Removing Dassault

In 1944 Marcel Bloch was arrested by the Germans and carried off to the Buchenwald concentration plan, from which he was freed in April 1944. At the time he was barely 70 pounds and it's hardly inconceivable that he would have died in the camp. So say that he actually does die.

What are the effects on French and by extensuon European aviation industry after 1945?

Hi Lascaris,


the Aviation in France will drop hard.

Was Dassault personally involved in the design of Ouragan, Mystere and early Mirage or by this point he was having more of an organizational role?

Lascaris said:

Was Dassault personally involved in the design of Ouragan, Mystere and early Mirage or by this point he was having more of an organizational role?

Click to expand...

He was deeply involved in design and motivated his engineers and worker on those projects.
some called him the "Mozart of Aircraft construction" !
and he had the right connections to government to push his projects to completion and sell it to foreign countries.

with no Dassault, the French aerospace would look completely different.
It's likely that Nord Aviation would dominating the french aerospace business.

The other design bureaus of the era were offering similar products to the Dassault lines. What would happen? Somewhat different shapes, probably called Breguet or Nord.

Non-French folk cannot answer this. 7/44: although (to be)AMD was not/almost everything else was Nationalised, almost all the money came from the State (just like in UK). Working folk in France and UK knew that Mother Russia had defeated the Boche. Parties with the word Communist in their name long remained electorally significant (though only French citizens then active may comment on their orientation - to France or to Moscow: Italians will say that, 1950s, if you objected to Parties with the word "Christian", you voted "communist", but PCI was firstly Italian).


Although a plethora of jet combat projects (no prospective enemy other than USSR) was funded in the Nationalised sector after 1945, AMD won almost everything except Vautour. A reason might be that communist influence on the production shop floor was less than in the Nords and Suds. Remember that in 1938 AdlA chose to fund Consolidated to do the Baku Bomber (to be B-24) rather than place it with seething Red beds.


By outbreak of Korea, France was already facing (apparently Sino-Soviet inspired/funded) pain in Cochin China: shop floor workforces seemed happy to build US-funded combat types under licence (Sud Aquilon - no other purpose than to bombard Uncle Ho; Sud Mistral, ditto Uncle Joe). If D'assault had not been there…I presume the Bordeaux site would have been, within an SN, would have bid, and won something. AMD had a fair share of Communautes: would tubby Mirage have become Mirage III without him (then Serge)? Qui ne le sait?

Qui sait, indeed?


I could be wrong, but I believe that Marcel Dassault's winning most military bids at the time had more to do with his influence and connections than because of the political leanings of the nationalized companies' workforce.

Lascaris said:

In 1944 Marcel Bloch... So say that he actually does die. What are the effects on French and by extension European aviation industry after 1945?

Click to expand...

I'll have to go back and re-read the "X-planes of Europe" book, but it would be tempting to posit the entry into military service of some of France's more oddball projects, e.g. ramjet and rocket-based fighters.


Also, with Dassault out of the picture, Anglo-French co-operation takes on a whole new face, with the possibility of the British leading. IMO the French were able to exert their muscle in such things as AFVG because Dassault had a proven track record of building good airplanes and had built credibility. Take that away, and the game changes radically. Hypothetically it could open the field for the entry to service of some British projects that never made it IRL. At the very least, those aircraft which actually started down a physical production line before they got canned (e.g. thin-wing Javelin, SR.177, P.1121) might have got a guernsey in some form or other, and maybe even TSR.2???

So lets revisit this, with 8 years passing. Marcel Bloch has met a tragic fate at Buchenwald. What happens to the French aircraft industry after 1944. Do Potez and Breguet fill up the void? Do the public companies end up running the show? How much of an independent aircraft industry as opposed to one more variant of Britain/Germany/Italy doing mostly joint European projects does France end up with?

Some idle thoughts of mine. Post 1958/59 or so Breguet seems to me well set to provide an alternative to the early Mirages. Br.1120 in place of Mirage III should work and gradual improvements of the basic design carry you to the early 1980s, start with the basic Atar 9 Br.1120 in place of Mirage III, follow this up with a Atar 9K50 variant as Mirage F1 then a M53 variant with FBW as Mirage F1E/Mirage 2000. Maybe SO.4062 in the Mirage IV role? (Breguet had Br.1180 as an alternative?) But that is in the late 50s and I'm hardly certain there were good alternatives to Ouragan/Mystere/Super Mystere earlier on... some Taon variant in place of Mystere maybe? I'd be unsurprised to see just more Mistrals and Aquilons, the licence built Vampire/Sea Venom eating up the Ouragan/Mystere niche.

Thoughts?

Statesmen-funders of Defence capability are not techno-, but are sovereignty-centric. We should look at this through those eyes.

Received narrative in UK is that US 8/46 McMahon Act stole our Bomb. It also, then, stole Canada's Bomb (ZEEP/Chalk River), and France's (Joliot-Curies). UK narrative is that Ike amended it to permit UK data access 7/58 under a pang of guilt, but then denied France that access.
So, annoyed, CDG did his solo Force de Frappe and Dassault flourished.

But, no. Statesmen don't lose sleep in 1958 over an Ally being upset by (perceived) disrespect in 1946. Ike had consigned McMahon to Archive immediately on his Inauguration, 1/53. Its purpose had been to put use of AW in President's hands, not Macarthur's or LeMay's.
In Ike's time USAEC lost all* AW custody and Commanders acquired them.

Suez, 11/56, was a lesson read differently in UK and France. New (10/1/57) UK PM Macmillan inherited a glacially-slow, uncapped-cost AW programme. He chose to abandon expensive AW Independence and to target-integrate Bomber Command and USAF/SAC, 1/7/58. The Mutual Defense Agreement, 4/8/58 gave UK selected AW data access.

New (1/6/58) French PM CDG inherited a paused AW programme; 17/6/58 assigned it Highest National Priority, and 17/9/58 tried to join the Anglos' AW Directorate. Denied, he pressed on solo, giving "absolute priority" 3/59 to AN-11/Mirage IVA. In 10/62 "US agreed to sell France (a PWR reactor)”, INS, tools for rocket motors, (K)C-135F. Weapon design data passed to CEA/DAM. J.Newhouse,Nuclear Age, Joseph,89,P324; I.Clark,Nuc.Diplomacy, Clarendon,94,P405. If only that had been agreed in 1958.

If...Ike had not (appeared to have) spurned CDG, 17/6/58 but had sought a repeat of UK's agreement to assign AW to NATO "save where (supreme) national interests are at stake”, then: France could have bought/licensed US delivery platforms for, either, US dual key weapons, like FRG and others did, or have gallified US Bomb designs, to much economic benefit. No Mirage IVA. No AMD dominance.

(*amended 15/6/22: by 6/59 USAEC: 3,968 weapons, DoD 8,337. fas.org/nuke/norris/nuc_11309901a_010.)

I have a trio of books and some more readings related to that 1957-1963 French nuclear bargain. All I can say is that the French
a) tried very hard to convince the americans to pass them nuclear tech, with little to none results
b) tried very hard to screw the british in passing US nuclear secrets of every kind (H*bomb to reentry vehicles, missile tech, solid fuel, and the kitchen sink - also to no avail, because the 1958 agreement locked everything)
c) tried very hard to screw NATO and enlist Germany and Italy and whoever else interested, into a non-NATO nuclear alliance
In the end all the above failed and the French mostly did it alone, until 1962-63 at least and all the "gifts" detailed in the post above.

Even the Blue Streak move into ELDO and Europa was a bit suspect. The French at some point clearly tried a trojan approach were ELDO was to be merely an "entry door" to grab Blue Streak and run away with its technology. Even if partially obsolete as an IRBM (LOX boiled away and had to be constantly replenished outside silos for 15 minutes - no such time in WWIII) Blue Streak would have provided an interim capability to Force de Frappe, essentially an IRBM ten years before the Plateau d'Albion S-3 IRBMs, circa 1971 so 1961 - imagine.

Ten years down the line in 1966-67 when the Chinese detonated their H-bomb while the French were stuck with the wrong way of doing and military disinterest - the British passed them some tips not locked by the 1958 US agreement: very much their own 1957 H-bomb, the one detonated in Montebello island. This allowed the french to detonate Canopus late august 1968 - 15 months after the chinese went thermonuclear, in June 1967.
(hell of an effort: the French had nearly a 5-year headstart for A-bomb, February 1960 versus October 1964. Yet the Chinese left them in the dust and went thermonuclear in less than three years, stunning the entire world. Even more since they were being trapped in the worst era of the Maoist foolishness, the Cultural Revolution)

Archibald said:

I have a trio of books and some more readings related to that 1957-1963 French nuclear bargain. All I can say is that the French
a) tried very hard to convince the americans to pass them nuclear tech, with little to none results
b) tried very hard to screw the british in passing US nuclear secrets of every kind (H*bomb to reentry vehicles, missile tech, solid fuel, and the kitchen sink - also to no avail, because the 1958 agreement locked everything)
c) tried very hard to screw NATO and enlist Germany and Italy and whoever else interested, into a non-NATO nuclear alliance

Click to expand...

I am actually interested what this might have entailed. Was De Gaulle willing to give the Italians or for that matter the Germans their own bombs?

Why do people expect Nord and not Sud to get significant orders? The Gerfaut is kind of interesting I guess and of course there are their crazy ramjet projects. But that pales to Suds output with the S.E.5003, SO.6000, SO.6020 and SO.9000. Though without Dassault we would obviously see even more projects.

Lascaris said:

I am actually interested what this might have entailed. Was De Gaulle willing to give the Italians or for that matter the Germans their own bombs?

Click to expand...

Definitely not the Germans. Italians, maybe.

R_K_M said:

Why do people expect Nord and not Sud to get significant orders? The Gerfaut is kind of interesting I guess and of course there are their crazy ramjet projects. But that pales to Suds output with the S.E.5003, SO.6000, SO.6020 and SO.9000. Though without Dassault we would obviously see even more projects.

Click to expand...

The first obvious problem IMO is that there is no good replacement for Ouragan and Mystere till... something like Breguet Taon gets designed which means roughly the mid 1950s. So what does this imply in practical terms? First much increased production of Sud Mistral and Sud Aquilon, that is license built De Havilland Vampire and Sea Venom respectively. Second that the AdA will be getting F-86 after all it got F-86D and F-100 even in OTL and quite possibly license producing it. Which may well be happening in the late monsieur Bloch's plants which with him dead would be part of... Sud.

Which brings you around 1956 with Sud Vatour being the first French designed combat jet to be mass produced along a Breguet "Super-Taon" as the first post war French designed fighter in mass production? By this point French aviation industry should be finding back its stride, Breguet Br.1120 is an obvious replacement for Mirage III and its descendants. But what of Mirage IV? SO.4062 Super Vatour makes as much sense as Breguet Br.1180...

My pecking order for "best outside Dassault" would be
- Breguet
- SNCASO (Sud Aviation later)
- SCAN (Nord Aviation later)
- SNCASE (Sud Aviation later)

As for "best supersonic jets outside Dassault"
- SNCASO 4060 heavy fighter
- Breguet 1100 / 1200 series
- SNCASE Durandal wasn't too bad

Lascaris said:

The first obvious problem IMO is that there is no good replacement for Ouragan and Mystere till... something like Breguet Taon gets designed which means roughly the mid 1950s. So what does this imply in practical terms? First much increased production of Sud Mistral and Sud Aquilon, that is license built De Havilland Vampire and Sea Venom respectively. Second that the AdA will be getting F-86 after all it got F-86D and F-100 even in OTL and quite possibly license producing it. Which may well be happening in the late monsieur Bloch's plants which with him dead would be part of... Sud.

Which brings you around 1956 with Sud Vatour being the first French designed combat jet to be mass produced along a Breguet "Super-Taon" as the first post war French designed fighter in mass production? By this point French aviation industry should be finding back its stride, Breguet Br.1120 is an obvious replacement for Mirage III and its descendants. But what of Mirage IV? SO.4062 Super Vatour makes as much sense as Breguet Br.1180...

Click to expand...

Right, the early fighters of Dassault are the real problem here. Licensing foreign designs is one option. The SO.6020 apparently sucked, but if france decides that they really want an indigenous fighter in the early 50s, Sud is the only one having any experience designing one and are the obvious ones to go to.