The Biggest Blunders in WW2 Aviation History

Sounds like an ex post facto explanation.

Rifle-calibre (.303 Enfield) medium machine guns had proven "good enough" against pre-war, fabric-covered biplanes, so the RAF just stuck with tradition, bolting more and more .30 calibre MGs to airplanes.


Before the war, Vickers had developed a .50 HMG, (12.7 x 81 mm) but only sold it to the Royal Navy, where it proved ineffective against modern, all-metal aircraft. The RN then ordered 20 mm AA rapid-firing cannons. That ineffectiveness may have been the start of the RAF's bias against Browning .50.

After .30 proved its limited killing power during the Battle of Britain, the RAF started installing 20 mm cannons in Hurricanes and Spitfires and all subsequent fighters.

The primary reason for retaining .30 MGs in turrets is that they were lighter, shorter and quicker to turn.
Consider that an entire Browning Model 1919 firing .30 cal. is in the 35 pound range, while a Browning .50 cal.(barrel and receiver) weighs more like 92 pounds.
 
The RAF knew before WW2 started that the .303 was inadequate, that was the point of F.37/35 and B.1/39, to provide fighters and bombers respectively equipped with cannon. It had also been planned to fit the Mk.II versions of the Manchester, Stirling and Halifax with two twin 20mm cannon turrets.

Unfortunately war intervened; weight growth in the existing bombers made fitting Hispano turrets impractical and B.1/39 was cancelled. A new scheme to fit .50 gun turrets was scuppered by a shortage of guns (the archive evidences talks of plans to buy the FN .50 factory in Belgium) whilst other up-arming schemes, such as installing a quad .303 mid-upper on the Stirling and Lancaster, on the heavy bombers were prevented by complaints about weight growth (in particular CoG) and the problems with rejigging factories for what were substantial structural changes just as emphasis was on increasing production.

There were some who claimed that the concentrated high RoF fire of the quad .303 tail turret would be as effective as a twin .50 cal at night engagement ranges in 1940; however many myths still existed in RAF senior officer circles in 1940.
 
riggerrob said:
Sounds like an ex post facto explanation.

Rifle-calibre (.303 Enfield) medium machine guns had proven "good enough" against pre-war, fabric-covered biplanes, so the RAF just stuck with tradition, bolting more and more .30 calibre MGs to airplanes.


Before the war, Vickers had developed a .50 HMG, (12.7 x 81 mm) but only sold it to the Royal Navy, where it proved ineffective against modern, all-metal aircraft. The RN then ordered 20 mm AA rapid-firing cannons. That ineffectiveness may have been the start of the RAF's bias against Browning .50.

After .30 proved its limited killing power during the Battle of Britain, the RAF started installing 20 mm cannons in Hurricanes and Spitfires and all subsequent fighters.

The primary reason for retaining .30 MGs in turrets is that they were lighter, shorter and quicker to turn.
Consider that an entire Browning Model 1919 firing .30 cal. is in the 35 pound range, while a Browning .50 cal.(barrel and receiver) weighs more like 92 pounds.
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The RAF didn't use .30cal machine guns...
 
one of my pet theories is that the British went down to the smallest caliber available to be able to fire massive numbers of bullets from maximum range and depend on claimed efficiency of incendiary rounds being developed . Practically because Dowding took B-17 as a yardstick and assumed it would have 20 mm cannon in the back and that might have radar control as well ... Also leading to those convulated airshow moves with 3 plane sections wingtip to wingtip covering maximum volume .
 
The concentration of fire tactics for bombers in tight three aircraft formations, also partly the same reason for the quad tail turrets, was the product of a belief in some quarters that only attacks from astern were likely. Even mid-upper turrets were considered unnecessary by some as they were regarded primarily as a beam defence mechanism. The tactics were actually used in combat in 1939.

The choice of the .303 was just a holdover from the pre-war period, the weapon was regarded as sufficiently effective prior to the widespread use of armour, amoured glass and self-sealing fuel tanks. Once those became commonplace the RAF knew it needed heavier weapons and the process was underway to equip the next generation of bombers with 20mm Hispano's prior to the outbreak of war.
 
Kadija_Man said:
riggerrob said:
Sounds like an ex post facto explanation.

Rifle-calibre (.303 Enfield) medium machine guns had proven "good enough" against pre-war, fabric-covered biplanes, so the RAF just stuck with tradition, bolting more and more .30 calibre MGs to airplanes.


Before the war, Vickers had developed a .50 HMG, (12.7 x 81 mm) but only sold it to the Royal Navy, where it proved ineffective against modern, all-metal aircraft. The RN then ordered 20 mm AA rapid-firing cannons. That ineffectiveness may have been the start of the RAF's bias against Browning .50.

After .30 proved its limited killing power during the Battle of Britain, the RAF started installing 20 mm cannons in Hurricanes and Spitfires and all subsequent fighters.

The primary reason for retaining .30 MGs in turrets is that they were lighter, shorter and quicker to turn.
Consider that an entire Browning Model 1919 firing .30 cal. is in the 35 pound range, while a Browning .50 cal.(barrel and receiver) weighs more like 92 pounds.
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The RAF didn't use .30cal machine guns...

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I stand corrected. Both versions of the Browning Model 1919 look the same from the outside.

Further research reveals that RAF MGs fired British .303 ammo (7.7 x 56 mm).

In comparison, US forces fired Browning Model 1919 chambered for .30-06 ammo (7.62 x 64 mm). Tactically the two calibres were equally accurate and deadly.

I have fired American .30 and 7.62 x 51 mm NATO ammo through different versions of Browning Model 1919.

What calibre of Browning Model 1919 was installed in British AFVs?
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JFC Fuller said:
1939.

The choice of the .303 was just a holdover from the pre-war period, the weapon was regarded as sufficiently effective prior to the widespread use of armour, amoured glass and self-sealing fuel tanks.
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the recent Osprey title on F4U vs Ki-84 states the Japanese were content with twin machine guns now that if they killed the enemy pilot in the dogfight there was no further need for heavier terminal effects .
 
riggerrob said:
What calibre of Browning Model 1919 was installed in British AFVs?
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.30cal. They came part and parcel as part of the CES for the vehicles they were attached to, provided under Lend-Lease from the US Army. After about 1955 they were converted to 7.62x51mm NATO.
 
The Royal Canadian Air Force's biggest blunder was continuing to train air gunners after they had been rendered obsolete by the introduction of Mosquito. A pair of Mosquitos could carry the same tonnage of bombs as a single Lancaster, but risk far fewer crew-members: 2 + 2 in Mosquitos versus 7 or more in a Lancaster.
Bomber Command casualties sometimes equaled casualties among WW1 trench-fighters!
Shocking casualties!

The RCAF's other blunder was slowly shifting production from British patterns and methods to American methods. At the start of WW2, Canadian factories were frustrated by how slowly drawings and specialized production tooling arrived from the UK. During early war years, Canadian factories struggled to learn how to build: Avro, deHavilland, Handley-Page, Hawker, Fairey, Westland, etc. Airplanes, but by the end of the war, Canadian factories were building airplanes under license from Consolidated, Curtiss, Fairchild, Grumman, etc

It was part of a much-larger process that saw Canadian industry shift from British patterns to American patterns.
 
For the Germans biggest blunder was not making the he-006 jet engine and the db-604 engine.
 
riggerrob said:
The Royal Canadian Air Force's biggest blunder was continuing to train air gunners after they had been rendered obsolete by the introduction of Mosquito. A pair of Mosquitos could carry the same tonnage of bombs as a single Lancaster, but risk far fewer crew-members: 2 + 2 in Mosquitos versus 7 or more in a Lancaster.
Bomber Command casualties sometimes equaled casualties among WW1 trench-fighters!
Shocking casualties!
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I'd be interested in seeing a Mosquito successfully carry a Tall Boy or a Grand Slam bomb...

The naivity in the Mosquito versus Lancaster argument assumes that everyhing the Lancaster could carry would fit into a Mosquito. I've just provide two examples which couldn't.

The Mosquito was an excellent aircraft but it was never intended to be a heavy bomber. Don't get the two roles mixed up, please!

The RCAF's other blinder was slowly shifting production from British patterns and methods to American methods. At the start of WW2, Canadian factories were frustrated by how slowly drawings and specialized production tooling arrived from the UK. During early war years, Canadian factories struggled to learn how to build: Avro, deHavilland, Handley-Page, Hawker, Fairey, Westland, etc. Airplanes, but by the end of the war, Canadian factories were building airplanes under license from Consolidated, Curtiss, Fairchild, Grumman, etc
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It might have helped if the Canadians learnt to speak and write English, rather than American. The correct term is "aeroplane" not "airplane"... ;)
 
JFC Fuller said:
Telling then that they spent the most of the war progressively up-arming their fighters.
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the split between their Army and the Navy is always amazing and the Zero was rather heavily armed compared the Oscar , though one could just barely argue that it would have worked if they could remain behind the Allied fighters to keep pouring lead into the cockpit .

and allow me to say that the 3.5 Mosquitos need 3.5 pilots to that lonely guy in the Lancaster . The debate then presumably becomes one of 3.5 Mosquitos survive far often than a Lancaster and the required pool of pilots could be realized .
 
Granted, Mosquitos were not heavy bombers on a parity Lancasters. Mosquitos carried fewer bombs, but they suffered far fewer casualties.

USAAF medium bombers (B-25 Mitchell and B-26 Marauder) suffered lower casualties than heavies (B-17 Flying Fortress and B-24 Liberator).

I was more concerned by casualties among heavy bomber crews' navigators, bombardiers, radio-operators, flight engineers and air gunners.
My family lent three brothers to the RCAF, but only one returned home after the war. The navigator died. The bombardier drowned. Only the pilot survived.
 
riggerrob said:
Granted, Mosquitos were not heavy bombers on a parity Lancasters. Mosquitos carried fewer bombs, but they suffered far fewer casualties.

USAAF medium bombers (B-25 Mitchell and B-26 Marauder) suffered lower casualties than heavies (B-17 Flying Fortress and B-24 Liberator).

I was more concerned by casualties among heavy bomber crews' navigators, bombardiers, radio-operators, flight engineers and air gunners.
My family lent three brothers to the RCAF, but only one returned home after the war. The navigator died. The bombardier drowned. Only the pilot survived.
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To give context medium bombers would have typically gone up against less well defended targets, spent less time exposed to enemy defences due to their shallower penetration into defended airspace, and had stronger fighter escorts due to their range being more comparable to a typical single engineer fighter, as versus the heavies.

Using medium bombers on the same missions as the heavies (presuming it was technically feasible) would have seen the loss rate of the medium bombers mount alarmingly.

The Mossie was a great aircraft but it could only be a complement not replacement for the Lancaster, both fine but very different aircraft. The Lancaster was very much the supperior bomb-truck of the European theatre; stronger enphasis on mosquitos as intruders going after German night fighters and their bases and earlier commencement of the campaigne against Germany's oil may have helped cut RAF night bombing losses earlier but the simple facts of doing this difficult task at night, in bad weather etc. was always likely to produce higher losses from non-combat causes.
 
Arjen said:
The Luftwaffe lost hundreds of the transport aircraft used to deliver the paratroopers when invading the Netherlands. I've read somewhere - can't remember where - this seriously hurt Germany's ability to deploy paratroopers.
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This is described in 'Blue skies, Orange wings. The Global Reach of Dutch Aviation in War and Peace, 1914-1945' by Ryan K. Noppen.

In 5 days, the Dutch air force and AAA destroyed 328 aircraft including 220 transports and damaged a further 200. The loss of transport capacity would 'cripple the Luftwaffe for the next year' and was a factor in postponing the invasion of the UK.
A year later, during the invasion of Crete, the Luftwaffe suffered similar losses. The combination led to there being e.g. no paratroops dropped on Stalingrad to support general Paulus' troops.

Noppen spreekt van een ‘tactisch succes voor Duitsland, maar tegen hoge kosten, en uitmondend in een strategisch falen’. Tijdens die vijf meidagen schakelde Nederland 528 Luftwaffe-toestellen tijdelijk of permanent uit: de hélft van de hele luchtvloot die Berlijn in de strijd had geworpen. Er zijn 328 volledig verwoest (37 gevechts-, 52 bombardeer-, 220 transport- en 19 overige vliegtuigen). Vooral het enorme verlies aan transportkracht verlamde de Luftwaffe bijna een jaar lang. Dit echoode de hele oorlog door. Zo waren de verliezen een belangrijke factor in Hitlers beslissing om voorlopig Engeland maar te laten voor wat het was; de Führer beschikte niet meer over voldoende luchttransport.

Een jaar later, in mei 1941, verliest de nog niet herstelde Luftwaffe nog eens hetzelfde volume aan transportkracht, bij de invasie van Kreta. Dit dubbele verlies, bij de Slag om Rotterdam en op Kreta, zal funest blijken in 1943. Dan is er niet genoeg luchtslagkracht meer om generaal Paulus’ Zesde Armee bij het Russische Stalingrad te ontzetten. Het verlies aan Fallschirmjäger en andere troepen in de meidagen was zo’n vierduizend. De 22e Luftlande-Division verloor zelfs 42 procent van de officieren en een op de vijf manschappen. Een perplexe luchtmaarschalk Hermann Göring forceerde het bombardement op Rotterdam, tegen het oorlogsrecht in, om weer bij de Führer in het gevlij te komen. Slappelingen waren de Nederlanders in de meimaand van 1940 bepaald niet. Ze hadden alleen minder middelen, en tegen bommen op Rotterdam was geen kruid gewassen.
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Given heavy casualties (50 percent) among Luftwaffe transport airplanes during the invasion of Holland and Crete .....
WI the Luftwaffe learned a different lesson?
WI LW concluded that paratroopers suffered too many casualties ... ergo quit dropping paratroopers one at a time?
WI LW concluded that floatplanes were one of two effective ways to deliver soldiers to battle (example Heinkel 59s landing on a river to capture ridges in Rotterdam)? What sort of transport/assault seaplanes would the LW develop?
Would they have side doors?
Would they have bow doors?
Would they have ramps under the tail?
What other lessons might the LW have learned?
 
Hobbes said:
Arjen said:
The Luftwaffe lost hundreds of the transport aircraft used to deliver the paratroopers when invading the Netherlands. I've read somewhere - can't remember where - this seriously hurt Germany's ability to deploy paratroopers.
Click to expand...

This is described in 'Blue skies, Orange wings. The Global Reach of Dutch Aviation in War and Peace, 1914-1945' by Ryan K. Noppen.

In 5 days, the Dutch air force and AAA destroyed 328 aircraft including 220 transports and damaged a further 200. The loss of transport capacity would 'cripple the Luftwaffe for the next year' and was a factor in postponing the invasion of the UK.
A year later, during the invasion of Crete, the Luftwaffe suffered similar losses. The combination led to there being e.g. no paratroops dropped on Stalingrad to support general Paulus' troops.
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Where they would have just been trapped and killed/captured along with all the rest of Paulus' troops.

Of considerably greater importance was the calling off of Operation Herkules - the invasion of Malta. A combination of the experience of Crete and Rommel's belief that he didn't need Malta, once he'd captured all the supplies he had in Tobruk (on the second time 'round). The result was that Malta remained a thorn in his side and when he was forced to retreat from Second El Alamein, he found his supply situation considerably worse.
 
Continuing on the question of why the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan wasted reseources training aerial gunners .... I researched the types of airplanes used to train aerial gunners: Fairey Battle IT while Boulton Paul Defiants and Westland Lysander towed targets.

Considering that turret-fighters were deemed obsolete by the time France had fallen, why didn't the RAF and Fleet Air Arm simply ship all thier turret fighters to aerial gunnery schools?

Part of the answer lies in the less than 200 Rocs built by Blackburn, so the entire fleet of Rocs (and Skyas) could easily be retired. OTOH 1,064 Defiants were built and many served as target tugs at BCATP schools. 140 Defiant TT Mark IIIs were specifically-built as target-tugs. Though I suspect that was motivated by the need to keep skilled workers gainfully-employed until the next combat airplane design was perfected. Why bother converting Defiants to target tugs when they already had turrets installed?

Why did Fairchild (of Canada) still need to install turrets in dozens (or hundreds) of British-built Fairey Battles?
Why install valuable RR Merlin engines in new-built airframes that were destined to spend their entire careers as trainers?
Did they wear out all the Defiants too early in the war?
Did Defiants use an obscure turret type?
Was it too difficult to retrain young Defiant Aerial gunners for Lancaster or Halifax?

Finally, why was an aircraft as complex as Lysander used to tow targets?
Was it simply a huge surplus of another obsolete airplane?
 
The gunners trained in Canada at the BCATP schools mostly (nearly all) wound up in turrets on multi-engine aircraft. Like 6 Group. Single engine trainers were used because they were available. The Battle had been ordered by the RCAF as early as 1938, in small numbers. Large numbers of Battles were shipped to Canada to start up the BCATP, initially for fighter pilot training, but were found to be useless in this roll. (Couldn't perform aerobatics, for example). Converting Battles to Mk. ITT configuration was cheaper than building new multi-engine types, and used up airframes nobody else in Canada wanted. None of the turreted Battles were intended as gunnery trainers when they were built, they had all been new built as bombers or crew trainers. Several arrived in Canada with battle damage from the French campaign.

The Defiant was built in relatively small numbers, used precious RR engines, and continued in use in the UK, first as night fighters and then as target tugs as the fleet was used up. Introducing a new type in Canada would not have been beneficial.

The Lysander, and the Bolingbroke (which had largely replaced Battles by the end of the war) were, as you suggest, aircraft in production and available, and not much good for anything else. Both used Bristol Mercury engines which had a high failure rate in Canadian weather, but were available. Unlike Merlins. Engine availability was a problem for the RCAF at home throughout the war, and led to large government investments to build up capabilities at P&W Canada. Many of the Canadian built Hurricanes were shipped to the UK without engines, CC&F rotated a small number of available engines amongst the aircraft under test in Canada.
 
riggerrob said:
Was it simply a huge surplus of another obsolete airplane?
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Basically, yes, it was.

TT aircraft should approximate the performance of the real-life, enemy aircraft that the pilots and air gunners are going to be firing against. Which is why many obsolete aircraft ended up in the role.

In the case of the Defiant, it was an excellent design and it fulfilled the role it was designed for very well, the problem was, the role had become outmoded by the time the war rolled around. It was simply too difficult for the pilot to fly the aircraft in an effective manner which would allow the gunner to bring his four .303in guns to bear on his target, whereas the opposition had the easier role, whereby the pilot just aimed his entire aircraft at the target and squeezed off a burst before taking a manoeuvre to avoid the enemy's own guns.

Often, as well, the wheels of bureaucracy take time to work out that an aircraft is no longer needed, whereas gearing up to build a different aircraft takes time. The Defiant's production line was kept open, producing an obsolete aircraft while another aircraft was being decided on, which the production line could build. The British weren't alone in this problem. The US also had it. Look up the P-43 Lancer. An excellent aircraft but there was another one which was better, being worked on, the P-47 Thunderbolt. So, rather than have all the workers sitting on their hands, wasting time and effort, they were put to, to build the P-43, while the problems were worked out of the P-47. The result was several hundred aircraft for which little use could be found, except in China and Australia.

In the real world, things do not change instantly, they require time and effort.
 
Two allied aircraft that immediately come to mind are:
- Brewster F2A Buffalo fighter
- Fairey Battle single-engine light bomber

Both designs designed and purchased on the cheap, sadly and detrimentally for their pilots and crews used against known enemy state-of-the-art enemy fighters and ground defences! :mad:


Regards
Pioneer
 
The awkward situation at the time WWII started was that both aviation technology and aviation tactics were in flux. Also, the belligerents were stuck with the war they were handed instead of the war they planned for. Aircraft that were state of the art a couple years ago were barely adequate, or simply unsuitable for the military situation. If the Defiant were designed with 2 x .50 cal mgs or 2x 20mm cannon, which would have been feasible at the time, it would have been a devastating night interceptor against German bombers. With proper tactics the Whirlwind would have been a wonderful bomber destroyer while the Spits and Hurricanes kept the German fighters at bay. In war, as in comedy, timing is everything.
 
royabulgaf said:
The awkward situation at the time WWII started was that both aviation technology and aviation tactics were in flux. Also, the belligerents were stuck with the war they were handed instead of the war they planned for. Aircraft that were state of the art a couple years ago were barely adequate, or simply unsuitable for the military situation. If the Defiant were designed with 2 x .50 cal mgs or 2x 20mm cannon, which would have been feasible at the time, it would have been a devastating night interceptor against German bombers. With proper tactics the Whirlwind would have been a wonderful bomber destroyer while the Spits and Hurricanes kept the German fighters at bay. In war, as in comedy, timing is everything.
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Yeah, good points!
Please excuse my ignorance, but how maneuverable was the Whirlwind?

Regards
Pioneer
 
Reportedly at lower level very good, in certain situations it could out manoeuvre a Spitfire at low level, however it's performance tail off at altitude due to the underdevelopment of the Peregrine engine. As Royabulgaf says it would have been an excellent bomber destroyer, or even a night fighter with the 4 x 20mm nose cannons.

The earlier introduction of the 20mm on Spitfires and Hurricanes would also have made a massive difference.
 
Thank you JohnR!!

Regards
Pioneer
 
Bill Walker,
The more I research this topic, the more I see the logic. Your comments help fill gaps in my historical knowledge.

For example, CCF installed Rolls-Royce Merlins in their first batch of Hurticanes while later batches were powered by Packard Merlins. I suspect that you rumour -about swapping a small batch of engines - was based on facts from the first batch of CCF Hurricanes.
There was not much point to shipping BP Defiants to Canada because: A not many were built and spare parts would soon become a headache.
For example the first batch of Avro Ansons arrived in Canada minus critical structural boots. North American-sized bolts did not fit.

Secondly a 4-gun turret is over-kill when trainer young gunners. Far more economical to install only 1 - maybe 2 - MGs like the Bristol turrets installed in the Fairey Battles and Bristol Bolingbrokes used by BCATP later in the war.

I wonder what a fresh-sheet gunnery-trainer would look like? One or two turrets on top? Under-hung tail surfaces (inverted U or V)?
Maybe a tail turret nestled in amongst tail surfaces?
Flat-toppled fuselage?
Fixed undercarriage?
Single-engined?
How about a turreted version of the Fleet Fort?
 
riggerrob said:
... How about a turreted version of the Fleet Fort?
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The Fort was underpowered as an intermediate trainer so it would have been a real dog with the extra weight of a turret.

The aborted Anson VI turret trainer - with more than twice the power of a Fort - was probably headed in the right direction. It was expected that 500 would be ordered but only prototype 13881 flew. According to Ken Molson, "the [Bristol Mk.IV] turret did not prove satisfactory and the Anson VI programme was cancelled."
 
Fleet Forts are powered by 330 horsepower Jacobs L6 engines Nd had a power-to-weight ratio of just over 10 pounds per horsepower.
Meanwhile different Marks of Avro Ansons sported a wide variety of radial engines ranging from Cheetahs, Jacobs to Pratt&Whitney R985. The big Pratt' engines developed 450 horsepower.
 
A purpose built gunnery trainer should look like the aircraft the gunner will eventually serve on. Best yet, if money is no option,it should BE the aircraft the gunner will serve on. The Second World War training philosophy of employing progressively more complicated training aircraft lead to lengthy training times, and a wide fleet. Early in the war, for example, a fighter pilot would expect to learn how to fly a Tiger Moth, a Yale, and a Harvard before seeing a fighter. Then he would train in a Hurricane, before moving on to a Spitfire. At the other extreme, today in several countries (Switzerland, Australia, etc) a fighter pilot will fly two aircraft types in their career: a PC-21 turboprop and the F-18. Similar story for other aircrew, where a 2nd WW gunner might go through several types at B&GS, maybe some wireless and nav training at other schools, then an obsolete operational aircraft at the OTU, and finally on to the operational aircraft. Non-pilot aircrew today may go through a few screening flights in something like a Dash 8 or King Air, and then train on a simulator of the intended operational aircraft.

The Anson VI was not further developed for a number of reasons, besides the turret issues. The RCAF had made a decision, early post war, to move to all metal airframes, so the Anson was on its way out. Lots of all metal Vegas, with modern powered turrets, were available from storage. Eventually, when the only operational turrets in the RCAF were a few Lancaster tail turrets, the gunners were trained in Lancasters at the OTU. There was also a conscious decision to move to North American supplied and supported aircraft, so the Bolingbroke continued briefly post war at the Air Armament School at Mountain View, but was replaced with Vegas as quick as they could be overhauled and reconfigured.
 
JohnR said:
Reportedly at lower level very good, in certain situations it could out manoeuvre a Spitfire at low level, however it's performance tail off at altitude due to the underdevelopment of the Peregrine engine. As Royabulgaf says it would have been an excellent bomber destroyer, or even a night fighter with the 4 x 20mm nose cannons.

The earlier introduction of the 20mm on Spitfires and Hurricanes would also have made a massive difference.
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That might overdoing Whirlwind manourvreability somewhat. The evidence held in the UK archives states that the aircraft was less manourvreable than either the Spitfire or Hurricane. It's advantages were the highly concentrated nature of its armament, the excellent pilot visibility and its low altitude speed. There is talk of new tactics having to be developed to exploit the speed advantage and negate the agility disadvantage.

In terms of RAF fighter "blunders" (I am not a fan of the word), selecting the Supermarine Type 312 instead of the Whirlwind may have gone a long way to getting the RAF a better fighter.
 
riggerrob said:
Meanwhile only German and Italian paratroopers clung to the (obsolete) Salvatore harness, long after everyone else converted to modern vertical (e.g. Irvin) harnesses. Salvatore harnesses limited Fallschirmjager weapons to pistols and grenades?
Even Luftwaffe aircrew wore vertical harnesses.
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Sorry, over looked this comment riggerrob

Really good point!
I always thought the German technique of parachuting looked odd (and awkward!!) :eek:
I'll endeavour to look into this "Salvatore harnesses" in more detail!

Regards
Pioneer
 
JFC Fuller said:
JohnR said:
Reportedly at lower level very good, in certain situations it could out manoeuvre a Spitfire at low level, however it's performance tail off at altitude due to the underdevelopment of the Peregrine engine. As Royabulgaf says it would have been an excellent bomber destroyer, or even a night fighter with the 4 x 20mm nose cannons.

The earlier introduction of the 20mm on Spitfires and Hurricanes would also have made a massive difference.
Click to expand...

That might overdoing Whirlwind manourvreability somewhat. The evidence held in the UK archives states that the aircraft was less manourvreable than either the Spitfire or Hurricane. It's advantages were the highly concentrated nature of its armament, the excellent pilot visibility and its low altitude speed. There is talk of new tactics having to be developed to exploit the speed advantage and negate the agility disadvantage.

In terms of RAF fighter "blunders" (I am not a fan of the word), selecting the Supermarine Type 312 instead of the Whirlwind may have gone a long way to getting the RAF a better fighter.
Click to expand...

Considering how over-stretched Supermarine and it's parent company Vickers were by Spitfire production, it might have been a better fighter but the RAF might still have been waiting for it when the Whirlwind was in production. Even Westlands though, found building the Whirlwind a bit of a handful, considering their only previous mass production modern aircraft was the Lysander...

I would suggest going with the Peregrine was the main mistake with the Whirlwind. If they had fitted a Merlin from the get-go, the aircraft would have had much greater potential and could have been more easily upgraded.
 
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Really good point!
I always thought the German technique of parachuting looked odd (and awkward!!) :eek:
I'll endeavour to look into this "Salvatore harnesses" in more detail!

Regards
Pioneer
[/quote]

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Looks like the Italian Salvatore harness was developed from earlier emergency parachutes that were issued to balloonists on both sides of World War One.

I found a photo of an Italian balloonist wearing a French-made "flower pot" parachute.
His harness is based on a wide (4 inches) belt that wraps around his torso at about diaphragm level. His harness has rudimentary shoulder straps and one inch wide leg straps. The leg straps only hold the belt in place because the belt is intended to support the jumpers' weight via D-rings on each side of the belt.
The Salvatore harness solved one problem: line twists, but created another: landing forwards by routing both risers from the wide belt up to a swivel that all he suspension lines were tied to.

Landing forwards on toes-knees-and-nose required German and Italian paratroopers to wear special boots, knee pads and padded gloves to reduce injuries.

Because Hitler was so fascinated by Mussilini, he ordered newly-formed German paratroopers to follow Italian practices, including harness design.

German and Japanese paratroopers followed Italian doctrine by only jumping with small weapons: pistols, grenades and knives. Long arms (Mauser 98 rifles, MG34 and mortars were dropped separately in cylindrical panniers (about 60 centimetres in diameter and a couple of metres long). After too many paratroopers died - before they could retrieve long guns - during the invasion of Crete, the Luftwaffe developed the FG42 rifle so that paratroopers could jump with rifles.
During WW2, WALLY paratroopers only jumped with weapons (pistols, SMGs, full-bore rifles and light machine guns) directly strapped to them, but not rucksacks.

After WW2, NATO and Warsaw Pact paratroopers learned how to jump with rucksacks, rifles, snowshoes, light machine guns, mortars, etc. They reduced landing injuries by lowering heavy stuff on 3 metre lowering-lines.
 
riggerrob said:
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Really good point!
I always thought the German technique of parachuting looked odd (and awkward!!) :eek:
I'll endeavour to look into this "Salvatore harnesses" in more detail!

Regards
Pioneer
Click to expand...

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Looks like the Italian Salvatore harness was developed from earlier emergency parachutes that were issued to balloonists on both sides of World War One.

I found a photo of an Italian balloonist wearing a French-made "flower pot" parachute.
His harness is based on a wide (4 inches) belt that wraps around his torso at about diaphragm level. His harness has rudimentary shoulder straps and one inch wide leg straps. The leg straps only hold the belt in place because the belt is intended to support the jumpers' weight via D-rings on each side of the belt.
The Salvatore harness solved one problem: line twists, but created another: landing forwards by routing both risers from the wide belt up to a swivel that all he suspension lines were tied to.

Landing forwards on toes-knees-and-nose required German and Italian paratroopers to wear special boots, knee pads and padded gloves to reduce injuries.

Because Hitler was so fascinated by Mussilini, he ordered newly-formed German paratroopers to follow Italian practices, including harness design.

German and Japanese paratroopers followed Italian doctrine by only jumping with small weapons: pistols, grenades and knives. Long arms (Mauser 98 rifles, MG34 and mortars were dropped separately in cylindrical panniers (about 60 centimetres in diameter and a couple of metres long). After too many paratroopers died - before they could retrieve long guns - during the invasion of Crete, the Luftwaffe developed the FG42 rifle so that paratroopers could jump with rifles.
During WW2, WALLY paratroopers only jumped with weapons (pistols, SMGs, full-bore rifles and light machine guns) directly strapped to them, but not rucksacks.

After WW2, NATO and Warsaw Pact paratroopers learned how to jump with rucksacks, rifles, snowshoes, light machine guns, mortars, etc. They reduced landing injuries by lowering heavy stuff on 3 metre lowering-lines.
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British paratroopers regularly jumped after about 1943 with rucksacks.
 

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