hanoi into a negotiated peace or suffer the consequences of a full scale bombing of North Vietnam or the use of tactical nuclear weapons in SEA.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madman_theory

I'll get the book. Thank you for your post, Dynoman.

The results of Operation Blowdown, conducted in Australia by a joint Australia, British, and American team, primarily for use in Indonesia in 1963, was used in the assessments for the possible use of TNW in Vietnam.

http://aso.gov.au/titles/sponsored-films/operation-blowdown/clip1/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Blowdown

"Nixon's Nuclear Specter" won't be published until June 7, 2015?

Triton, thats correct. I have "Nixon's War" by Kimball, who has co-authored "Nixon's Nuclear Spector" which will be out this summer. The book will delve into the specifics of the nuclear gamble that Nixon and Kissinger played with the Soviets in order to pressure Hanoi to the table. "Nixon's War" looked at the character of both Nixon and Kissinger and how they shaped US foreign policy and developed the Madman theory. The actual implementation of the Madman Theory is to be covered in "Nixon's Nuclear Spector."

Just looking at the impact of a TNW, such as a B61 that could have been used during that era, I went to Nukemap to determine the scale of the impact on the Ho Chi Minh Trail south of Vinh, near the DMZ.
Using a B61 with a yield of 34kT air burst (approximately 7,000 ft AGL), the casualty rate was 10,230 fatalities and 23,510 injuries.

Note: The small radius is the Fireball Radius, grey is the Air Blast Radius, and the larger radius is the Thermal Radiation Radius.

You can find blast radius information at:
http://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/

The method of delivery could be a lofting technique as seen in the video below:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3dIqfN_aPtY

You can't separate the use of TNW in this war from the potential geopolitical consequences, which were huge. The B-52 force would, if concentrated, probably have been more than capable of delivering an equivalent level of deforestation. The use of TNW would only have served as a political demonstration of how serious the US was about winning the war. Compare Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which IIRC were actually less devastating in terms of lives lost and area destroyed than the firebombing of Tokyo. The effectiveness of nuclear weapons there was not in terms of the destruction wrought, but the fact that it was done by a single airplane with a single weapon in the blink of an eye (the lingering effects of nuclear weapons didn't come into it in that particular context; the Japanese capitulated too soon thereafter).


Even if the USSR and China had chosen not to make a nuclear response, you can bet that the political backlash at home would have been unsurvivable - led (as it would have been) by people willing to conveniently ignore the existence, effectiveness and complexity of the NV air defence network (and the identity of the nations which had supplied and built its component parts) in favour of a "peasant guerrillas vs Imperialists" narrative.

Somewhere in a blog or site about the Davy Crockett nuclear bazooka there is reference to it being part of the Orbat of a US Division sent to Vietnam and the confusion that it was feared some might have been sent with the Division. Little John a system like that later Lance which could be helicopter carried was another component of 60s US Divisions.
The nuclear demolition munitions (SADMs and MADMs) were only deployed in Korea and West Germany but I suppose that might have found a place in a "limited nuclear war".
US experience of fighting the Chinese in Korea I suspect was a good reason alone for keeping the Vietnam War a limited one.

Pathology_doc, I agree a sustained conventional bombing offensive against North Vietnam's infrastructure would probably have been militarily decisive and the discussion of TNW made completely unnecessary. If TNW's had been used the political backlash in the US would most likely have resulted in a resounding cry for Johnson's or Nixon's impeachment. The international response would have been equally detrimental to US foreign affairs as international partners would have shrunk from joint civil and military projects or in their support for future US military campaigns. The propaganda coup for Russia and China would also have been immeasurable as the US would have been viewed as an aggressor that is willing to destroy small-emerging nations for its own benefit.


It is interesting to note that in later interviews with NV general's Vo Nguyen Giap and Bui Tin, the communist military leaders thought that an unrestricted bombing campaign of Hanoi would have brought them to the negotiation table earlier in the conflict. They also believed that severing the HCMT, as Westmoreland had planned in 1968 with his request for 200,000 additional troops to do so, would have crippled their efforts to launch offensives in to the south.


http://www.snopes.com/quotes/giap.asp


Conventional bombing campaigns, agent defoliation, and other methods used to attack the HCMT system were viewed as ineffective by the North Vietnamese generals and that the only effective means would have involved an extension of the DMZ through Laos. The use of TNW's against the HCMT to physically clear areas may have aided in the defense of the DMZ, but the political price to pay would make it unfathomable. However, from most of the accounts that I have read, it wasn't the public condemnation of the act of using TNW's, it was the counter attacks from the VC using Russian or Chinese portable TNW's against 14 primary US bases in South Vietnam. According to the Jason Division document, this counter-attack would essentially "annihilate" US forces in South Vietnam.


UK 75, although no nuclear weapons were deployed to Vietnam (including Davy Crockett), the Marines did bring, in March of 1965, howitzers capable of firing a nuclear-tipped rounds. In 1963 an increase in the number of US off shore deployments of nuclear weapons to Guam, Okinawa, the Philippines, and Taiwan grew to about 2,400 by 1967. US Navy aircraft carriers also had a small stockpile of TNW's aboard ship in the region. The primary target for these TNW's were China in the event of an invasion (OPLAN 39-65) of Vietnam.


The concerns over China entering the war was the largest obstacle for American strategist in planning a North Vietnam offensive. China had an estimated 25,000-45,000 Chinese troops in North Vietnam providing air defense training and manning AAA sites in the north. The Chinese were so concerned about loosing North Vietnam (i.e. as a buffering nation to US or democratic expansion towards the border of China) and the military threat that it would present that the Chinese moved its factories away from the coast and into the mountains to frustrate an American attack.


http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/chinesesupport.aspx


Prior to 1975, the USSR believed that the North Vietnamese would be unable to defeat the south, so long as American support continued. Hence, Moscow repeatedly pushed for Hanoi to negotiate a peace deal with the US in order to stabilize the region and make gains along ideological fronts. After the fall of Saigon, the Soviets were emboldened by the lack of commitment that American policy makers had in countering communist expansionism, which ultimately drew America in to conflicts by proxy in Afghanistan, Africa, and Latin America.

Both American administrations had little or no understanding of the region. And the thousand years of political and military history that tended drive the majority of the players in that conflict.
The Americans completely misread China and their support for North . Apparently it never occurred to them that the war in Korea had a completely different set of strategic circumstances that drove it.

Fact is that LBJ and Nixon at some points did thought of tac nukes to try and end the Vietnam nightmare. There was a story about an operation FRACTURED JAW on the Internet, dated 1968 so LBJ.
Also in spring 1972 the tac nukes option was briefly examined along with another option of breaking the dams and flood the countryside. In the end they picked mining of the ports and Linebacker I and II.

Archibald said:

Fact is that LBJ and Nixon at some points did thought of tac nukes to try and end the Vietnam nightmare. There was a story about an operation FRACTURED JAW on the Internet, dated 1968 so LBJ.
Also in spring 1972 the tac nukes option was briefly examined along with another option of breaking the dams and flood the countryside. In the end they picked mining of the ports and Linebacker I and II.

Click to expand...

The problem was, that it could easily lead to even worse nightmare - USSR giving tactical nukes to Vietnam so they could strike back. And since all the gloves would be off, USSR could also give Vietnamese modern interceptors, long-range and low-altitude SAM's, anti-ship cruise missiles to sunk American warships and even short-range ballistic missiles (like SCUD) with nuclear warheads to attack American bases.